A very British occupation

Soft caps and a conciliatory approach are said to typify the British army's strategy in southern Iraq, in contrast to the more robust approach by the Americans. But, as British troops consider submitting to American command, the truth is rather more complex.

Eighteen months after the invasion of Iraq the words of Colonel Tim Collins's celebrated eve-of-battle speech still echo in the ears of British squaddies pacing the pot-holed streets of Basra.

"If you are ferocious in battle remember to be magnanimous in victory," Col Collins told the 1st Battalion of the Royal Irish, in a pep-talk that stole the newspaper headlines as the invasion began in March 2003.

It's become something of a cliché that while American soldiers face murderous attacks almost daily, in the British patrolled south-eastern quarter of the country troops have fostered a more relaxed environment.

But the so-called "softly-softly" approach by the British is said to have provoked a backlash in some quarters, with an unnamed American general apparently dismissing it as "risk averse" and "institutionalised cowardice".

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The true picture is far more complex.

Partly it's a matter of geography. From the start it was widely acknowledged that British troops would have a relatively easier job than their American counterparts in the central and northern belt.

The Shia Muslims in the south always had more to gain from the overthrow of the ruling Sunni minority in Baghdad.

However, the tidal wave of religious sentiment in the south, after years of suppression, has thrown up its own challenges. The uprising by Shia rebels in Najaf in August spilled over into the UK-patrolled sector - British bases in Amara and Basra sustained several hundred mortar hits between them.

In response the British fired 100,000 rounds of ammunition, recovered several tonnes of ammunition and are said to have killed "hundreds of Iraqis" in the process.

By and large, things have bedded down again, although the killing of two British soldiers in an ambush last month was a reminder of the constant underlying threat of violence. It brought the number of UK military casualties to 68.

Small things mean a lot

Troops in Basra are back on foot patrol, and in some instances at least, are sporting soft caps rather than hard helmets - headgear has come to be seen as a barometer of the threat facing the military.

Sunglasses and hard hats - the mark of patrolling US soldiers

Similar, sometimes almost negligible, factors have been credited with helping bridge the gap with locals. British soldiers tend to forgo sunglasses, enabling them to make eye contact with civilians, and they drive in soft, canvas-backed Land Rovers.

Even the way they hold their weapons - disciplined, but non-confrontational - has been noted.

Col Tim Collins, now retired from the army, likens the British approach in Iraq to its successful counter-insurgency efforts in Malaya in the 1950s, while the American style is more akin to Vietnam in the 60s, he says.

"You have to abide by certain principles as an occupying force. Set a time frame for withdrawal, act scrupulously within the rule of international law, separate insurgents from the mass of well-meaning people and win the hearts and minds," says Col Collins.

"The British approach has been to seek to address the causes of insurgency come what may. Regrettably, the Americans seem to be following the approach of increasingly bombing the locals into submission."

Devolved authority

The British approach is both cultural, and derived from lessons in Malaya and Oman in the 60s and 70s, and taught - counter-insurgency techniques are part of the basic training for soldiers and officers alike.

Conduct of British troops is scrupulously judged by Iraqis

A senior army officer points to key operational differences between the US and UK approach.

"While American soldiers are no less intelligent or have no less initiative they tend to rely on repetitive drills and operating procedures rather than what we call 'mission command' allowing the soldier on the ground to make a decision.

"We have a term - the 'strategic corporal'. A corporal is the lowest rank who can command a unit on the ground and yet they are taught right from the outset that they are allowed, even expected, to make important decisions in the blink of an eye."

Lower ranking US troops don't have that autonomy, meaning they are less able to tailor action in the fluctuating circumstances of a confrontation, the senior officer says.

While more hot-headed troops would almost certainly shoot on sight a man in civilian clothes who is wearing a gun, the British tend to be more circumspect, he says.

"We would be questioning whether that man might have been a policeman on his way home, a soldier about to report for duty - in other words, not always what it may first seem."