

Alison Blackshaw

From: Daniel Pruce
Sent: 10 September 2002 12:25
To: 'Mark Matthews'
Cc: Matthew Rycroft, 'Paul Hamill', Godric Smith, Alastair Campbell
Subject: DOSSIER

Mark,

I promised some quick thoughts on John's draft of 9 September

On content

- in general I think we should personalise the dossier, placing the focus on Saddam as much as possible. So I would propose that we replace most, if not all, of the references to Iraq with references to Saddam,
- the personal witness statements are very powerful. Are there more we can use to illustrate Saddam's repression of his own people through murder, rape and torture?
- we make a number of statements about Saddam's intentions/attitudes. Can we insert a few quotes from speeches he has made which, even if they are not specific, demonstrate that he is a bad man with a general hostility towards his neighbours and the West?
- in the public's mind the key difference between this text and the IISS text will be the access to intelligence material. I like the idea of the history of JIC assessments. Might we also include a general statement on the nature of the intelligence services and their role. This could be drawn from material that is already in the public domain. It's inclusion might help underline the fact that the services have contributed to the report, often in ways which, for perfectly fair reasons, are imperceptible,

On presentation:

- the text now reads as a single continuous narrative. This is fine - but I think we should look at breaking it up into the sections set out in Alastair's note of yesterday,
- much of the evidence we have is largely circumstantial so we need to convey to our readers that the cumulation of these facts demonstrates an intent on Saddam's part - the more they can be led to this conclusion themselves rather than have to accept judgements from us, the better,

On mechanics

- I'd be grateful if you could discuss with the FCO Publications team production times and costs. I would envisage that most people would access this text over the web, but I would guess that 500 hard copies will be needed. We can look at design questions later - but I would envisage a fairly sober presentation with a very "official" flavour
- we also need to think, once we have John's further draft tomorrow, how we prepare the ground for the launch of the text to get expectations in the right place

Danny

Clare Sumner

From: Daniel Pruce
Sent: 14 August 2003 20:23
To: Clare Sumner
Subject: FW: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

-----Original Message-----

From: Philip Bassett
Sent: 11 September 2002 15:27
To: Godric Smith, Daniel Pruce, Alastair Campbell
Cc: Matthew Rycroft
Subject: RE: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

Agree with Godric

& also

- think it needs to be written more in officialese, lots of it is too journalistic as it now stands, with some of it (eg opening chapter as a biog of Saddam !) reading like STimes at its worst eg para 11 "emeshed", "web" or para 13
- needs much more weight, writing, detail even the stuff marked as new (section 6) is only 12 pages at best out of a bundle of 56 (& that's at best eg p35 is all old UNSCOM stuff) It needs to be at least good as LISS, which it isn't yet, and at least as good as things like *Saddam's Secrets*, the book on the hunt for Iraq's hidden weapons, by an ex-UNSCOM and ex-UNSCOM advsier, which I'm not sure it is
- pictures in the text don't get the right feel what about making them look more report-like, less journo-like, by putting them all the end, as appendices ?
- crucially, though, it's intelligence-lite It feels like this is the least possible intelligence material the intell people are prepared to let go (despite the fact that we say at a couple of points eg para 2 that it's everything the Govt knows on the issue - which it clearly isn't) All intelligence material tends to read like unevidenced assertion, and we have to find a way to get over this a) by having better intelligence material (and better flagged-up) and b) by having more material (and better flagged-up) and c) more convincing material (eg by printing some of it eg as appendices, with names, identifiers etc blacked out
- it needs to end At the moment, it just stops (on p42) A conclusion, saying something - making a case which is compelling At the moment, it isn't

-----Original Message-----

From: Godric Smith
Sent: 11 September 2002 12:35
To: Daniel Pruce, Alastair Campbell
Cc: Matthew Rycroft, Philip Bassett
Subject: RE: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

I think there is material here we can work with but it is a bit of a muddle and needs a lot more clarity in the guts of it in terms of what is new /old In each area we need to distinguish between the two and better source (as much as we can) to intelligence It needs to be more factual if anything, less assertion based, with the rhetoric stripped out as I think this undermines it

