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PRODUCER: Julia Rooke

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“FILE ON 4”

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O’HALLORAN: Last month a major public inquiry into the murder of two Cambridgeshire schoolgirls exposed gaping holes in the systems for dealing with police intelligence across England and Wales. And Home Secretary David Blunkett demanded the sacking of the Humberside Chief Constable over years of blunders by his force in its dealings with Ian Huntley before he committed the Soham murders.

ACTUALITY OF DAVID BLUNKETT COMMONS STATEMENT, 22nd June 2004

BLUNKETT: Mr Speaker, we know that this must once again be a terrible time for the families of Jessica and Holly. We owe it to them to make substantial progress as rapidly as possible in ensuring that these failures are not repeated ever again. I commend Sir Michael’s report to the House.

O’HALLORAN: Ever since the case of the Yorkshire Ripper, quarter of a century ago, police have known the huge potential of computers in crime detection. But the record of applying that knowledge to police intelligence has been one of disagreement, delay and failure. While forces in Scotland have made big progress over ten years to set up modern, shared information systems, similar ambitions south of the border have got nowhere. Detectives have been left hamstrung by a mish-mash of local intelligence systems – a situation which Soham

O'HALLORAN cont: inquiry chief, Sir Michael Bichard, has told File 4 amounts to 'madness'. So why are the Home Office and police chiefs in England and Wales a decade behind, and who's to blame?

SIGNATURE TUNE

ACTUALITY OF SUE BARNETT WITH PHOTOS

BARNETT: This is quite a nice one of Jane with my son, Michael, when he was about three or four months old. That's a really nice photograph. That's myself and Jane on the beach at Brighton. We were collecting pebbles. That's quite good. Yeah, that's quite sweet.

O'HALLORAN: Sue Barnett, sister of the Brighton music teacher, Jane Longhurst, who went missing in March last year and was found strangled five weeks later. When the killer, Graham Couatts, was jailed for life in February, he was revealed as a user of internet sadism sites. But there was less focus on another aspect of his past. He had been charged, though acquitted, six years earlier with trying to secretly video a woman in a swimming pool changing room – a case which remained unknown to Sussex Police as they probed Jane Longhurst's disappearance and murder. The family endured weeks of agony as they waited for Jane's body to be found. And Sue Barnett believes detectives might have had the killer in the frame and therefore found the body much sooner had they known of the earlier Peeping Tom allegation.

What was your reaction when you heard that information?

BARNETT: Appalled actually. I was surprised that this had, one, taken place and one, not been brought to the attention of the police regarding the investigation against Graham and the murder of my sister. I think it would have got to Graham quicker as he was one of the last one of Jane's alleged friends to see her, so they would have got to him quicker, I believe, and maybe quizzed him a bit more thoroughly than is normal.

O'HALLORAN: What, as far as you are aware, did Sussex Police know about the background of Graham Couatts in terms of their intelligence when they were first questioning him?

BARNETT: They didn't, they didn't.

O'HALLORAN: So they didn't know anything about the previous Peeping Tom case against him, as far as you're aware?

BARNETT: No, no. As far as I am aware, no. I just feel that this needs to be addressed. There are so many cases out there where people are being acquitted and then go on to horrendous crimes and so forth. So I do feel that they should keep a record.

O'HALLORAN: Sussex Police confirm they did not know of the earlier Coutts acquittal until after his murder trial. But they say that since 1999 they now keep information on acquittals indefinitely. All records of criminal convictions should go onto the police national computer. But what happens in other forces to acquittal records and other intelligence which might one day prove crucial in an investigation? Chief Superintendent Rick Naylor of the Police Superintendents' Association, says there's wide variation across the country.

NAYLOR: Normally such records would be kept for possibly about seven years, because the force would be concerned about civil litigation. But also they should be kept from the point of view of criminal intelligence. But that depends on which part of the country you're in, because there's no uniform system.

O'HALLORAN: What questions does that sort of case pose to you, would you say?

NAYLOR: It asks what sort of systems are in being in that particular police force at that particular time, and whether the investigating officers were aware of all the information that the force was actually holding. That is the most important part. I think we all want to see more and more professionalism in the way that we collect, collate and deal with intelligence, because intelligence in the modern police service is its lifeblood. Intelligence is the vital key to solving some of these very very difficult crimes – child abuse and child murders are the most difficult ones to solve.

