In full: Memo from Walt Slocombe to Bremer

In a BBC programme examining the planning and aftermath of the Iraq war by British and US governments, reporter John Ware discusses a memo sent by Walter Slocombe, a US security adviser, to Paul Bremer, the then head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in May 2003.

Here is the full text of the memo.

Memo for Amb. Bremer

From Walt Slocombe

Subject: Results of Slocombe meetings at NATO on 12 May, and in London, 13 May 2003.

Brief visits included meetings at NATO with LTG, Feliu, my deputy - Spanish Perm Rep UK, SB, and Polish Mill Reps; USDCM Nuland, and General Schuwirth, Director of EU Military Staff (SPCHOD, Admiral Morenco, in town for MCCS meeting, was guest at dinner) in London with officials from MoD, FCO, DFID and Home Office; MoD Hoon, and newly installed MIN for DFID Amos. Feliu was in all meetings.

I outlined my mission and the structure of my office, as well as the overall structure and mission of the CPA concept for NIC. I emphasised themes of working with Iraqi leadership as it emerged but no deadline/no early "provisional government" debaathification, even at some cost and efficiency in the short-run (especially in security sector), need for comprehensive approach, and desire that the CPA effort be international.

In addition to outlining current thinking on staffing my office (including desire for coalition participation) I answered questions about US plans to the best of my knowledge.

Questions and comments include:

DCM Newland said that US and other coalition member allies should encourage NATO to play a role, beginning by identifying tasks NATO could undertake, with the long-term objective of having NATO at some point able to take on the organisation and command of the international force, as it has in Afghanistan. In this connection she said some allies had indicated a willingness to provide trainers for 'new' military.

In assembly of international force several suggested we should press Muslim nations to participate even if Arab States are unwilling at this point, participation by nations like Pakistan or Bangladesh would diminish an impression that the force and the mission is supported only by 'Christian' countries.

UK officials main theme was the need for CPA efforts to consider security sector reform comprehensibly - the task goes well beyond military, and includes (indeed may be dominated by) issues of police, internal security agencies, judicial system, and all should be done in coordination. (I made a pitch for police contributions, for both operations and training).

SP reps reaffirmed their willingness to lead a gendarmerie Unit as part of the international stabilisation force and suggested CPA consider as part of the effort to reform and rebuild IQ Police, creating an Iraqi GD force. They argued that, given its internal security functions and special expertise needed it should be part of the MININT not MoD.

UK observe that their experience in other situations led them to believe that GD are useful for crowd control and dealing with organised relatively open efforts to upset public order but for serious internal security measures are no substitute for well trained and well equipped national police.

UK briefed on their (admittedly not fully developed) thoughts on security sector reform, which they see as including debaathification, reconstruction, IIA, an information campaign - and turning on having sufficient resources. They gave us their papers on the security sector reform generally, police/military coordination, and on the UK approach to the future of Iraq.

If some UK officers or officials think we should try to rebuild and reassemble the old RA*, they did not give any hint of it in our meetings, and in fact agreed with the need for vigorous debaathification, especially in the security sector. Hoon tentatively offered UK military to operate one of the training/intake centres for the NIC.

I said we were still very much in the planning stage, but would welcome help, noting however that there would have to be a common approach at all centres, because the goal is to have an integrated force. Hoon and other UK officials said their experience in Sierra Leone (which they regard as very successful) might be relevant and offered to put us in touch with the people who'd worked on there.

Hoon said that the infamous 'UK lawyers' were taking the position that the CPA cannot introduce a new currency. I said that, so far as I know, the US has not made any decision on currency reform (but will use US dollars for many purposes) but that I was confident that US believes that a currency reform would be well within CPA's rights as an element of providing public services and restoring economy and order.

Amos meeting will be subject of Emb London, reporting cable. She emphasised a need to work military reform and coordination with other security sector issues, desirability of limiting the scale of spending by Iraqis on military, given other priorities.

UK people raised issue of ex soldiers as potential source of trouble. I said, "my personal view is that the new military should not be expected to sop up unemployment - if only because at any plausible size, it would not sup up very much, and that the issue, while very real, should be dealt with by hiring Iraqis for as much of the restoration, development, work as possible".

Walt

Attached: draft embassy cable on the meetings.**

*Walt Slocombe explained to the BBC that this stands for 'Regular Army'.

** We do not have this document.