-----Original Message-----

From: Daniel Pruce
Sent: 11 September 2002 10:04
To: Alastair Campbell
Cc: Matthew Rycroft, Philip Bassett, Godric Smith
Subject: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

It's getting there, but needs more work My initial thoughts on this latest draft

Ownership:

- the foreword is good but whose voice is it? Do we need a minister to sign it off? Probably not Who will issue the text? Us? The Cabinet Office? Why don't we issue it in the name of the JIC? Makes it more interesting to the media,

Saddam:

- I think we need to personalise the dossier onto Saddam as much as possible - for example by replacing references to Iraq with references to Saddam,

- in similar vein I think we need a device to convey that he is a bad and unstable man. The section on Saddam's Iraq (pp9-11) could be expanded into a psychological profile and presented as such,

- and a few quotes from Saddam to demonstrate his aggressive intent and hatred of his neighbours and the West would help too,

Feel:

- our aim should also be to convey the impression that things have not been static in Iraq but that over the past decade he has been aggressively and relentlessly pursuing WMD while brutally repressing his own people. Again the dossier gets close to this - but I think some drafting changes could bring this out more;

Intelligence:

- Section 6, the one based on intelligence, is the one that readers will go to first. This draft already plays up the nature of intelligence sourcing. I think we could play this up more. The more we advertise that unsupported assertions (eg Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of WMD) come from intelligence the better. The history of JIC Assessments will help too. And why not an annex on the work of the intelligence services (we could draw from material already in the public domain)?,

Witness accounts:

- the material in Annex A on HR abuses is powerful - we might bring elements of it into the body of the dossier,

- in similar vein can we add copies of original documentation, if necessary with parts blanked out, to add to the feeling that we are presenting real evidence?,

Weapons:

- wherever we refer to them (either what the inspectors found or what we think he has) I think we should also describe their destructive capacity as well - eg. p 26 UNSCOM found enough chemical warfare agent to kill x thousand people or contaminate an area the size of Wales

Do you want to meet and discuss today? Separately I'm in touch with the FCO on production and distribution. We also need to develop a handling plan to get expectations in the right place before we launch

Danny

Clare Sumner

From: Daniel Pruce
Sent: 14 August 2003 20:17
To: Clare Sumner
Subject: FW: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

-----Original Message-----

From: Philip Bassett
Sent: 11 September 2002 10:34
To: Daniel Pruce; Alastair Campbell
Cc: Matthew Rycroft, Godric Smith
Subject: RE: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

Very long way to go, I think. Think we're in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now.

-----Original Message-----

From: Daniel Pruce
Sent: 11 September 2002 10:04
To: Alastair Campbell
Cc: Matthew Rycroft, Philip Bassett, Godric Smith
Subject: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

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- in similar vein can we add copies of original documentation, if necessary with parts blanked out, to add to the feeling that we are presenting real evidence?;

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Danny

Daniel Pruce

From: Matthew Rycroft
Sent: 11 September 2002 11:59
To: Tom Kelly; Alastair Campbell
Cc: Daniel Pruce, Godric Smith, Philip Bassett
Subject: RE: Dossier

yes, part of the answer to "why now?" is that the threat will only get worse if we don't act now - the threat that Saddam will use WMD, but also the threat that Iraq's WMD will somehow get into the hands of terrorists [REDACTED] [REDACTED] This all links into the illicit money, since the more funds he has - and his cash pile is growing all the time - the more likely he is to buy fissile material etc

-----Original Message-----

From: Tom Kelly
Sent: 11 September 2002 11:50
To: Alastair Campbell
Cc: Matthew Rycroft, Daniel Pruce, Godric Smith, Philip Bassett
Subject: Dossier