O'HALLORAN: Back in February, when murderer Graham Couatts was jailed, Sue Barnett had no idea that her concerns about the handling of police intelligence would be echoed, with much greater force, the very next month at the hearings in two police blunders over Soham murderer, Ian Huntley. The Bichard inquiry revealed that Humberside Police had failed to record properly contacts they had had with Ian Huntley over five years. That meant they failed to see and deal with Huntley's developing pattern of sexual offences and assault on teenage girls. But behind that, inquiry chairman Sir Michael Bichard suspected there were widespread misunderstandings among police forces over how long to keep intelligence reports.

BICHARD: We can't say how many records in Humberside were deleted without proper review. We do know that there were a large number. It's said in one place that intelligence was haemorrhaging. I think part of the reason for that is because there wasn't sufficiently clear guidance available for Humberside and other forces to work to. Also ...

O'HALLORAN: And that, and that guidance should have come from where?

BICHARD: Well, ACPO. The chief police officers produce some guidance, because at the present moment we have the potential for 43 forces interpreting the guidance in 43 different ways, and therefore keeping in some places intelligence for a year and other places for two years and other places for ten years.

O'HALLORAN: So the police in Humberside, whatever they did wrong, part of their problem was they didn't have adequate national guidance?

BICHARD: We don't think that the guidance was clear enough. On the other hand we think that Humberside's interpretation of that guidance was not of a standard that you would expect.

O'HALLORAN: But you say in your report the problems in Humberside on all this, which were obviously severe, those problems were not very probably unique to the Humberside force. What do you mean by that?

BICHARD: Well I haven't, as I've said, I haven't done a review of all the police services. I would be surprised if Humberside was the only force that was encountering difficulties in interpreting what guidance there was on record creation, on retention, review and deletion.

O'HALLORAN: The Home Office refused to be interviewed for this programme, but in June responded to Sir Michael's report by pledging a statutory code of practice to standardise police information handling by the end of this year. And that's long overdue, according to a detective who until last year ran the abusive images unit in the Greater Manchester force. Chief Superintendent Terry Jones spent ten years working to protect children from paedophiles. He says that confusion on the ground through lack of correct guidance on the 1998 Data Protection Act caused much valuable intelligence to be junked.

JONES: For the unit that I ran, which was essentially about targeting people through their collection of indecent images of children, I mean our unit had actually been there long before things went digital, it had been there 25 years, and historically we kept computer records, but also alongside those we kept paper records as well, a card index system. And there were snippets of information that, I think when the Data Protection Act came along, that we destroyed through the, I suppose the advice that we were given, the instructions we were given, that I'm sure in the fullness of time, certainly in terms of paedophile activity, would have been invaluable.

O'HALLORAN: The Data Protection Act came along, as you put it, in 1998. What were the tasks that faced you at the time in terms of all your records that were held on paper or on databases or wherever?

JONES: In my particular unit, we had something like 7,500 records about people who had been involved in this world and the world of obscene material. Perhaps some of those records should have been weeded out, but we finished up reducing that total of about 7,500 individuals down to about 150. With the benefit of hindsight, I'm sure that intelligence was lost there.

O'HALLORAN: And by coincidence, that is the kind of time when Humberside Police were deleting, failing to make, getting rid of intelligence that they had on Ian Huntley.

JONES: Yeah, I mean, I think all police forces were faced with this new challenge. Should we be holding this piece of information without proper justification? And it may well be that, you know, some of the babies have been thrown out with the bathwater.

O'HALLORAN: The value of computers in crime detection was forcibly brought home to police in England nearly 25 years ago.

ACTUALITY IN CHAPEL LANE, HEADINGLEY

WALL: This is Chapel Lane, the junction of Chapel Lane and St Martin's Lane in Headingley in Leeds. I was living over there in the Manors, and my friends and I had been in the pub, the local pub, and we'd walked down this route that very night. We subsequently found there had been a very vicious assault by the Yorkshire Ripper on a Malaysian doctor, a Dr Bandura that night.

