The Metropolitan Police has been found guilty of breaching health and safety laws over the shooting dead of Jean Charles de Menezes in July 2005. At the outset of the trial, the prosecution set out what they said were 19 alleged key failures.
The Met denied all of these alleged failings, saying the prosecution did not understand how the police ran operations. On reaching their verdict, the jurors said they believed Commander Cressida Dick, one of the key officers, was not personally culpable for what happened.
1. There was a failure adequately to communicate Commander McDowell's strategy to the officers who took over the running of the operation on 22 July, the surveillance officers and the firearms officers.
2. There was a failure adequately to plan for or carry out Commander McDowell's strategy for controlling the premises.
3. The control room officers, the firearms officers and the surveillance officers had a confused and inconsistent understanding of what the strategy was for Scotia Road.
4. There was a failure to deploy officers to stop and question persons emerging from the Scotia Road premises, including Mr de Menezes.
5. There was a failure to ensure that an CO19 firearms team was in attendance at Scotia Road when Mr de Menezes emerged from the communal doorway.
6. There was a failure to have a contingency plan for dealing with persons who emerged from a block of flats before CO19 arrived.
7. There was a failure to stop and question the persons emerging from the Scotia Road premises.
8. There was a failure to identify a safe and appropriate area where those leaving Scotia Road could be stopped and questioned.
9. The briefings given to firearms officers at Leman Street and Nightingale Lane police premises were inaccurate and unbalanced and provided the firearms officers with inadequate and inaccurate information about the operation at Scotia Road.
10. Information as to the identification of Mr de Menezes, his clothing and likely level of threat was not properly or accurately assessed of disseminated to officers and in particular the firearms officers.
11. There was a failure to ensure that doubts about the correctness of the identification of Mr de Menezes as the suspect were communicated to relevant officers in the control room at New Scotland Yard.
12. The control room officers failed to satisfy themselves that a positive identification of Mr de Menezes as the suspect had been made by the surveillance officers.
13. There was a failure to deploy firearms officers at relevant locations in time to prevent Mr de Menezes from getting onto a bus and entering Stockwell Tube Station.
14. The firearms officers failed to satisfy themselves that a positive identification of Mr de Menezes as the suspect had been made by the surveillance officers.
15. There was a failure to take effective steps to stop tubes or buses or take other traffic management steps so as to minimise the risk to the travelling public.
16. Mr de Menezes was twice permitted to get onto a bus and to enter Stockwell underground station despite being suspected of being a suicide bomber and despite having emerged from an address linked to a suspected suicide bomber.
17. There was a failure to give a clear or timely order that Mr de Menezes be stopped or arrested before he entered Stockwell Tube Station.
18. There was a failure to give accurate information to Commander Dick as to the whereabouts of CO19 when she was deciding whether C019 or C012 surveillance officers stop Mr de Menezes.
19. There was a failure to minimise the risk inherent in effecting the arrest of Mr de Menezes by armed officers whether in relation to the location, timing or manner of his arrest.