Video highlights: Blair at the Iraq Inquiry

This is a transcript of edited highlights of Tony Blair's appearance at the Iraq war inquiry chaired by Sir John Chilcot on 29 January 2010.

CONSEQUENCE OF 9/11

Sir Roderic Lyne: 9/11 was a massive shock, which changed the international environment, and particularly, with regard to this question and your former Foreign Secretary spoke about this in detail, so we probably don't need to go over all this ground again it changed the way that the United States perceived the world. It changed the perception of risk. It changed attitudes towards perceived threats, and, as Jack Straw was later on to put it to you in his minute of 25 March 2002, summarising the situation with regard to Iraq: "Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September. What has, however, changed, is the tolerance of the international community, especially that of the United States." I wonder if you could just tell us how your attitude to Iraq, not that of the United States, evolved in these months after 9/11?

Tony Blair: Straight after 9/11, in the statement I made to the House of Commons, just a few days after, I think on 14 September, I specifically deal with this issue, to do with weapons of mass destruction and the danger of the link with terrorism. Here is what changed for me the whole calculus of risk. It was my view then, it remains my view now. The point about this terrorist act was that over 3,000 people had been killed on the streets of New York, an absolutely horrific event, but this is what really changed my perception of risk, the calculus of risk for me: if those people, inspired by this religious fanaticism could have killed 30,000, they would have. For those of us who dealt with terrorism from the IRA, and, incidentally, I don't want to minimise the impact of that terrorism? each act of terrorism is wicked and wrong and to be deplored. But the terrorism that an organisation like the IRA were engaged in was terrorism directed towards a political purpose, maybe unjustified, but it was within a certain framework that you could understand. The point about this act in New York was that, had they been able to kill even more people than those 3,000, they would have, and so, after that time, my view was you could not take risks with this issue at all.

Sir Roderic Lyne: From the evidence that we have heard so far, from now a large number of witnesses, and from the documents we have read, it does begin to appear that by about March or April of 2002 you were strongly attracted to the idea of changing the regime in Iraq, and, in a sense, in doing so, you were building on a philosophy of humanitarian intervention that you had first, I think, set out in a very public way in your Chicago speech of April 1999, and you in April, of course, of 2002, after your meeting with President Bush, returned to it in your speech at the George Bush Presidential Library at College Station when you said, talking in general of regime change, not specifically in this paragraph about Iraq: "If necessary, the action should be military, and, again, if necessary and justified, it should involve regime change. I have been involved, as British Prime Minister, in three conflicts involving regime change: Milosevic, the Taliban and Sierra Leone." Had you reached the point where you regarded, within this philosophy, removing Saddam's regime and I do not think anybody was ever in any doubt about the evilness of Saddam's regime as a valid objective for the government's policy?

Tony Blair: No, the absolutely key issue was the WMD issue, but I think it is just worth at this point and then I will come specifically to the text of this speech and deal with this notion that somehow in Crawford I shifted our position.

Sir Roderic Lyne: We will talk about Crawford separately. I'm sticking on the strategy now. I'm referring to the speech.

Tony Blair: Wasn't that the day after the Crawford meeting?

Sir Roderic Lyne: It was the day after the Crawford meeting and it is in the context of your philosophy of regime...

Tony Blair: Okay. Let me make it quite clear. In the Chicago speech, in 1999, what I was doing was setting out very clearly what I thought the consequences were of an interdependent world, and what I was really saying was this: that whereas in the past people might have thought that a security problem in one part of the world can be divorced from its impact on another part, in the world that was developing, we were no longer able to do that, not financially, not in terms of security, not in terms, actually, of the cultural issues. In other words, as a result of an interdependent world, it then became in our selfinterest,not as part simply of some moral cause, but in our self interest to regard ourselves as affected by what was happening in a different part of the world. I actually have the Chicago speech here if you want me to refer to it.

Sir Roderic Lyne: I have it too, and I have referred to it.

Tony Blair: It is quite important to make this point

Sir Roderic Lyne: It is an important speech.

Tony Blair: Yes, because, if you read the speech, you will see very clearly that the basis for what I'm saying is not that I now believe that we should apply, rather than a test of national interest, a moral test I mean, I think there are moral issues to do with dictators and so on.

What I was saying was that, from now on, in the new world that is developing, we should realise that it is in our national interest to understand that the problem in a different part of the world can come back and hit us in ours. The reason why I was so strongly in favour of action in Kosovo, action, incidentally, to rescue an essentially Muslim population from persecution by a country that was a Christian country, was not simply that I felt affronted, as I think people should and did do, about the prospect of ethnic cleansing, but also because I was convinced that the consequences of allowing such an action to go unchecked would never stay at the borders of the Balkans. So that's the basis of it.

When we then come to the Texas speech, it is not that I suddenly say, "Now it is regime change, rather than WMD". On the contrary, you quoted a passage I then go on to say this: "We cannot, of course, intervene in all cases, but where countries are engaged in the terror or WMD business, we should not shrink from confronting them. Some can be offered a way out, a route to respectability. I hope in time that Syria, Iran and even North Korea can accept the need to change their relationships with the outside world. A new relationship is on offer. But they must know that sponsoring terrorism or WMD is unacceptable."