This does have some new elements to play with, but there is one central weakness - we do not differentiate enough between capacity and intent - we know that he is a bad man and has done bad things in the past - We know he is trying to get WMD - and this shows those attempts are intensifying - But can we show why we think he intends to use them aggressively, rather than in self-defence - We need that to counter the argument that Saddam is bad, but not mad - We also, I think, need more direct argument on why containment is breaking down - In other words, putting the emphasis as much (maybe more) on the present and future, as the past

The key must be to show that Saddam has the capacity, and is intent on using it in ways that threaten world stability, and that our ability to stop him is increasingly threatened

Alison Blackshaw

From: Mark.Sedwill [redacted]
Sent: 11 September 2002 12:28
To: Charles Gray [redacted]
Cc: Edward Chaplin [redacted],
Ed Owen [redacted],
dmanning [redacted], matthew rycroft [redacted],
acampbell [redacted]
Subject: CONF: Dossier 10/9 Version - Comments



ATT08668.htm

Charles,

Handling and Timing

I have sent this out to the Foreign Sec's party to see whether they think it is along the right lines (tone, content etc). [redacted]

I spoke to Alastair Campbell earlier about timing. He agreed we need to keep our options open on bringing forward publication from w/b 23 September (which would coincide with the possible recall of Parliament) to next week [redacted]

Drafting Comments

The draft looks to me to be heading in the right direction and is much better than earlier drafts. I think the tone could move further in the direction of factual analysis.

Specific comments:

Foreword Suggest we get upfront UNSCR 687's demand that Iraq disarm. We need to make a key issue Saddam's defiance of the UN (one thing which distinguishes him from other dictators and holders of WMD), his persistent obstruction of the weapons inspectors and the 23/27 obligations (and however many specifically on WMD) unmet.

Executive Summary Looks pretty good. Could be tweaked a bit in places. The first bullet of para 6 (the importance of WMD) should be strengthened to explain the centrality of WMD to SH's rule - the projection of power etc. I am a supporter of para 8, although I would drop the last phrase which takes it into policy rather than analysis. This document needs to set out the problem rather than the solution. People should conclude that for themselves.

Sections 1 & 2: I would combine these. Most of Section 2 (paras 1-12) should go after para 7 of Section 1. Paras 13-15 of Section 2 should follow Para 10 of Section 1. The passage on Saddam's Iraq (paras 8-15 of Section 1) needs amplifying. A wiring diagram showing the structure of the regime, the role and nature of the SRG, SSA (explaining that they are modelled on the SS and Gestapo etc) and Saddam's fedayeen etc, pictures of Saddam in his various guises (para 14). Crucially this section should explain the role of WMD in the political mythology which has sustained the regime, implicitly why giving it up would amount to a change of regime and how responsibility for WMD rests with those parts of the apparatus on which Saddam depends for

CAB/11/0030

his own security [REDACTED]

Section 3 looks pretty good. I would depersonalise it a bit. Maybe use "the regime" instead of "SH" more. Para 5 could become a text box explaining more vividly the effects of the various agents. It does not sit very easily amidst the narrative.

I would combine Sections 3 and 4 to demonstrate more explicitly the link between UNSC action and persistent Iraqi obstruction. I would put in a text box listing UNSCRs, Iraq's non-compliance or late compliance with them. I would expand the history of weapons inspections. It is an interesting story and would give the media a better feel for the difficulties they faced and the persistence of the Iraqi obstruction - Hussein Kamal and the chicken farm etc. [REDACTED] We might also get a couple of ex-inspectors to recount their experiences. Could we get the UK's UNSCOM Commissioner to do a piece? The blocking by armed guards of Ritter's team's attempt to get access to the SSA in October 1997 to track BW after the Iraqis had tried to run off with documents would be a good vignette. [REDACTED] Include Annex C.

Section 6 is the crux of this and needs to be as factual as possible. I would lose the sub-title "Why are we concerned?" We need a very simple table somewhere (perhaps to be repeated in the Executive Summary) bringing together the unaccounted stuff with what we know since. This should be brief enough to get onto the Sky wall ie, no more than 5 bullets.

Annex A. Suggest this is divided up into so it is obviously a set of case histories.