O'HALLORAN: David Wall returns to an area of Leeds he knew well as a student in 1980. At that time, women in West Yorkshire and beyond lived in fear of one of Britain's most notorious serial killers. Peter Sutcliffe murdered thirteen women and carried out vicious attacks on many more. For years he eluded detectives as a massive investigation drowned in witness statements, card indexes and other paper records weighing forty tons. Today David Wall is Professor of Criminal Justice and Information Technology at Leeds University. He says there was one huge lesson for the police from the Ripper case.

WALL: The big problem was that they couldn't assemble the massive amount of information together. They'd interviewed Sutcliffe, for instance, nine times, and certainly on a number of occasions they had no knowledge that their colleagues had interviewed him on a previous occasion over a number of different issues, a number of different themes that they were trying to link together. So the police needed a computing system to assemble all this information, to pick out the information about interviews on one issue, and as a direct result of this, the lessons learned, the HOLMES computing system for dealing with serious incidents arose.

O'HALLORAN: Big major murder inquiries?

WALL: A massive major murder inquiry system.

O'HALLORAN: But the HOLMES computer system, developed after the Ripper case, has only been brought into play on rare occasions, like major inquiries to catch serial killers. It is not a general intelligence storage system, and plays no role in day-to-day police investigations around the country. Nor was there any equivalent leap forward in terms of a national IT system for dealing with the intelligence reports filed day after day on suspects in police forces across England and Wales. Alison McVean of Buckinghamshire Chilterns University College, who is an advisor to the Home Office on police affairs, says the result was that each police force went its own way in developing intelligence systems.

MCVEAN: Bearing in mind there are 43 different police forces, each force has its own autonomy to develop its own intelligence base, and that is by and large what has happened. Most of these intelligent IT systems are not compatible with each other, so one force's won't read each other's, and the information that is stored on these systems are also unique to each of that force area.

O'HALLORAN: Now does this literally mean that there are 43 forces in England and Wales, and that each of them really, in reality, has a different intelligence computer system?

MCVEAN: In terms of developing own local intelligence, then yes they have. What has happened here is that there's been great emphasis on tackling local crime within the community, antisocial behaviour, crime that affects people living very very closely within that area, and in some ways it's created geographical myopia in terms of intelligence. You know, the police are interested just in that local community, they're not particularly interested in what's happening in the next community, nor the next police force. You do need a national database that will cut across all the intelligence, and you really need to get the information in a timely way to the people that need it and can act upon it in order to use intelligence efficiently.

O'HALLORAN: All this has left a disjointed patchwork of computer systems across 43 forces which puts detectives at a disadvantage in defeating criminals and protecting children and other vulnerable people. There's often no easy way for one police force to know which other forces throughout the country hold intelligence on any suspect they may be investigating.

ACTUALITY OF NEWS REPORT

REPORTER: Robert Wells, a once-respected police doctor, now a convicted paedophile. This is the riverside flat in Southampton where he raped and abused his child victims. According to one of the young girls, they were strapped to this horrifying contraption called Satan's Pillow.

O'HALLORAN: When Dr Robert Wells was jailed for fifteen years last month, it emerged that before working as a police doctor in Hampshire, he had been charged with child rape in two cases in the mid 1990s in Sussex. The prosecutions failed. But Sussex Police had retained an intelligence file on him. However, when Wells applied for the Hampshire Police post, neither the agency which hired him nor the force itself learned about the Sussex intelligence record. Mark Oaten, Liberal Democrat Home Affairs spokesman and MP for Winchester, where Hampshire Police have their headquarters, says he was shocked by the case.

OATEN: I've got two girls myself, and any parent would be horrified to discover that that kind of situation could have happened when there was a previous track record, and it will alarm and concern parents that something like that can slip through, and an individual who has carried out those kind of atrocities can be put in a position of authority. It's a troubling case. If we had a national database, then I think charges and information about individuals would be shared, and I don't think individuals would be given appointments and jobs because we'd know about their positions. I don't want to see a situation where you have a Huntley pattern or a similar situation to the doctor in Hampshire working for the police, where there has clearly been a pattern of allegations and that goes ignored. Anybody looking at this particular individual's record, who had seen the pattern of allegations, surely the alarm bells would be ringing if there had been allegations and cases that had been put against the individual in the past.

O'HALLORAN: The Deputy Chief Constable of Hampshire, Ian Readhead, says the background checks which were required at the time were carried out on Dr Wells. They included a national criminal records check, which showed no convictions, and a local background check in Hampshire.