Then I go on to deal with Iraq: "As for Iraq, I know some fear precipitate action. They needn't. We will proceed, as we did after September 11, in a calm, measured, sensible but firm way ..." Then I go on: "... but leaving Iraq to develop WMD in flagrant breech of no less than nine separate United Nations Resolutions, refusing still to allow weapons inspectors back to do their work properly, is not an option."I then go on to describe the brutality of Saddam, but then I come back to the issue of WMD.

So, for me, the issue was very, very simple: it was about the need to make absolutely clear that from now on you did not defy the international community on WMD. I would like, if I might, also to make one other point, because I have read obviously a lot of the evidence that has been given to you.

I think there is a danger that we end up with a very sort of binary distinction between regime change here and WMD here. The truth of the matter is that a regime that is brutal and oppressive, that, for example, has used WMD against its own people, as Saddam did, and had killed tens of thousands of people by the use of chemical weapons, such a regime is a bigger threat, if it has WMD, than one that is otherwise benign.

DEAL WITH PRESIDENT BUSH?

Baroness Usha Prashar: Your Chief of Staff told us that at Crawford and subsequently you did not set any conditions for Britain's support for the US, but that your approach was to say, "We are with you in terms of what you are trying to do, but this is a sensible way to do it. We are offering you a partnership to try and get to a wide coalition." But other witnesses who were also involved in the decision-making process have told us that you set a number of clear conditions for our support. Which was it?

Tony Blair: It was the former. Look, this is an alliance that we have with the United States of America. It is not a contract. It is not, "We do this for you, you do this for us". It is an alliance and it is an alliance, I say to you very openly, I believe in passionately. I had been through with President Clinton, Kosovo, and just let me emphasise to you, 85 per cent of the assets we used in Kosovo were American assets. I had real difficulty persuading President Clinton that it was right to go all the way on Kosovo, and he was in a really difficult position and it was an immensely courageous decision he took, because the American people were saying to him, "Look, this place is thousands of miles away from America. Let the Europeans deal with it. It is on their doorstep". It is important to understand this.

Baroness Usha Prashar: But Sir Christopher Meyer did say you were saying, "Yes, but", but the "but" was not being listened to.

Tony Blair: I don't think he was there at the critical meeting.

Baroness Usha Prashar: But he had correspondence, he was briefed on all of that.

Sir Roderic Lyne: He was talking about a wider period in 2002, not just about one meeting.

Tony Blair: Yes, but the fact is, at that meeting and it is, I think, the other evidence that has been given to you, particularly by David Manning, is very clear about this we were setting out a position, and, as I say, that position was not a private position, it was a public position, but I was just explaining about the American line, because it is important and it is important in understanding my thinking on this. So I had been through this process with President Clinton. When he, with a lot of courage, had committed America. September 11 happened. I never regarded September 11 as an attack on America, I regarded it as an attack on us, and I had said we would stand shoulder to shoulder with them. We did in Afghanistan and I was determined to do that again.

Baroness Usha Prashar: Now, I think the term used by Jonathan Powell was that you said that, for tactical reasons so granted you partly for tactical reasons, you set out for the US the issues you believed needed to be tackled for the policy to be pursue successfully, but I think at Crawford you did discuss UK participation in US military planning. Now, when you discussed that, what conclusions do you think President Bush took from the meeting about your commitment of dealing with Saddam Hussein through military action?

Tony Blair: I think what he took from that is exactly what he should have taken, which is that, if it came to military action because there was no way of dealing with this diplomatically, we would be with him, and that was absolutely clear, because, as I had set out publicly, not privately, we had to confront this issue, it could be confronted by a sanctions framework that was effective. For the reasons I have given, we didn't have one. It could be confronted by a UN inspections framework we will come to that or, alternatively, it would have to be confronted by force. I was going earlier but I won't do it, but I'm very happy to make available the comments I had made, even prior to September 11 2001, because we had been through this with Saddam several times, 1997, 1998, and so on and so forth. You know, the fact is force was always an option. What changed after September 11 was that, if necessary, and there was no other way of dealing with this threat, we were going to remove him.

MILITARY VIEW

Baroness Usha Prashar: How did you weigh up the risks to the troops involved in the situation in Iraq?

Tony Blair: As I was just explaining, when I come to take this decision, the very first thing I do is I ask the military for their view, and their view in this instance was that they were up for doing it and that they preferred to be right at the centre of things. That, actually I'm not hiding behind them, because that was my view too. I thought, if it was right for us to be in it, we should be in it there alongside our principal ally, the United States, I thought that in Afghanistan and I thought that in Iraq also.

Baroness Usha Prashar: That was your view too, so you were at one with what you were being advised on?

Tony Blair: Correct.

Baroness Usha Prashar: Did President Bush at any stage request a particular form of scale of the UK contribution?

Tony Blair: No. He very much left this to us, to decide what we wanted to do, but I had taken a view that this was something that, if it was right to do, actually it mattered to have Britain there and it mattered not simply for reasons to do with...