Annex B should come into the main text - probably into the amplified Section 2.

Annex C should be brought into the combined Section 3 & 4.

Hope this is useful.

Mark

Mark Sedwill
Private Secretary

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
+44 20 7213 2000 (M)
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (M)

Alison Blackshaw

From: Ed Owen [mailto:edowen@fco.gsi.gov.uk]
Sent: 11 September 2002 13.14
To: Mark.Sedwill [mailto:msedwill@fco.gsi.gov.uk]; Charles.Gray [mailto:cgray@fco.gsi.gov.uk]
Cc: Edward.Chaplin@fco.gsi.gov.uk, [mailto:edward.chaplin@fco.gsi.gov.uk]; [mailto:edward.chaplin@fco.gsi.gov.uk]; dmanning [mailto:dmanning@fco.gsi.gov.uk]; matthew.rycroft [mailto:mrycroft@fco.gsi.gov.uk]; acampbell [mailto:acampbell@fco.gsi.gov.uk]
Subject: RE CONF: Dossier 10/9 Version - Comments



ATT08844.htm

I have just looked at the latest draft, and agree with MS that it is a good deal better than earlier drafts. I also share most of Mark's particular comments, and will add further this afternoon. Meanwhile, here are a few thoughts

The foreword needs to refer to the UN in the first sentences. This is, after all, about the authority of the UN and international law. This is the only way we can win the argument in Parliament and elsewhere. Kofi Annan made some very helpful remarks on the radio this morning about the unique aspect of Iraq's behaviour towards the UN

It also needs to reiterate the number of UNSC resolutions, and separate obligations, Iraq continues to ignore. In that vein we need to enhance Section 4 - which should list point by point, the obligations on Iraq - and tick off those SH is flouting

Section 1 is a little odd. It is far too personal about Saddam, particularly paragraphs 12 to 15

I will make further comments later

Ed

CAB/11/0033

Alison Blackshaw

From: Mark Sedwill [redacted]
Sent: 11 September 2002 17.42
To: Charles Gray [redacted]
Cc: [redacted], DManning [redacted], mrycroft [redacted], ACampbell [redacted], Edward Chaplin [redacted], Ed Owen [redacted], julian miller [redacted], [redacted], john scarlett [redacted], dpruce [redacted]
Subject: URGENT: Iraq Dossier: 10/9 Version - Foreign Secretary's Comments



ATT00290.htm

Charles,

The Foreign Secretary has now had a chance to go through the draft dossier. He has endorsed the comments I made earlier on it (see below) and has the following additional points:

- General:
- more graphics, photos, diagrams, textboxes (like the one on p 26)
 - incidents etc should have dates - one or two don't

Foreword

- should be in narrative form by the Prime Minister
- needs a killer para on Saddam's defiance of the UN, only annexation of another member state and unprecedented use of WMD

Executive Summary. V good. No additional changes

Section 1 Put up front the section on the nature of the regime with more details on the means of oppression and control (aggression and violent oppression are intrinsic to the regime's projection of itself)

Section 3 Draw more on external sources eg, detailed reports from Liverpool University on Halabja or the ICRC on human rights. More credibility

Annex A needs better intro to make clear that human rights violations are of a sort different to anywhere else (CW against his own population). There is good material from UN Special Rapporteur in a preliminary report from his visit in Feb 2002

Mark

..

CAB/11/0034

Alison Blackshaw

From: Daniel Pruce
Sent: 17 September 2002 12:01
To: Tom Kelly, Alastair Campbell, Godric Smith, Tanya Joseph
Subject: Dossier - 16 September draft

I attended a further Cabinet Office read through this morning. They have

- re-ordered the text, with the new intell nearer the front (might be able to bring it further forward),
- added a short chapter on JIC and intelligence. Good but could give more details,
- kept in the longer nuclear timelines (p24, para 18 estimates a weapon within 5 years if sanctions are lifted, or within 1-2 years if Iraq obtains fissile material). We need to think carefully about how these will appear to compare with the IISS figure of a weapon within a few months,
- added a short conclusions table - not sure this adds a lot to the Executive Summary