READHEAD: Now locally, what Hampshire would check is, has this person ever been arrested in Hampshire? Has he ever been drawn to our attention and held on one of our intelligence systems? All of those kind of things we checked. But of course, Dr Wells had only been dealt with in Sussex. It could have been any other force that he'd been dealt with, but we would not have known that.

O'HALLORAN: And Sussex Police say, I think, that there was an intelligence file, there is an intelligence file on Dr Wells in Sussex, but no one asked them to see it.

READHEAD: And the reason is, of course, nobody would know that they held it, other than Sussex.

O'HALLORAN: Whereas if we had had a national intelligence database, then it's very likely that check would have been done and would have been successful.

READHEAD: Well clearly it would be the case that a national intelligence solution would have enabled the Hampshire Constabulary to have known of that doctor's history.

O'HALLORAN: And as a Chief Police Officer yourself, I mean, do you find it embarrassing at all that a character like Robert Wells could walk into any police force's area and there might be intelligence on him elsewhere, and that police force he'd just gone into would have no sensible way of knowing that that intelligence was there?

READHEAD: Well I certainly think that, you know, all of my colleagues nationally would much prefer to have intelligence available on individuals who quite deliberately move around the country to avoid detection.

O'HALLORAN: A shared police national intelligence database could be accessed from all parts of the country. It would override the information barriers which exist now along police force boundaries. The Home Office and police first saw the desirability of such a system a long time ago. It was included in a national strategy for police information systems set out in the mid 1990s. However, Sir Michael Bichard was surprised to discover at his inquiry that the whole plan had been allowed to run into the sand.

BICHARD: It was flagged up very clearly in the national strategy back in 1994. I think there were some thirty-odd different systems that were referred to as part of that national strategy, and an important one was the national intelligence system. It was dropped in 2000, in the year 2000, it was just dropped off the list of priorities for the national information strategy. Although everyone was telling us how important intelligence was, how important it was to modern policing, the rhetoric was all there, but the practice didn't reflect it. In other words, the systems were not being put in place to provide access to the intelligence that was so important. We do not need, I think, 43 intelligence systems that do not talk together. It's just madness in the current day and age.

O'HALLORAN: Just why a national database for police was first of all shelved and then dropped altogether is still shrouded in some mystery. It appears that the 43 police forces in England and Wales couldn't agree on a solution, and crucially there was no central funding from the Home Office. However, in that same year, 2000, Scotland was forging ahead. Police chiefs and the Scottish Executive agreed to create an intelligence database shared by all of their eight forces and the Scottish Drugs Enforcement Agency – a system giving officers a vital weapon in terms of solving and preventing crime.

ACTUALITY IN ABERDEEN

O'HALLORAN: I'm next to a playground, bounded on two sides by cream and grey houses and tenement blocks, in the Powis Circle district of Aberdeen. It was here, on a sunny July afternoon in 1997 that 9 year old Scott Simpson went missing. A few days later, Scott's body was found in bushes nearby. An informant's phone call had led officers to a known and dangerous paedophile living nearby who quickly confessed to the boy's murder. But the case became notorious in Scotland because of a catalogue of blunders by Grampian Police – mistakes which included intelligence failures over monitoring the paedophile before the killing, and

O'HALLORAN cont: neglecting to search computer records which could, according to a later inquiry, have allowed detectives to solve the case within hours.

PATSY SIMPSON: It still feels like yesterday, although it's like seven years, it'll be seven years on Saturday. Just like a bad dream and you're waiting to waken up. It's not happened. It's not real.

O'HALLORAN: The daily grief which afflicts Patsy Simpson over the death of her son, Scott, seven years ago is compounded by her recollection of the blunders made by the police in the early hours and days of their investigation. They failed to make rapid use of information from witnesses who had seen a man in the park offering cigarettes to children. A later inquiry by another Scottish police force revealed to her that a computer search using obvious keywords would have promptly identified as number one suspect the man later convicted of Scott's murder.

PATSY SIMPSON: If they'd typed in a cigarette on a computer, his name would have come up. He was like more or less the only one that offered children cigarettes, and his name would have come up straightaway.

O'HALLORAN: And did the police in that investigation ever do that? Did they ever interrogate their own criminal records office in Scotland?

PATSY SIMPSON: No, nothing was done.