Baroness Usha Prashar: It mattered, but did the scale matter? Because there were different ways in which we could have contributed, but did it have to be on the large scale that we committed ourselves to?

Tony Blair: It didn't have to be. You could have chosen one of the other two options. There were three basic options.

Baroness Usha Prashar: Why did you choose you were advised, but you were of that view. Why were you of that view?

Tony Blair: Because, if you believe it is right and you are going to do it, my view was that it is best for Britain to be in there, right alongside, and I say that because I regarded this whole issue as a threat to our security, as well as a threat to the security of the United States of America. It is not simply that I valued the alliance, although I do value the alliance. As I always say to people: you can distance yourself from America, if you want to, but you will find it is a long way back. I believe it is a vital part of our security, and I also believe this: if we think it is right, we should be prepared to play our part fully.

Baroness Usha Prashar: But the reasons given by the Chief of Defence Staff was about the relations and the morale. Was there a question of how much influence we would be able to exercise if we contributed on a large scale?

Tony Blair: It wasn't so much that. It is a matter of common sense, obviously. If you are there with a bigger force alongside the Americans than otherwise, then, of course, you will be more intimately involved, but that's not really the reason. The reason was to say: here we have this situation, in which we believe there is a threat, America believes there is a threat, we are going to act jointly. We have acted jointly before, we are going to act jointly again, and it does in part derive from the importance that certainly I attach, and I hope the country does, to the American alliance, and also to the fact that our armed forces and the thing that is extraordinary about them and magnificent about them, they are prepared to do the difficult things.

Baroness Usha Prashar: So you are saying it was driven by your sense of what was the proper UK contribution to policy?

Tony Blair: Correct

Baroness Usha Prashar: Influence wasn't an important part of it?

Tony Blair: You didn't, and shouldn't, do it for influence. Although, as I say, it stands to reason, if you are making a bigger contribution, you are going to have more of a say.

THE 45-MINUTE CLAIM

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Did you understand the difference between the 45 minutes relating to battlefield munitions and, say, a long-range missile?

Tony Blair: I didn't focus on it a great deal at the time, because it was mentioned by me, and then, as I say, it was never actually mentioned again by me. As I indicated to the Butler Inquiry, in the light of what subsequently happened and the importance it subsequently took on, it would have most certainly been better to have corrected it. However, if I could just make this point about the you know, where you quite rightly say, of course it is not surprising it takes on significance because of all the controversy, quite rightly, over the intelligence that was wrong. It was for that very reason that we held the Hutton Inquiry, which was a six-month Inquiry, precisely into whether we had inserted this from Downing Street into the dossier, and of course we didn't, and the JIC was the...

Sir Lawrence Freedman: I think it has been established that, in that sense, the dossier wasn't doctored by any improper insertion of false intelligence. It is more a question of how a particular bit of intelligence was interpreted and presented, losing its specificity and gaining a broader meaning. So just to clarify from what you said, you seem to be saying that you hadn't actually paid a lot of attention to this, so that, when it appeared in the foreword the phrase is well known about the 45 minutes you weren't particularly aware yourself that you were saying something that went beyond what the intelligence would really allow?

Tony Blair: Correct, and as I say, I mentioned it, I think, in my statement of 24 September, but I mentioned it without any great emphasis and I mentioned it, I think, in reasonably sensible terms.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: You have already mentioned, not just the Standard, but a number of newspaper reports the next day headlined this. It wasn't just a question of it appearing as one part of a long discussion. Presumably, at this point, it must have struck you that something had hit home. Were you at all concerned that in a issue of such moment that intelligence, intelligence of a certain nature was getting an exaggerated sense of importance?

Tony Blair: You know, the thing that strikes me most now, when you go back and look at the dossier and how it was received, it was actually received as somewhat dull and cautious at the time.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Yes, we have been told.

Tony Blair: It really assumed a vastly greater importance at a later time, precisely because of the allegation, which was an extraordinarily serious one, that we, Downing Street, had deliberately falsified the intelligence, which of course we hadn't.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: The importance of the dossier, of course, is in terms, in part, of its immediate political impact, and no doubt you are right to say that the general view that this was telling us what we already knew, but if it was, it was saying quite important? that we had detailed intelligence on Iraqi WMD that led you to certain conclusions, and, therefore, in a sense, if it was considered old news, it was because you had already been successful in establishing that point of view.

Tony Blair: I don't think it was us that were successful in establishing that point of view. I think you would have been hard pushed to have found virtually anybody who doubted he had WMD and a WMD capability and programme, because we had been through this whole saga, ten years of military action. As I say, I took the first military action in respect of Baghdad with President Clinton in 1998. So it wasn't that so much, and, incidentally, I just point out that in the statement with the dossier, which I think, to be frank, it was the statement people would have heard rather than the foreword, I actually say specifically:"'Why now?' people ask. I agree, I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next, Saddam will use his weapons." So the issue was not he is about to launch an attack.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: I appreciate that. What I'm trying to get at is the quality of the intelligence, because just to take an example, President Chirac, certainly in September 2002, seemed to believe that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, but I think he also said, "But I have seen no proof". The issue that is now important because you have decided to go down the UN route, is that that detail is going to be tested. Indeed, you had a press conference with President Yeltsin (sic) in October, where he said he didn't believe in it, and you said, "Well, that's for the inspectors to find out". I think you did.