The re-organised material paints a more convincing cumulative picture, but the facts remain thin on nuclear

John Miller will take in a further round of comments this afternoon and send over a final draft to us this evening

Separately, Tanya and I are calling on the FCO this afternoon to discuss the practicalities of production and distribution

DP

Alison Blackshaw

From: Jonathan Powell
Sent: 17 September 2002 13:36
To: Alastair Campbell, David Manning
Subject: RE: Revised dossier foreword

Three comments

- I think it is worth explicitly stating what TB keeps saying, this is the advice to him from the JIC. On the basis of this advice what other action could he as PM take. Something like "I am today taking the exceptional step of publishing the JIC's advice to me because I want MPs and the British public to see the advice on which I am acting. When you have read this I ask you to consider what else a responsible PM could do than follow the course we have in the face of this advice?"

- We need to do more to back up the assertions. "We cannot of course publish the detailed raw intelligence on which this report is based without endangering the lives of agents. But all of the statements in this report are backed up by detailed intelligence reports, the veracity and the sources of which have been verified by the intelligence agencies." Is there any independent verification we can cite?

- In the penultimate para you need to make it clear Saddam could not attack us at the moment. The thesis is would be a threat to the UK in the future if we do not check him.

-----Original Message-----

From: Felicity Hatfield **On Behalf Of** Alastair Campbell
Sent: 17 September 2002 10:21
To: Jonathan Powell, David Manning
Subject: Revised dossier foreword

<< File: 020916 - AC - TB Foreword - dossier doc >>

Alison Blackshaw

From: Ed Owen@fco.gov.uk
Sent: 17 September 2002 15.41
To: [redacted] jscarlett@fco.gov.uk
Cc: Mark Sedwill@fco.gov.uk, dpruce@fco.gov.uk, akelly@fco.gov.uk, Edward Chaplin@fco.gov.uk, richard.stagg@fco.gov.uk, William Ehrman@fco.gov.uk, [redacted]@fco.gov.uk; [redacted]@fco.gov.uk; Charles Gray@fco.gov.uk; Stephen.Pattison@fco.gov.uk, Tim Dowse@fco.gov.uk, [redacted]@fco.gov.uk, [redacted]@fco.gov.uk; [redacted]@fco.gov.uk; mark.matthews@fco.gov.uk, [redacted]@fco.gov.uk; [redacted]@fco.gov.uk; Andrew Patrick@fco.gov.uk, [redacted]@fco.gov.uk; [redacted]@fco.gov.uk; [redacted]@fco.gov.uk, jmillen@fco.gov.uk; [redacted]@fco.gov.uk
Subject: RE: Iraq - Dossier



ATT02837.htm

I want to limit my remarks to the Executive Summary which I do not think reads well enough to give a sceptical reader the confidence to believe that this dossier provides the necessary information.

Para 2 should not include reference to the IISS (too defensive so early on) and should start

"A huge amount of information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from United Nations reports and from Iraqi defectors. This shows that Iraq continues to possess chemical and biological agents and weapons from the Gulf War etc

Delete last sentence and provide new par 3 which reads

"An independent overview of this public evidence was provided by the IISS in its report, "xxx", on 9th September. This report also suggested that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources. We endorse the IISS's analysis

New para 4 should then begin:

"As well as this publicly available evidence, significant additional information is available to the Government ... etc.

Then there should be a new par which follows and starts

"As a result of this intelligence we judge that Iraq has

- bullet points to follow.

I think there are too many bullet points. The first one repeats what we have said already and the fifth is pretty obvious. The 10th about Ababil-100 only makes sense to Jane's Weekly. The 12th again appears superfluous

I think about eight bullet points which perhaps combine existing points would be far more persuasive

I think it odd that we only mention UNSC resolutions until the end of the exec summary. It's also rather oddly written. Shouldn't it read something like.

