UK deployment raises tactical concerns

By Paul Reynolds
BBC News Online world affairs correspondent

While there is a political dimension to the issue, the US request for British troops to move north in Iraq to take over from US marines is probably more connected to operational problems.

British troops have secured local goodwill in southern Iraq

Indeed, the US request is hardly something Mr Bush would want to shout about. It exposes the weakness of US forces in south central Iraq that they have to ask an ally for help.

The British government is going through a two-stage process. The first is to consider the military implications and, if those are resolved, the second will be to consider the political fall-out.

But the request has probably little to do with President Bush wanting allied back-up at this crucial stage of his election campaign.

It is doubtful if Americans would place much value on this as a voting incentive.

So what are the operational reasons behind this possible deployment?

The first is that the US forces are preparing for an assault on Falluja as part of the overall pacification programme in advance of elections in January. We have already seen US troops go into Samarra as a first step.

The timing of such an operation against Falluja is uncertain though most observers doubt if it would begin in earnest until after the US election on 2 November. However, there has already been an increase in strikes by both aircraft and artillery and US and Iraqi forces have surrounded the city with increased vehicle checkpoints.

Marines

The second factor is that the US troops earmarked for the Falluja operation are marines. It is no coincidence that so are the troops the British would replace.

It is important here to note that there is as much tension between the philosophy of US marines and that of ordinary US troops as there sometimes is between US and British doctrines.

US marines: Known for their aggression

In the New York Times recently it was remarked: "The Najaf battle has also raised fresh questions about an age-old rivalry within the American military - between the no-holds-barred, press-ahead culture of the Marines and the slower, more reserved and often more politically cautious approach of the Army."

So the marines are collecting together their own units to be used in Falluja and the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) of some 2000 men happens to be based not far away in Iskandariya.

This leads to the third issue. Because the 140,000 or so US troops in Iraq are severely stretched, there is nobody, it seems, to turn to other than the Brits to fill in behind the marines. A further question is who would fill in behind the British units if they are moved?

The US argument is that the British have proved themselves in the quieter, though not inactive, southern sector around Basra so they can be trusted to deal with the Iskandariya area which is tougher than Basra though not as tough as others.

The British unit of some 650 or so would probably be based in Iskandariya. Its area of operations is not an easy one. It could include Latifiya where the British hostage Ken Bigley is thought to have been held and beheaded.

Under US command

A British deployment however raises important tactical questions.

One is that the British force will be under overall US command. This is not new in Iraq. Britain itself commands other national units in the south.

But it does lead to the issue of what tactics are used. The British battle group will need more than light infantry. It will need tanks and possibly artillery and, since the British army has not managed to get its Apache attack helicopters into operational use yet, it will need US air support.

Any difference in tactical approach between the British army and the US marines would need to be clearly recognised and allowed for in advance.

Who, for example, would be responsible for calling in artillery or air support? How aggressive would the troops be?

Blazing guns

A flavour of the marines' approach can be gained from an account of a recent operation on the website of the 24th MEU.

It involved an ambush on a patrol to which the marines responded with artillery fire.

"With the squad laying down a heavy amount of fire, enemy rounds continued to bounce off their vehicles. Marines called the battalion's headquarters for fire support.

"The battalion then forwarded the squad's fire-support request to the Marines of Bravo Battery, who responded with blazing guns. After receiving and processing the request, the cannoneers sent six rounds hurling toward targets called in by Alpha Company.

"With the added firepower, the squad easily overpowered the enemy."

For the Marines, this was an example of "combined arms warfighting doctrine. It allows Marines to dial up their intensity to overcome their enemies. In Iraq, the practice is working well. "

That is not the kind of softly-softly talk that is sometimes used by British commanders, though the Black Watch, the unit likely to be designated, is hardly a wilting flower.

If such a deployment is made, it could be an interesting test of the two methods of pacification.