Tony Blair: No, I was merely reflecting on the fact that there was a whole issue to do with Russia and its view of how to proceed.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: There is indeed an issue, but the point just to keep focused on it at the moment is that the actual quality of the intelligence that the British had and the Americans had was more important about whether this was a shared assumption, because we were now proposing, or you were hoping, indeed, as the dossier was published, the President had promised to take this through the UN route. So the quality of the information was important. This brings us to the - it has been pointed out to me I said "Yeltsin" rather than "Putin" - This is important we get to the foreword. You said in the foreword that: "The assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt that Iraq has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons." Now, you have already mentioned the JIC reports about "patchy", "sporadic", "limited", et cetera. Given that, was it wise to say that intelligence is ever beyond doubt? Wasn't this setting yourself up for a higher standard of proof than it might be possible to sustain?

I think what I said in the foreword was that I believed it was beyond doubt. What: "What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons." I did believe it. I think that was the and I did believe it, frankly, beyond doubt.

Beyond your doubt, but beyond anybody's doubt?

Tony Blair: If you if I had taken, for example, the words out of even the 9 March 2002 or the March 2002 JIC assessment, it said, "It was clear that ..." Now, if I said, "It was clear that" in the foreword, rather than "I believe, beyond doubt", it would have had the same impact. I actually think now and this is, incidentally, I think, a lesson that came out of the Butler Inquiry but I think it is relevant to this as well, and I said this at the time, now, I would take government right out of this altogether. I would simply have published, if the intelligence services had been willing, the JIC assessment, because they were absolutely strong enough on their own, and if you look at the dossier itself and, of course, the dossier itself, if you just take the executive summary I mean, I won't go through and read it, but this executive summary wasn't drawn up by me. It was drawn up by the Joint Intelligence Committee and they did it perfectly justifiably on the information they had before them. It is hard to come to any other conclusion than that this person has a continuing WMD programme, and I mean, we will come at a later point in this to the issue of what the truth was about Saddam, because the Iraq Survey Group, which is, in my view, an extremely important document, has actually resolved the conundrum and the riddle of what Saddam was up to, and we therefore can see what happened. But if you go back to that time, if you read the executive summary and the information that follows, I can't see how anyone could come to a different conclusion.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: This is possibly a problem, maybe another lesson. Intelligence is often described as joining up the dots, because your information is limited, and there was a very powerful hypothesis that allowed you to join up the dots in a particular way, but there were alternative hypotheses and they were around at the time. So it is partly a question almost of due diligence. Was there a challenge to the intelligence? Are you absolutely sure that there isn't another way of explaining all this material?

Tony Blair: When you are Prime Minister and the JIC is giving this information, you have got to rely on the people doing it, with experience and with commitment and integrity, as they do. Of course, now, with the benefit of hindsight, we look back on the situation differently. But let me say what was troubling me at the time was supposing we put it the other way round and it was correct and I wasn't going to act on it, that was the thing that worried me, and when I talked earlier about the calculus of risk changing after September 11th, it is really, really important, I think, to understand this, so far as understanding the decision I took, and, frankly, would take again: if there was any possibility that he could develop weapons of mass destruction, we should stop him. That was my view. That was my view then and it's my view now.

SECOND UN RESOLUTION

Sir Lawrence Freedman: I would like, therefore, to fast forward, if I may, to your meeting with President Bush in Washington on 31 January 2003. Was your main objective at that meeting to convince the President that, just as you had convinced him that it was important to go through the UN to get the fist resolution, that now it was necessary to get a second resolution?

Tony Blair: Yes. The second resolution was obviously going to make life a lot easier politically in every respect. The difficulty was this: that 1441 had been very clear and I know you have gone through this in enormous detail with Peter Goldsmith, but just to emphasise the point, it was a very strong resolution. It declared Iraq was in material breach, it said that it had fully and unconditionally and immediately to cooperate and cooperate with the inspectors and so on.

It was a strong resolution. It specifically mentioned the previous resolutions, 678, 687 and so on. But, as you have heard, the truth is there was an unresolved issue, because some people some countries obviously wanted to come back and only have a decision for action with a specific UN Resolution specifically mandating that action. We took the view that that was not necessary, but, obviously, politically, it would have been far easier.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Sir Roderic will be talking to you later about the legal case, but perhaps just to note from the evidence we heard from Lord Goldsmith, the last advice you had from him, before you went off from Washington, was that, at that time, he believed that the legal position was that we did need a second resolution.

Tony Blair: Correct. So there was that issue as well and that was another reason why getting a second resolution would have been important, although Peter was not, I don't think, saying that that resolution had to be in those terms, but that we needed to come back for a further decision, as it were.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: What was the president's view of the need for a second resolution?