"In continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction Iraq has flagrantly flouted international law. In a series of SC resolutions, Iraq is under an

CAB/11/0054

obligation to destroy its arsenal of these weapons, under the supervision of UN's inspection regime. But, as this paper sets out, Iraq has a history of dishonesty, deception, intimidation and concealment in its dealings with UN inspectors which left in 1998

Hope this helpful

Ed

Surely and 3 are long and dense Par 2 is confusing and its reference to the IISS report somewhat odd

CAB/11/0055

Alison Blackshaw

From: Jonathan Powell
Sent: 17 September 2002 19:41
To: Scarlett John - SEC - A
Cc: Alastair Campbell; David Manning
Subject: Dossier

The dossier is good and convincing for those who are prepared to be convinced

I have only three points, none of which affect the way the document is drafted or presented

First the document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat from Saddam. In other words it shows he has the means but it does not demonstrate he has the motive to attack his neighbours let alone the west

We will need to make it clear in launching the document that we do not claim that we have evidence that he is an imminent threat. The case we are making is that he has continued to develop WMD since 1998, and is in breach of UN resolutions. The international community has to enforce those resolutions if the UN is to be taken seriously

Second we will be asked about the connections with Al Qaeda. The document says nothing about those and TB will

Third, if I was Saddam I would take a party of western journalists to the Ibn Sina factory or one of the others pictured in the document to demonstrate there is nothing there. How do we close off that avenue to him in advance?

WAB 111 10069

Alison Blackshaw

From: Scarlett John - [redacted]
Sent: 18 September 2002 08:36
To: Powell Jonathan - No 10 -
Cc: Campbell Alastair - No 10 -, Manning David - no10-
Subject: RE: Dossier

We are now doing a note now giving the detail on Iraq and AQ. [redacted]
[redacted] but more complete [redacted]

The dossier mentions about eight sites. There are dozens more which could be relevant. At least one of the eight (the engine test stand for long range missiles) would not be easy to stage manage without dismantling the stand i.e. this would be progress. The dossier stresses the dual-use problem and the ease of concealment. This applies to trained inspectors let alone journalists. We ought to be able to work out lines to tackle this issue up front.

-----Original Message-----

From: Jonathan Powell [redacted]
Sent: 17 September 2002 19:41
To: Scarlett John - SEC - A
Cc: Alastair Campbell, David Manning
Subject: Dossier

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Second we will be asked about the connections with Al Qaeda. [redacted]

[redacted] given the different [redacted]

Third, if I was Saddam I would take a party of western journalists to the Ibn Sina factory or one of the others pictured in the document to demonstrate there is nothing there. How do we close off that avenue to him in advance?

The Cabinet Office's computer systems may be monitored and communications carried on them recorded, to secure the effective operation of the system and for other lawful purposes.

CAB/11/0072

Alison Blackshaw

From: Mark Sedwill [redacted]
Sent: 18 September 2002 09:51
To: julian miller [redacted]
Cc: Edward Chaplin [redacted]; Charles Gray [redacted]; Ed Owen [redacted]; acampbell [redacted]; john scarlett [redacted]; mrycroft [redacted]
Subject: RE. CONF Dossier 10/9 Version - Comments



ATT04426.htm

The Foreign Sec has two small comments:

- * Para 1 of the Executive Summary - should say "Iraq had to admit" rather than "has admitted"
- * Para 3 of Par 1 should say " . Prime Minister and senior Ministers"

Grateful if he could see the draft going to Alastair Campbell

Mark

Mark Sedwill
Private Secretary

CAB/11/0076

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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CAB / 11 / 0078

Alison Blackshaw

From: Felicity Hatfield on behalf of Alastair Campbell
Sent: 18 September 2002 14:31
To: Scarlett John - SEC - A
Cc: 'Julian.Miller@uk.intelligence.gov.uk'
Subject: Another dossier memo!

I asked someone in my office, whose judgement I trust, who has nothing to do with this area, to read the dossier "cold", as it were, and give me impressions, which I want to pass on.