ACTUALITY OF DETECTIVE ON PHONE

DETECTIVE: Hi, it's David McGrath calling from Force Intelligence at Central Scotland Police in Stirling. It's requiring an Interpol inquiry that you sent us yesterday.

O'HALLORAN: To support the routine work of their detectives, and with lessons of the Scott Simpson case fresh in their minds, police chiefs in Scotland agreed four years ago to set up a shared intelligence database.

ACTUALITY WITH COMPUTER DATABASE

McCANDLISH: What you see before you is the Scottish Intelligence Database, and I've just logged on. This intelligence log tells me that David Adams is dealing in large quantities of cocaine and diamorphine along with his new female partner ...

O'HALLORAN: The new system has cost around £11 million, and in most forces it's now in daily use. Detective Superintendent Ian McCandlish, who heads the project, says it can help in tackling all kinds of crime.

MCCANDLISH: It was restricted initially. The thinking was that it would be for very high level crime. But it very soon became apparent that the benefits would be so much greater if that was extended to encompass all levels of criminality, and so that across the eight forces and the Drugs Enforcement Agency there would be an openness and a sharing of intelligence from the operational officer's perspective, he would be able to access in excess of 95% of intelligence that's submitted in the Scottish police service.

O'HALLORAN: So the decision was taken in the year 2000. By what date will all parts of all Scottish police forces have this shared intelligence database?

MCCANDLISH: We'll roll out the final force in October this year.

O'HALLORAN: Why do you think it is really that Scotland has gone down this route? You took the decision to go for this intelligence database in the same year that it was being put off the agenda in England and Wales.

MCCANDLISH: Well, I can't comment on the situation south of the border, obviously.

O'HALLORAN: Three years ago, soon after the Scottish move, top computer experts back in England were trying to persuade the Home Office to adopt the same system. One of them was Jim Brookes, who has been both Chief Executive of the British Computer Society and an IT chief with Avon and Somerset Police. He reckoned the Scottish database could be extended one region at a time throughout England and Wales. By working with police chiefs in smaller groups, he aimed to get the agreement among them that had proved elusive in the past.

O'HALLORAN cont: And he calculated the region-by-region approach would lessen the risk of the kind of large scale computerisation fiasco which had dogged the public sector in the past. In early 2001, with his hopes high, he took the plan to Whitehall.

BROOKES: We talked with the senior officers in the Home Office, in the Police IT Organisation. We talked to the chairman of the Police IT Organisation. We spoke with the police minister

O'HALLORAN: Who was that at the time?

BROOKES: At the time, it was just before the General Election, at the time it was Charles Clarke.

O'HALLORAN: That's the current Education Secretary?

BROOKES: Indeed.

O'HALLORAN: So you went to him and you said what?

BROOKES: We put the proposition for looking at what was going on in Scotland, re-evaluating it, improving the technology, seeing to what extent it could meet the England/Wales police requirement. He actually understood very well what we were saying and seemed really quite receptive and asked us to continue to discuss this with both the Police IT Organisation and his Home Office colleagues.

O'HALLORAN: So what happened?

BROOKES: Well, there was a General Election, and after that Charles Clarke left the Home Office, and we then revisited with his successor, and were referred again back to the officials and basically we were not able to take it forward any further.

O'HALLORAN: One of the Home Office ministers Jim Brookes took his idea to was John Denham. Today Mr Denham is a backbencher and Chairman of the Commons Home Affairs Select Committee. He doesn't recall the meeting, but he says all such proposals were

O'HALLORAN cont: going into a decision-making system that was, in his words, dysfunctional. It included the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), representing all 43 forces in England and Wales, and the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO), which had been set up in 1997.

DENHAM: There was no shortage of people coming round with plans for all sorts of things at that time, and no doubt in the years before and the years afterwards. What probably would have happened is it would have gone into this not very functional arrangement where a scheme would have had to have been adopted both by ACPO and individual police forces and PITO, the procurement organisation. Because certainly at that time the Home Office didn't have a role of imposing central system. So they thought, let's set up an arms' length organisation, PITO, and that in a sense, we'll work with that to coordinate these projects. The difficulty in practice was that PITO was no more able than previous arrangements to actually marry plans to resources. And if you were a minister, you would get a succession of very glossy presentations about this, that or the other project, but really no grounding in the resources that were available.