Tony Blair: President Bush's view and the view of the entire American system was that, by that time, Saddam had been given an opportunity to comply. I think the Resolution 1441 said it was a final opportunity.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: A final opportunity?

Tony Blair: To comply, and he hadn't taken it. Indeed, what we now know is that he was continuing to act in breach of the UN Resolutions even after the inspectors had gone back in there. So the American view was the American view throughout had been, you know, "This leopard isn't going to change his spots. He is always going to be difficult". So that was their concern about the UN route, in a sense, was that they'd get pulled into a UN process, you'd never get to a proper decision and then you'd never get the closure of the issue in the way that you should. The problem, obviously, from our perspective, was that we had gone down the UN route, we wanted to carry on going down the UN route, but the Americans had taken the view and in a sense we took the same view of the Iraqi behaviour up to that period at the end of January that they weren't complying.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: So to be clear, the President's view was that it really wasn't necessary, but was he prepared to work for one?

Tony Blair: His view was that it wasn't necessary but he was prepared to work for one.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Now, it has been reported in the New York Times in 2006 that the President said at that meeting that the Americans would put the work behind the effort but, if it ultimately failed, military action would follow anyway. Is that correct?

Tony Blair: The President's view was that if you can't get a second resolution because, in essence, France and Russia are going to say no, even though in fact I don't think they were really disputing that Iraq was in breach of Resolution 1441, then we were going to be faced with a choice I never wanted to be faced with: did you go then without a second resolution? My view very strongly was that, if he was in breach of 1441, we should mean what we have said. It was a final opportunity to comply, he wasn't complying.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: So your position at the time was that, if couldn't get a second resolution, you would agree with the Americans, go with the Americans, on military action?

Tony Blair: Well, there was then the legal question, which was very important, because Peter had drawn my attention to that. So there were all sorts of factors that were going to be in play there. There was the political question as to whether we would get the support for it. But my own view, and I was under absolutely no doubt about this, was that, if you backed away, when he was playing around with the inspectors in precisely the way he had done before, then you were going to send a very, very bad signal out to the world.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: It has also been reported, and I don't think it's a big secret, that you were informed that the proposed start date for military action at that time was March 10th.

Tony Blair: Hmmm

Sir Lawrence Freedman: Is that your recollection?

Tony Blair: It was at that meeting or around about that time, certainly, yes.

Sir Lawrence Freedman: But the date eventually slipped back just over a week. Is it also fair to say that the President was adamant that this military planning set the terms for the diplomatic strategy rather than the other way round?

Tony Blair: Well, this was a debate that continued frankly, and you see, what I tried to do, as you know, before the military action, is I had one last attempt to get a consensus in the Security Council around a resolution I drafted, effectively with Hans Blix, to lay down a series of tests that Saddam had to comply with. You see, the problem was this: there was no doubt he was in breach because he wasn't complying fully and unconditionally and immediately. On the other hand, people were saying, "Well, but give the inspectors more time", which is perfectly you know, understandable. I was thinking, "How do we actually get to the point where you force people to understand and, in a sense, Saddam finally to decide, whether he is going to comply or not?"

Sir Lawrence Freedman: We are getting a bit forward, although you raise issues that are obviously important. I think it is fair to say, at that time, the American view was that the military timetable, with a little bit of give, had to be adhered to. My point is simply this this is the question from the end of January, you had perhaps six weeks, maybe more, maybe seven, how did you think you could get a resolution through in such a short period of time? Wasn't the danger of this situation that, in a sense, not only were you giving Saddam an ultimatum, but you were almost giving yourself an ultimatum as well?

Tony Blair: It wasn't that I was giving myself an ultimatum, because our position had been clear. We had to resolve this through the UN. If we couldn't resolve it through the UN inspectors, we had to resolve it by removing Saddam. What actually happened was we had time enough to do it. The problem was very simple: in the end, after 1441, in a sense France and Germany and Russia moved to a different position and they formed their own power, in a sense, essentially saying to America "We are not going to be with you on this".

LEGALITY OF WAR

Sir Roderic Lyne: What discussions did you, or others under your instruction, if any, have with Lord Goldsmith between 7 March, when you received his formal advice, and 13 March, when he decided that his position had evolved further?

Tony Blair: I can't recall any specific discussions that I had. I don't know whether others would have had with him before 13 March, but essentially what happened was this: he gave legal advice, he gave an opinion saying, "Look, there is this argument against it, there is this argument for it. I think a reasonable case can be made", and obviously we then had to have a definitive decision, and that decision is: yes, it is lawful to do this or not. So

Sir Roderic Lyne: A huge amount hung on that decision.

Tony Blair: Of course. A lot hung on that decision,and it was therefore extremely important that it was done by the Attorney General and done in a way which we were satisfied was correct and right, and that's what he did. If I can just point this out, too: if you go back and read Resolution 1441, I think it is quite hard to argue, as a matter of common sense leave aside there are issues to do with the precise interpretation of some of the provisions. 1441, the whole spirit of it was: we have been through ten years of Saddam Hussein breaching UN Resolutions. We finally decide that he is going to be given one last chance. This is the moment when, if he takes that chance, there is no conflict, we resolve the matter, but if he doesn't take that chance and starts messing around again, as he started to do, then that's it.