Overall, she found it convincing CW/BW, in particular. "By the time I got to human rights, I was in no doubt he has to be dealt with". Indeed she felt she could have read a lot more on human rights.

However, she found the nuclear section confusing and unconvincing. "It left me thinking there's nothing much to worry about". She felt the whole section lacked the clarity of the rest of the document. "It needs a section that sets out what you need to make a nuclear weapon, set alongside to what he has already". She also felt it could benefit from an explanation of sanctions, how they work, what they do.

Sorry to bombard on this point, but I do worry that the nuclear section will become the main focus and as currently drafted, is not in great shape. Do you have a new version yet?

A few minor points she made (Page numbers refer to the one you gave me yesterday am)

- different spelling of Qusay/Qusai
- Edinburgh spelled wrong in the box on page 10
- an "S" missing on the end of "delivery mean", par 11 and page 12
- par 10, page 19 can we have more details on "illegal foreign assistance"
- page 21, par 12 first block, UK - US has an aberrant question mark in the middle
- page 30, par 33 we say nobody can't be used for military procurement, yet elsewhere we say it has been so used for growth agents.
- top line, page 36, aberrant apostrophe in "Iraqi's" should be deleted
- page 43, par 4, the words "there are" should be inserted between "that" and "no" in the first line of that paragraph

Finally she felt that the conclusion box on CW/BW should include a list of agents in possession and production. I agree with that.

Sorry about the earlier mix up re foreword. You should have the correct one now.

Alison Blackshaw

From: Joanna Nadin
Sent: 18 September 2002 14:42
To: Alastair Campbell
Subject: intelligence

Another point I have just thought of - when it mentions "intelligence" - what exactly are they talking about?

Do they mean our people in Iraq (if there are any), do they mean defectors?

Saying "intelligence suggests that this factory has probably been rebuilt" is not entirely convincing - especially if you do not know what "intelligence" is.

I think it needs to make clear to whatever extent it can (there are restrictions I am sure) how good these sources are
No-one outside Whitehall will know

Alison Blackshaw

From: Scarlett John - ISS - [REDACTED]
Sent: 18 September 2002 15:06
To: Campbell Alastair - No. 10 -, Scarlett John - ISS -
Cc: Miller Julian - Intelligence and Security Secretariat -
Subject: RE: Another dossier memo!

[REDACTED]

John Scarlett has seen these comments and is taking account of them in the revisions now in the process of being incorporated. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] regular Wednesday JIC meeting and will be available to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] He will revert later. The aim remains to have the draft finalised in the course of this extended day

CAB/11/0090

Alison Blackshaw

From: Felicity Hatfield on behalf of Alastair Campbell
Sent: 19 September 2002 08:21
To: Scarlett John - SEC - A
Cc: David Manning, Jonathan Powell, 'Julian.Miller@britainoffice.x.gva.gov.uk'
Subject: Nuclear Section

As I said to Julian last night, I think it would be simpler to have just one clearer section on nuclear timelines, perhaps on the following lines. (This would delete par 18 and replace 24)

It is impossible to be precise about nuclear timelines. We can be clear however, that provided sanctions and export controls remain in place and effective, it is not possible for Iraq to develop nuclear weapons. This is because although they have the expertise, the design data, the planning and the intent they do not have the material necessary for the production of fissile material. This contrasts with CW/BW, which they can produce indigenously. Even if sanctions were removed, we assess that it would take up to five years for them to develop nuclear weapons. The timelines are considerably shortened however if Iraq manages to obtain fissile material illegally from overseas. In these circumstances, the JIC assessed in early 2002 that they could produce nuclear weapons in between one and two years

AB/11/0091

-----Original Message-----

From: Tom Kelly
Sent: 19 September 2002 10:50
To: Alastair Campbell
Cc: Godric Smith, Daniel Puce
Subject: Tuesday core script

<< File: dossier draft doc >> This is a rough draft of what could be a core script for Tuesday - whether we go up on Today, or do a briefing. I think the key point in our favour is the systematic nature of what Saddam is up to. The weakness, obviously, is our inability to say that he could pull the nuclear trigger any time soon. But the basic message of by then it would be too late does deal with that I think.