O'HALLORAN: So there was a bit of unhappiness, was there, would you say, among ministers about the Police Information Technology Organisation?

DENHAM: I think everybody was unhappy in a way. I think PITO were frustrated that they could identify needs but had no way of delivery. Ministers had a difficulty in saying 'We can't make these projects work,' and police forces were saying, 'We're not getting the product that we want.' As a result of that, a lot of those projects never saw the light of day.

ACTUALITY ON SOUTH BANK

O'HALLORAN: The Police Information Technology Organisation occupies a suite of offices here in a glossy and highly desirable location, with attractive cafes and bars and riverside walks on the south bank of the Thames next to London's Blackfriars Bridge. The organisation's website boasts that its vision is to be a world class provider of IT services and systems. But Sir Michael Bichard concluded in his inquiry that the organisation would be disappointed with its lack of success in the long saga of the failure to create a police national intelligence database. So what does this body, which costs £350 million a year to run and employs over 600 people, what does it have to say in its own defence? Surprisingly, nothing.

O'HALLORAN cont: years ago? Hampshire Deputy Chief Constable, Ian Readhead, a leading figure on computer technology in the Association of Chief Police Officers, is repentant.

READHEAD: Now certainly you can look at the Scottish experience and you can, I think, fairly say, well we perhaps should have been doing that in this country, using flagging methods. But the fact is, we weren't. We weren't using flagging methods.

O'HALLORAN: Any idea why not, though? I mean ...

READHEAD: No, I don't ...

O'HALLORAN: ... you and your fellow officers or your predecessors in these jobs look across the country, look up to Scotland and think, well that would help us, why don't we have that? It doesn't cost a huge amount of money.

READHEAD: Well, I can only say I was not aware that flagging was being used in Scotland, and I wasn't aware of national PNC ...

O'HALLORAN: Until the Bichard report pointed that out?

READHEAD: No, I didn't know that that was actually happening. Now that's a failure on my part, I understand that and clearly, you know, you can say that as a chief officer I should have known better, and I do hear that. But I didn't know that that was the case.

O'HALLORAN: When Sir Michael Bichard says, you know, it's disappointing how little progress there has been in the last ten years, do you in ACPO, the Association of Chief Police Officers, accept your share of the blame?

READHEAD: Yes, I think we all acknowledge the same disappointment that Sir Michael referred to. There has been though much good work done in ACPO in delivering national solutions, but one can't help but observe that this would be a critical core area of our business and will have great benefits for the service and frontline officers in particular.

O'HALLORAN: The Home Office says an evaluation of the intelligence flagging system in Scotland began last August. But it's still not clear why no action was taken in the previous ten years or so to adopt the Scottish model. Sir Michael Bichard says now is the time to catch up and catch up fast across the whole area of police intelligence.

BICHARD: I think it's a story of missed opportunities. I think it is a story which suggests that intelligence is really not being given the priority that people say it should be given. I think it is probably a story of failure to understand the potential or the capacity of information technology to enable us to access intelligence easily.

O'HALLORAN: Is it fair for an ordinary person to interpret your report as revealing really a total shambles on information and intelligence recording, I mean, this vital intelligence recording, in the last ten years?

BICHARD: I don't think it's been a total shambles. I think it's certainly not been as effective as all of us would have wanted. I think people sometimes have been carefully treading, avoiding each other's sensitivities, and as a result of that no one has taken the really big decisions that needed to be taken and obtained the investment that was necessary.

O'HALLORAN: The most troubling aspect of this long saga is that even today, in any part of England and Wales, if an Ian Huntley or a Dr Robert Wells or someone similar with previous accusations but not convictions, is arrested by police, officers will have no sensible way of checking which forces in the rest of the country hold intelligence on the suspect. Supporters of the Home Office say that, until a new law was passed two years ago, it had no power to override the stalemate which existed among the police and other bodies which allowed this situation to continue. What Sir Michael Bichard concludes is that the Home Office could easily have taken those powers long before 2002. And, at the end of the day, he suggests, it's the government that must carry the can.

BICHARD: The Home Office needs to give a firmer lead. Sometimes we do need national funding for national solutions. Frankly I just feel that this is such a cornerstone of modern policing, that is effective intelligence, that if it hasn't happened by now, it damn well needs to happen now.

SIGNATURE TUNE