Sir Roderic Lyne: So it is quite hard to argue what? Quite hard to argue that a further resolution is necessary?

Tony Blair: The further resolution was clearly politically preferable. For us, if you can get everybody back on the same page again, it is clearly preferable, but if you actually examine the circumstances of 1441, the whole point about it and and this is the argument I used with the Americans successfully to get them to go down this route and by the way, I should just point out, at the end of October 2002, I remember specifically a conversation with President Bush in which I said, "If he complies, that's it". There is no ...

Sir Roderic Lyne: Yes, I think you mentioned this earlier.

Tony Blair: But this is important, because people sometimes say it was all kind of cast in stone from ...

Sir Roderic Lyne: But wasn't Number 10 saying to the White House in January and February, even into March, that it was essential, from the British perspective, because of our reading of the law, to have a second resolution?

Tony Blair: It was politically, we were saying ...

Sir Roderic Lyne: Not merely preferable, but essential.

Tony Blair: No. Politically, we were saying it was going to be very hard for us. Indeed, it was going to be very hard for us.

Sir Roderic Lyne: Weren't we saying it was legally necessary for us, because that was his advice?

Tony Blair: What we said was, legally, it resolves that question obviously beyond any dispute. On the other hand, for the reasons that I have given, Peter, in the end, decided that actually a case could be made out for doing this without another resolution, and, as I say, did so, I think, for perfectly good reasons.

Sir Roderic Lyne: Well, it must have been of considerable relief to you, on 13 March, when he told you that he had come to the better view that the revival argument worked, because, at that point, he had given you subject to you making the determination, the clear legal grounds that you needed.

Tony Blair: Yes, and the reason why he had done that was really very obvious, which was that the Blix reports indicated quite clearly that Saddam had not taken that final opportunity.

Sir Roderic Lyne: But he had done it in disagreement with the international lawyers, all of them, as we understand from Sir Michael Wood, then in the government's employ.

Tony Blair: I seem to remember but I may be wrong on this? if I am, forgive me but I think that he had also sought the advice of Christopher Greenwood QC.

Sir Roderic Lyne: He had, and we discussed that, and it didn't appear from our discussion that there were many other people outside government arguing in the same direction that Lord Goldsmith eventually argued.

Tony Blair: Obviously, other countries, of course, were having the same issues as well and having to decide this and it wasn't I don't think it is right to say it was irrelevant that the American lawyers had come to a different view.

Sir Roderic Lyne: Clearly not irrelevant, because it had a big impact on him, but, apart from America, were there other countries in which we have heard recently what a Dutch review has found on this, but were there other countries in which people were arguing in favour of the revival argument?

Tony Blair: I think all countries who took the military action believed they had a sound legal basis for doing so. All I am pointing out is, actually, when you analyse 1441, it is less surprising as a conclusion to come to than as sometimes is made out today, because the fact is 1441 was very deliberately constructed. It had, if you like, a certain sort of integrity as a resolution to it. It basically said, "Okay, one last chance. One last chance, Saddam, to prove that you have had a change of heart, that you are going to cooperate", and he didn't.

Sir Roderic Lyne: We are not lawyers, we have simply listened to the views of lawyers, Lord Goldsmith, Sir Michael Wood, Ms Wilmshurst, Mr Brummell, and looked at what they told us about the balance of legal opinion on this subject. Lord Goldsmith obviously was not in a position in which he had wide support within the international legal fraternity within the government, indeed any, I think, in the UK, when he made his judgment. But he is a lawyer of the highest eminence and they accepted his authority, even if they didn't agree with it. So that was the final position.

Tony Blair: Sorry, forgive me, Sir Roderic. All I'm trying to say is, when you actually go back and read 1441, it is pretty obvious that you can make a decent case for this.

Sir Roderic Lyne: Well, let me not pass judgment on that. I'm asking questions and I do not have an opinion to state on it. I would just like to ask one final question to wrap up this legal chapter, and this is really you were in the position, ultimately, where you had to give this determination. You had to go through with the action, Lord Goldsmith was preparing with the assistance of Christopher Greenwood for the possibility of legal challenge. He knew that he had taken a decision that some others, many others, perhaps, were arguing with and were going to argue with, and he had put something to you that was described as a reasonable case, but, nevertheless, not one that he would have confidently put before a court. You then had to decide whether you were convinced that this was a strong enough legal basis to take a very serious action of participating in a full-scale invasion of another country. How convinced were you, at this point, that you had a strong legal case for doing what you did?

Tony Blair: I would put it in this way. What I needed to know from him was, in the end, was he going to say this was lawful? He had to come to conclusion in the end, and I was a lawyer myself, I wrote many, many opinions for clients, and they tend to be, "On the one hand ... on the other hand", but you come to a conclusion in the end and he had to come to that conclusion. Incidentally, I think he wasn't alone in international law in coming to that conclusion, for very obvious reasons, because, as I say, if you read the words in 1441 it is pretty clear this was Saddam's last chance. So that was what he had to do. He did it. As I say, anybody who knows Peter knows he would not have done it unless he believed in it and thought it was the correct thing to do, and that was for us and for our armed forces, that was sufficient.

