Ten years on Saddam still in power
MARK URBAN:
Nothing quite like it had
happened since 1945. Half a million
servicemen and women, fighting under
American leadership. Thousands of
combat aircraft pounding targets, week
after week. It was war without limits,
both sides even considered using weapons
of mass destruction. At the head of the
American Armed Forces, there was
uncertainty. Was this the right way to
proceed? Could it end in another
Vietnam? Right up until the bombing
started, General Colin Powell had his
misgivings.
SIR PATRICK HINE:
He was a definite dove. When I called on
him in Washington, in October 1990, he
told me quite clearly, he thought it would
be folly to go to war, in order to get Saddam
out of Kuwait. He would have gone on
for at least two years, applying sanctions.
URBAN:
Two years?
HINE:
Yes. Up to two years is what he
said to me. I argued with him that
that was totally unrealistic, because
we had a very large number of forces
in the theatre at that time, and you
couldn't keep them there for two years.
Saddam would have claimed a victory,
that we just didn't have the guts to go
in, and sort him out.
URBAN:
Once the battle was
joined, these doubts had to be banished.
The Pentagon dealt with its anxiety, by
bombing, trying to shatter the Iraqi forces
before any ground attack. A new kind of
warfare was defined. Day by day, the
intelligence reports came in to this
underground headquarters, and experts
collated a bomb-damage assessment.
And it revealed that air power had destroyed
two-thirds of the Iraqi air force, and about
half of the army. The ground war, when it
started, lasted just four days and consisted of
driving through the shattered remnants. This
was, really, the first war in history won by
air power, something with profound implications.
The air war model was repeated in the Balkans
by President Clinton. But those who served
Bush the father, believe Bush the son has a
better understanding of the political purpose
of war.
JOHN BOLTON:
I think the Persian Gulf war was a classic use
of military force, in support of national interests,
and I think many of the military interventions
that took place over the Clinton administration,
were interventions that were not really in support
of significant American interests. That's why
there has been so much opposition in Congress
to kind of, casual use of military force. But I
think there is a very strong support, bipartisan
basis, across the American electorate that, if
we need to use force, whether we have Security
Council approval for it or not, we will use it
in defence of our national interests.
ANNOUNCER:
I am pleased to announce that, at midnight
tonight, all United States and coalition forces
will suspend offensive combat operations.
URBAN:
The Gulf War was ended by President
Bush on the advice of Colin Powell, a decision
which still causes rancour among the British
allies.
TOM KING:
There was no discussion about the
ending of the war. That was very much decided
in Washington. Obviously, they had the
overwhelming bulk of the forces there, but it
was the one time when the really close co-operation
and consultation between particularly ourselves
and the Americans, and other members of
the alliance, broke down. That was decided
in the White House, and we suddenly learnt
that they were proposing to stop. But I personally
have always thought that another 24 or 48 hours,
and some real damage inflicted on the Republican
Guard, would probably have tilted the balance of
power in Iraq quite significantly, and could have
led to a different outcome, which might have been
rather happier for the future of Iraq, and for the
whole of that region.
URBAN:
In bringing Saddam Hussein down?
KING:
Yes.
URBAN:
Powell and the White House had been
disturbed by images of the slaughter of Iraqi forces.
The final destruction of the Republican Guard
would have required more of this. With hostilities
over, the coalition put weapons inspectors into
Iraq, and bound its economy with sanctions. A
huge amount of nuclear and chemical weaponry
was destroyed, but over the years, the Iraqis have
gained much sympathy for the human cost of
sanctions. This system collapsed in December
1998, when President Clinton ordered a new wave
of air strikes. Saddam Hussein had kicked out the
weapons inspectors. Sanctions, meanwhile, have
been crumbling, imports and exports increasing
apace. But American policy has been reduced to
one of drift. Perhaps those with the greatest
incentive for the current impasse, to end are those
who are still required to fly over Iraq.
HINE:
I think they are concerned there is this stalemate
situation, I don't know where it's leading. Certainly,
it is containing Saddam in a military sense, until
such time as a new political initiative is found,
and one which will persuade him to see reason.
URBAN:
The air operation over Iraq continues virtually day
to day, and while American and British airmen are
risking their lives in those skies, the system of
economic sanctions is collapsing. Everybody agrees
it can't go on, but while many countries think now
is the time to abandon the whole package, America
has got a new administration that wants to toughen
it all up again. Many, though, are concerned by the
plight of poorer Iraqis. Today, anti-sanctions
demonstrators picketed Parliament. In other former
members of the Gulf Coalition, feelings have been
even stronger. That will define the new administration's
diplomatic strategy.
GEOFFREY KEMP:
If what General Powell means, is strengthening
those sanctions, that we believe are going to have
most impact on Saddam Hussein's military capability,
that is to say sanctions on all military transfers,
dual-use technology, then I think that can be done.
I think there is a will to do that, not just in this country,
but in Europe, and even in the Middle East and
possibly Russia. Where I think there is less enthusiasm,
is for general sanctions which are seen to hurt the
Iraqi people more than they hurt Saddam Hussein and
his regime.
URBAN:
As Secretary of State designate, Colin Powell once
more is putting his faith in sanctions. And the objective?
BOLTON:
I don't think there is any possibility of a workable
weapons inspection regime being recreated. Maybe we
were naive in the first place, but it's just not going to
work now. I think, instead, we need effective economic
sanctions, to preclude Saddam from getting the economic
resources he is now using, to recreate his conventional
weapons capability and his capability in weapons of mass
destruction.
URBAN:
Saddam's people show their contempt for America
and its values, but it is they who pay, whether in
battlefield casualties or suffering from sanctions, and
Colin Powell must find a way to change that, if he is
once again to put Saddam under pressure.