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If action is to be taken, what form will it take and what will the consequences of this action be? Will the coalition of nations stay together if the military attacks spread to other region? What are the options for our military planners in the days ahead?
Transcript:
Newshost:
Benjamin Lai, Bangkok/Thailand asks: Osama Bin Laden's network and sympathisers are scattered around the world, so any "Military war" will not be confined to Afghanistan alone. What will the Allies military response be on a multi "front" scenario?
And what measures can be taken to prevent the world wide uncontrolled escalation of this conflict?
Paul Adams:
Obviously that goes very much to the heart of many of the issues that this crisis has thrown up and one of the debates that we have heard a lot of is, is this going to be a battle on a narrow front or on a much broader front. Interestingly, the thinking, as the days and weeks go by, it seems to be towards a narrower battle. People are talking much more now about Osama Bin Laden, the Taleban, the situation in Afghanistan and rather less about other countries that sponsor terrorism.
So I think at the moment at least, as far as military planners are concerned, their concern is the immediate objective - getting Osama Bin Laden and, and if necessary if the Taleban are seen to be getting in the way of that objective, dealing with the Taleban regime as well. At the moment a multi-front scenario, despite the huge array of forces that we see assembling in that part of the world, doesn't appear to be the immediate objective.
Newshost:
David Nzaligo, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania asks: If you need only Osama and his network what is the need of having all the forces there? I also want Osama captured, but I think you are planning to use unreasonable force. Is there another agenda at work here?
Paul Adams:
I think there are various military doctrines at play here and one of them is one that Colin Powell, now the US Secretary of State, and in the Gulf War the head of America's Armed Forces, dictated which is, overwhelming force. Be absolutely sure that you have the numbers to overwhelm your enemy. Clearly what they are doing in moving aircraft carriers, planes and men to that part of the world is making sure that whatever form this fight takes, they have the wherewithal to do the job and do it successfully.
I don't think we should necessarily conclude that because there are these huge numbers of men and machines gathered in that area that they are all going to be employed in a fight against Osama Bin Laden and Taleban - that is clearly not going to be the case. What we are going to see, I think, is the much more specific use of particular assets - particularly aircraft, special forces - this is something that has been talked about a great deal. But all the time with this backdrop, if you like, of overwhelming force which sends a political message.
Newshost:
Mainak Dhar, Singapore asks: Given the lack of easy military targets (airfields, missile silos etc.) that there were Kosovo or Iraq, what are these aircraft going to do?
Paul Adams:
You're right. Many people have said that this is a country without military assets - a country without very many military targets. So again, what's the use of all this overwhelming firepower? I think it's worth pointing out that, almost certainly, there are people on the ground right now in Afghanistan identifying targets. Those targets could be anything from the bases that Osama Bin Laden and his people have been using - maybe deserted now for all we know - possible facilities that could be used by the allies once they go in and start operating in any numbers in Afghanistan. For example, they might decide that they need airbases inside Afghanistan. Not just for introducing further forces but possibly also for flying in aid.
It's clear as these weeks have evolved, there is some - and perhaps as much - attention being given to a humanitarian campaign as there is to a military campaign. It is possible that we'll see people going in to secure those types of facilities. So I think the targets are limited but there are still targets there and I am sure they are being identified as we speak.
Newshost:
1) Robert Powell, London, England asks: What do you think the consequences will be on our armed forces in the medium to long term? Do you think defence spending will have to increase?
Another more specific question from Mark Higgins, Belfast, Northern Ireland who asks: What are the implications for defence procurement in Britain? Is the US/UK Joint Strike Fighter programme now guaranteed? Will Britain get its two new carriers?
Paul Adams:
Good questions. Robert, you'll have heard only yesterday, the Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, talking about the role of Britain's Armed Forces in this. Clearly there are going to be consequences and those consequences are a little hard to predict because we still don't quite know what form this campaign, this war - whatever you call it - is going to take.
I think what people have now already identified - and Geoff Hoon, was alluding to this - is that despite the fact that Britain's approach to military doctrine was overhauled only three years ago in the strategic defence review, what happened on September 11th was so unprecedented that they are going to have to go back and look at some things again. There was reference to terrorism, there was reference to weapons of mass destruction and so forth in that review three years ago.
But because of the very particular circumstances that now exist and loom so large in our minds, there is going to be increasing effort to look at ways of combating this particular kind of terrorism and that is going to concentrate on things which may not actually be hugely costly. It may be intelligence, it may be the use of particular forms of communication - making sure that special forces introduced on the ground have the wherewithal to conduct these very precise, very limited operations. The implications of all that - Mark raises the question of the big ticket programmes - the Joint Strike Fighter and the carriers. In a way the shift has been away from those big programmes. I am quite sure that the Ministry of Defence will be pushing those still because there are still - behind all this emphasis on terrorism - a view that we need to be able to have rapid reaction using large assets. So I think those programmes will continue but I don't the implications of this crisis will be felt particularly there.
Newshost:
You mention Special Forces, David Adams, Miami, US asks: What chance is there that British Special Forces will take on a strike role for the US? Can the UK cope with such action?
Is this any relation of yours?
Paul Adams:
I rather think it is actually. I suspect that this is my twin brother in Miami. David - thanks for calling in - I know you have been interested in this over on your side the Atlantic and the role of the American Special Forces and it is a question that is being raised a great deal over here too.