Sir Roderic Lyne: You weren't worried by him saying that he wouldn't expect to win in a court with this one?

Tony Blair: I do not know that he said "not to win", he simply said, you know, there is a case either way, and there always was a case either way. That's why it would have been preferable, politically, and and to have removed any doubt, to have had the second resolution, but in the end, we got to the point in the middle of March when, frankly, we had to decide. We were going either to back away or we were going to go forward, and I decided, for the reasons that I have given, that we should go forward.

POST WAR PLANNING

BaronessUsha Prashar: But why is it that so many witnesses have said to us that the aftermath planning was deficient?

Tony Blair: I think, first of all, a lot of the criticisms have been directed at the American system. Now, all I would say about that is I think, like you, if you look at the Rand Report or the Inspector general's report, I think done in 2009, in America, I think it lays out very clearly the problems in pre-war planning and the problems in post-war execution. I think for ourselves, if we knew then what we know now, we would, of course, do things very differently. On the other hand, for what we thought we were going to have, we had planned for it and we actually met those eventualities.

Baroness Usha Prashar: You say that criticisms were directed at the Americans, but what had you agreed with President Bush about the aftermath?

Tony Blair: What we had agreed was that this was the whole dispute, really, about the United Nations. We were saying the United Nations had to come back into the situation.

Baroness Usha Prashar: But they were very reluctant to give the United Nations a role and that is something, I think, which we wanted and there was a resistance from the Americans?

Tony Blair: Yes, that's absolutely right, Baroness, but in the end the Americans agreed that they should have what we called a vital or central role.

Baroness Usha Prashar: But Andrew Turnbull said we were being fobbed off by President Bush when he said that.

Tony Blair: I think if you actually look at what then happened with the United Nations in Iraq, I think Resolution 1483 is really a very important resolution. I don't know whether you want to look at it now, I'm perfectly content to do it, but ...

Baroness Usha Prashar: I have got it, but

Tony Blair: Rather than refer to it, let me just make this very simple point: I saw Kofi Annan, I think on I think it was around 16 April. In other words, shortly after the military action had begun. I had a good and close relationship with Kofi Annan, someone I respect very much. He had been in a very difficult position throughout the last few months. He made it clear that the UN had to be independent of the coalition, but he also made it clear he wasn't arguing for the lead role. What he was arguing for ...

Baroness Usha Prashar: In the circumstances, not surprising.

Tony Blair: Absolutely.

Baroness Usha Prashar: The fact that it had been a coalition-led invasion and he did not want the responsibility of reconstruction, that's not surprising.

Tony Blair: Correct, but that is why when people say that, as it were, the UN should have been given the lead role, I'm simply pointing out the fact that he didn't want that. What he did want was a vital role, which is what we got the Americans to agree to, and if you look at Resolution 1483, it sets out the areas in which his special representative, which he agreed to appoint, was going to have influence and say, and actually, that special representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello, was absolutely excellent, would have made an enormous difference to Iraq and its future, but the terrorists killed him, assassinated him in August 2003.

Baroness Usha Prashar: I understand, but I want to go back to the points, because my recollection is that, as early as September 2002, a number of very sensible questions were being asked in Parliament about the aftermath planning. We have also been told that you were given rather an optimistic view by the Americans who thought it would be all right on the day.

Tony Blair: Well, the Americans were making efforts, actually, but I think, as I say, if you read the Inspector General's report, if you read the Rand Report, it is very clear things could have been done differently. I think the American administration, or the American system, as it were, has accepted that.

Baroness Usha Prashar: But I understand you personally became involved in the aftermath arrangement about February 2003. Was that not too late?

Tony Blair: No, I was personally involved in what was going to happen before then. As we came to the point of actually going in, it is true we had a meeting, I think in February 2003 and then subsequent meetings but the absolutely central point, since we are trying to see what are the lessons that we can learn, is that, unfortunately, what we thought was going to be the problem didn't turn out to be the problem.

Baroness Usha Prashar: That's true, but I think I go back to my earlier point. It is the adequacy of the planning on a whole range of things, economic, political, because in a way there was a danger, there was information that Iraq could have fractured, given the insecurity of the Kurds, what could have happened with the Shias and Sunnis. I mean, there is a whole range of eventualities which you planned for that wasn't done.

Tony Blair: I would say we most certainly did plan for the problems in relation to the potential for a Sunni/Shia/Kurd split, and what we tried to do was to make sure that, as soon as possible, we brought the Sunnis and the Kurds and the Shia together. So what actually happened and this happened in May, only just a few weeks after the invasion they brought together I think it was called the Iraq Governing Council or the Interim Governing Council. That had a membership of 25. I think there were 13 or I think it was 13 Shia and 11 Sunni, and one ...

Baroness Usha Prashar: But before that, I mean, the decision was taken, for example, the ORHA was actually replaced by CPA and, you know, changes were made without any consultation with us.

Tony Blair: Well, I think look, what actually happened was it became very clear that ORHA was not capable of doing that.