CAB/11/0092

Alison Blackshaw

From: Jonathan Powell
Sent: 19 September 2002 13:57
To: Alastair Campbell, Scarlett John - SEC - A
Cc: David Manning
Subject: RE

Can I see it?

-----Original Message-----

From: Alison Blackshaw **On Behalf Of** Alastair Campbell
Sent: 19 September 2002 12:43
To: Scarlett John - SEC - A
Cc: Jonathan Powell, David Manning
Subject:
Importance: High

I had a quick skim and am now out of the office until 2:30pm

Re the foreword, I don't like the first sentence which makes him sound a bit James Bond-y. Can we discuss?

I don't think the conclusion works. I would either revert to, and strengthen, the box idea, or drop it. In a way, the foreword covers most of the points.

I'm not sure about the "protest and project" his power bit.

Could the Shia uprising point go in the executive summary?

P 26, para 17, line 4, can we say "required for", rather than "that could be for use in"?

"May have" re Qusai is very weak.

Sorry this is so rushed.

[REDACTED]

From: Jonathan Powell [REDACTED]
Sent: 19 September 2002 15:45
To: Alastair Campbell, Scarlett John - SEC - A
Cc: David Manning
Subject: RE:

Importance: High

Found my copy I think it is good
I agree with Alastair you should drop the conclusion.
Alastair - what will be the headline in the Standard on day of publication?
What do we want it to be?
I think the statement on p19 that "Saddam is prepared to use chemical and biological weapons if he believes his regime is under threat" is a bit of a problem. It backs up the Don McIntyre argument that there is no CBW threat and we will only create one if we attack him I think you should redraft the para My memory of the intelligence is that he has set up plans to use CBW on western forces and that these weapons are integrated into his military planning
It needs checking for typos, eg Iraqi in middle of page 27.

> —Original Message—

> From: Alison Blackshaw On Behalf Of Alastair Campbell
> Sent: 19 September 2002 12:43
> To: Scarlett John - SEC - A
> Cc: Jonathan Powell; David Manning
> Subject
> Importance: High
>
> I had a quick skim and am now out of the office until 2 30pm.
>
> Re the foreword, I don't like the first sentence which makes him sound a bit James Bond-y. Can we discuss?
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> Could the Shia uprising point go in the executive summary?
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> P.26, para 17, line 4, can we say "required for", rather than "that could be for use in".
>
> "May have" re Qusai is very weak.
>
> Sorry this is so rushed.

Alison Blackshaw

From: Alison Blackshaw on behalf of Alastair Campbell
Sent: 19 September 2002 17:03
To: Scarlett John - SEC - A
Cc: Clare Sumner, Matthew Rycroft, David Manning, Jonathan Powell
Subject: FW Re final points for your 5pm meeting

Importance: High

1) Re nuclear timelines. If we're saying that it would take between one and 2 years for them to build a nuclear weapon by illegal means, why would it take 5 years with no sanctions? A lay reader may assume that no sanctions would mean he could do what he wanted and therefore, presumably, what he needed between 1 and 2 years

If the answer is that it would take 5 years to go from planning to reality, whereas he could purchase ready-made materials from overseas, and so cut the timelines, I think that should be made explicitly clear

Sorry not to have spotted this earlier but it now seems an obvious point.

2) Do we really need the 2 sentences on radiological dispersal device? They add little.

3) Further up that page, on the 2 blob points, could we say "is required to" rather than "could be used to"

Alison Blackshaw

From: Robert Hill
Sent: 20 September 2002 09:27
To: Alastair Campbell, Jonathan Powell
Cc: Sally Morgan
Subject: Dossier/Statement on tuesday

This may be blindingly obvious but in terms of giving credibility to the dossier are we making parallels with Afghanistan
People said then: 'Show us the evidence before you attack'. We did - we could not share it all or give chapter and
verse for it all. But when we went in we were proved right - in fact the situation was worse than we had described

CAB/11/0111