The consensus seems to be - viewers and those joining us will have certainly heard the Americans more or less announcing that Special Forces - American and British - are already operating inside Afghanistan. It goes back to what I was saying earlier on - that there are going to be people on the ground looking around, not necessarily engaging the enemy at this point - in fact probably working quite hard not to. But identifying the kinds of situation that prevails on the ground, looking at what is happening with the Taleban and its forces - is there any sign that the Taleban's forces are disintegrating. Looking possibly at identifying usable facilities, should we choose to go in later on - and that this activity will continue.
Can the UK cope is a good question because at the moment the SAS - the elite British Special Forces, only number something in the region of 250 - possibly rather fewer than that. I think that one of the areas that may well be examined when we get back to this question of the impact on British military spending etc. is do we need more of that kind of special forces. They are difficult to train, it is very hard training, but that may be a challenge that we have to look at?
Newshost:
What can British Special Forces do that American Special Forces can't? Why do they need to enlist the British on this?
Paul Adams:
Without wanting to sound jingoistic or wave the flag, the consensus seems to be that British Special Forces are probably better than most - including many of their American counterparts. We have also some history of dealings in that particular part of the world. British Special Forces are known to have been in Afghanistan training with the Muhajadin in the fight against the Soviet invasion back in the 1980s. So there is particular experience of the conditions on the ground and a feeling that this is the kind of thing that they are well suited to do.
Newshost:
Pyers Symon, Ipswich UK
How much would the British experience of the 1970's Oman campaign be used as a model for any action in Afghanistan? In particular the "hearts and minds" methodology. I ask because that is a classic example of a western force defeating a guerrilla movement in conditions and culture similar to that in Afghanistan?
Paul Adams:
Pyers, you are absolutely right to mention that comparison. Indeed, I have heard Oman and the 1970s mentioned even in Ministry of Defence briefings in the last week or two. They do feel that that was a perfect example of the use of Special Forces - of particularly winning over local tribesmen - this was a key to the British success in Oman - they got local tribesmen on their side. That is clearly something that is going on, when one thinks about the Northern Alliance's efforts to draw in parts of the existing anti-Taleban Afghan forces - that is something again where Special Forces, British and American, are going to be involved. Who are these people? Who are the most effective fighters? How can they be brought effectively into the fight? Do they perhaps constitute an alternative government? All these questions are going to be looked at - Oman in the 1970s was a quite a model for all that.
Newshost:
Gary Holcombe, Cardiff, UK
Many speak of this war being the next Vietnam. This has sent shudders through young people such as myself who worry that the Government will start drafting people into the Army if too many casualties occur. Do you see this being a possibility?
Also Richard Haut, Nice, France asks: The Taleban may be hard for many of us to understand - cutting off their own income seems unlikely. Is there a danger of Britain occupying a similar role in this conflict to the one that it did in the Opium War against China in the mid-19th Century?
Paul Adams:
I suppose they are both, essentially, raising the same point. Are we in danger of getting sucked into something that we don't really understand? Afghanistan has been often described as a graveyard of Imperial armies.
I think that what we are looking at the moment is a campaign which is not going to involve large numbers of troops on the ground - at least at the way it looks at the moment. It doesn't seem likely that we will find ourselves in a Vietnam situation - bogged down and trapped by the enemy. These are inevitably going to the be the issues that the planners and the politicians are looking at. Recent history with the Russians shows that you don't wade into Afghanistan with large numbers of men and heavy armour and think that you can get out easily. Winter is approaching - another reason to be extremely cautious in this regard.
But having said that, we are being drawn in, inevitably, to a conflict focused on Afghanistan which has enormous regional dimensions - with the ex-Soviet Republics along the North - all of them have their particular perspective on this - the very difficult relationship and involvement of Pakistan. This is not just the business of going in and dealing with terrorism - it has enormous political, regional, geo-political implications and all of those are going to throw up, I suspect, unpredictable factors as we go along. That I think is one of the reasons why the rush to get involved, the rush to strike back we saw so vividly and heard so vividly from politicians three weeks ago, is beginning to be tempered quite considerably now.
Newshost:
Gareth Bennett, Colwyn Bay, Wales asks: Has the technology of war changed to such an extent that a repeat debacle of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan won't occur this time around?
Paul Adams:
Certainly technology has moved on and perhaps strategy as well. I think that the Soviet failure was precisely to think that they could go in, in large numbers, get stuck in and think that they could control the situation around them - they plainly couldn't and it started to disintegrate almost as soon as they got in there.
So, yes, we have got superior hardware, we've got superior intelligence - the kind of mechanisms that are being used now to gather intelligence with unmanned aerial vehicles flying constantly over the skies of Afghanistan. Presumably by now giving us a pretty accurate impression of what is going on, on the ground. That is going to help in this effort and I think also just the caution - the awareness that we are not going to go in the way they did, because if we do, the same fate could await us.
Newshost:
Ruth Lonie, Dundee, Scotland
We have all heard of the germ warfare threat that Osama Bin Laden's network may pose. However, do they pose any real nuclear threat?
Paul Adams:
It is one of the imponderables - both germ warfare and nuclear warfare. I think what the consensus seems to be - and I have no particular insight into this I have to admit - that while there may have been efforts to acquire some biological, chemical capability - it is difficult to "weaponise" that stuff - getting it is one thing and turning it into a weapon is another. But nuclear capability is a rather different order. Yes, they are close to former Soviet Republics where technology and personnel existed - some of that personnel found itself unemployed. It may well be that disaffected people could have found their way to a man with a large amount of money to spend - like Osama Bin Laden.
There is no hard evidence that I am aware of, that that has happened and no one that I have heard of has said we should be worried about a nuclear threat posed by Osama Bin Laden.