Baroness Usha Prashar: I know that, but my point is, in terms of working together, if we were a joint occupying power, were we being consulted, were we exerting the kind of influence we needed to?

Tony Blair: I think we were being consulted on the questions everyone thought would arise, but it is true I mean, Tim Cross and others were coming back and saying, "This system is not working in the way it should", and we were then interacting very strongly with the Americans. The only thing I say is: had we had even more focus on it, we would have still been focusing essentially on the humanitarian side with an assumption that we would inherit a functioning Civil Service infrastructure, and it was that assumption that proved to be wrong. I think that one the reasons why we set up and I know you have had evidence about this what is called the Stabilisation Unit, in 2004, was precisely because we recognised in the future and I think this is what the American system now knows, for sure, if you are going to go into a situation like this, you have to go in as nation builders and you have got to go in with a configuration of the political and the civilian and the military that is right for a failed state situation. That doesn't mean to say that you don't do it, but you need to be prepared for it.

Baroness Usha Prashar: But the point really is our assumption was that we would get the United Nations to take the lead role. Eventually, that didn't happen, but did we have a plan B then? Because, in a sense, all I'm really wanting to get at is the ability to plan for eventualities.

Tony Blair: We did plan for those eventualities. We did an analysis of what they might be, and we worked them out. The trouble was we didn't plan for two things: one was, as I say, the absence of this properly functioning Civil Service infrastructure? and, of course, the second thing, which is the single most important element of this whole business of what happened afterwards, people did not think that al Qaeda and Iran would play the role that they did, and we could have if what you had ended up having was essentially an indigenous violence or insurgency, or the criminality and the looting and so on, again there are issues to do with the numbers of troops, the types of troops and ...

Baroness Usha Prashar: We will actually come to that later. I will pass on to Sir Martin Gilbert.

Tony Blair: I just want to

Baroness Usha Prashar: Yes, do finish.

Tony Blair: I just wanted to finish by saying all of those are very important questions. We could have handled the situation if that had been the problem. It was the introduction of the external elements of AQ and Iran that really caused this mission very nearly to fail. Fortunately, in the end, it didn't, and the reason why that is important is that that itself, in my view, is a huge lesson, because those are the same forces that we are now facing, Afghanistan right round the region.

ANY REGRETS?

Sir John Chilcot: The other perspective clearly and you will appreciate this better than anyone can, probably. Our participation in the Iraq conflict has been very divisive here and abroad, has caused deep anguish to those who lost people they loved, some of whom are in this room. There is gratitude, great gratitude, to our armed forces for the sacrifices they made and the bravery they showed and great sorrow at their losses. But we, like you, have also experienced at first hand the anger which is still felt by many people in this country and we have been asking, therefore, the question why. And so, as we conclude today, can I ask what broad lessons you have drawn you have drawn some already in the course of your testimony and to say whether you have regrets about key aspects of the Iraq conflict?

Tony Blair: I mean, I have said some of the things that I think are lessons that can be learned about nation building. I think you have got to look very carefully at what type of forces you require because there will be a security situation that you face, a challenging security situation. I also think you have really got to look at the issue to do with the nature of this threat from al Qaeda on the one hand, Iran on the other, and the impact that that will have, not just on Iraq but potentially in different arenas right round the Middle East region and beyond. I feel of course, I had to take this decision as Prime Minister and it was a huge responsibility then, and there is not a single day that passes by that I don't reflect and think about that responsibility, and so I should.

But I genuinely believe that if we had left Saddam in power, even with what we know now, we would still have had to have dealt with him, possibly in circumstances where the threat was worse and possibly in circumstances where it was hard to mobilise any support for dealing with that threat. I think we live in a completely new security environment today. I thought that then, I think that now. It is why I have said this to you a number of times today I take a very hard, tough line on Iran today, and many of the same arguments apply. In the end it was divisive, and I'm sorry about that and I tried my level best to bring people back together again, but if I'm asked whether I believe we are safer, more secure, that Iraq is better, our own security is better with Saddam and his two sons out of power and out of office than in office, I indeed believe that we are, and I think in time to come, if Iraq becomes, as I hope and believe that it will, the country that its people want to see, then we can look back, and particularly our armed forces can look back, with an immense sense of pride and achievement in what they did.

Sir John Chilcot: And no regrets?

Tony Blair: Responsibility but not a regret for removing Saddam Hussein. I think that he was a monster, I believe he threatened, not just the region but the world, and in the circumstances that we faced then, but I think even if you look back now, it was better to deal with this threat, to deal with it, to remove him from office, and I do genuinely believe that the world is safer as a result. I know sometimes, because this happens out in the region, sometimes people will say to me, "Well, Saddam was a brake on Iran". Let's be clear, there is another view of foreign policy in this instance, which is the way, if we had left Saddam in place, he would have controlled Iran better.

I really think it is time we learned, as a matter of sensible foreign policy, that the way to deal with one dictatorial threat is not to back another, that actually the best answer to what is happening in Iran is to allow the Iraqi people the freedom and democratic choice that we enjoy in countries like ours.