Q&A: UK forces equipment failures

By Paul Adams
BBC News

Are British troops getting the equipment they need?

The Ministry of Defence has been criticised for failing to supply soldiers in Afghanistan with basic equipment, following the death of paratrooper Capt. James Philippson.

An inquest in Oxford heard that the Paras had previously complained about a lack of proper equipment.

What kind of equipment was involved in this case?

On the night of June 11, 2006, Capt. Philippson was carrying his standard issue SA80 assault rifle, a Browning 9mm pistol, a Mark 6 helmet and Osprey body armour.

Others in his patrol would have been similarly equipped. Some had American night-vision goggles, but since a bracket to mount the goggles onto a British helmet had not been fitted (or even procured), soldiers wore them around the neck.

Despite the level of risk associated with a night-time operation in a hostile area, the unit did not carry Minimi light machine guns or grenade launchers attached to their rifles because they had not been issued with them.

When they found themselves in the middle of a Taleban ambush, they were outgunned. The Army's Board of Inquiry also speculated that the lack of a Bowman radio set may have contributed to a lack of "situational awareness" on the part of the men.

Was this only about equipment?

No. Events like this can rarely be put down to a single factor.

The Oxfordshire assistant coroner, Andrew Walker, has highlighted a lack of kit, but the board highlighted other issues, including "poor tactical decision-making" and a "lack of SOPs" (Standard Operating Procedures) on the ground.

It questioned whether James Philippson's unit, whose principal role was to offer mentoring and liaison with the Afghan army, should ever have been sent out, at night, to recover a downed unmanned spy plane of "relatively low value."

And it suggested that the commanding officer could have taken more time to organise and prepare his men before sending them out.

Is it a British problem, or does it affect all armies?

There is nothing uniquely British about this. In a world of falling defence budgets, anyone fighting abroad is doing so in a world of economies and day-to-day decisions about priorities.

Even US forces, with the might of the Pentagon's colossal budget behind them, have at times complained of equipment shortages. In 2004, the then US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, visiting US soldiers at a staging post in Kuwait, faced hostile questioning about the failure to provide enough armour on Humvees in Iraq.

The unpredictable nature of 21st century counter insurgency operations is another factor. In the "good old days" of the Cold War, everyone prepared for something that was knowable and calculable: a clash of conventional military forces.

But when British troops went to Helmand province in 2006, they simply did not know the precise nature of the threat they would face. Some will regard that as a failure of intelligence.

Is it generally a case of the MoD actually not having the items - or not getting them to the right country - or supply lines not working?

A mixture of all three. "Asset tracking", as it is known in the military, has been a perennial problem and the MoD struggles to find better ways of ensuring that equipment sent out to units overseas actually reaches the men who need it.

Human error often plays a part too. In a statement on Friday, the MoD said that "a failure to follow the correct staff procedures...resulted in a 25-day delay in providing night-vision goggles" for Capt Philippson's unit.

Is it getting worse?

No. If anything, the situation is improving.

A system of "urgent operational requirements" (UORs) has, in some cases, shortened the length of time between a need being identified and a solution being provided. The government has spent a lot of money in making sure that key bits of equipment, including better armoured vehicles, get to where they are needed. Some well-known areas, including helicopters, remain in short supply.

Since boards of inquiry and inquests tend to conclude long after the deaths which trigger them, the public is presented with a vivid snapshot of the way things were, not necessarily of the way things are now.