Question: How strong is the Iraqi army?

Question: How strong is the Iraqi army?

Whether you are worried, angry or confused, there are thousands of questions surrounding the Iraq crisis. The Iraq Questions Panel is trying to give you some answers.

QUESTION
James Morgan, UK
1) The regular Iraqi army will offer token resistance - if that - to an allied invasion. But how might the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard and the military/para-military brigades of the intelligence agencies respond to Baghdad being threatened?

James Morgan

2) Most of the "security state" in Iraq is designed to protect Saddam Hussein. Once he's gone, its prestige and privileges will vanish. Will these organisations continue to pose a threat to peacekeeping forces sent in after war?

ANSWER
From Chris Lincoln-Jones, former Gulf War commander
The Iraqi regular army is predominantly truck-mounted infantry; the parts of it that have tanks and armoured personnel carriers are equipped with old Russian and Chinese kit. Tanks like the T-62 and T-55 series are the predominant varieties. You are therefore right to assume that these troops will not pose much of a threat to an allied force.

I will go further and say that senior officers will defect once they are sure that the invasion is committed. They will want to secure favourable terms in a post-conflict Iraq, so capitulation will be quick and this is affected by the fact that these troops are furthest away from Baghdad and not best placed to hide in towns and cities.

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The Republican Guard is a more difficult force to judge. The main body is garrisoned around Baghdad; these soldiers are responsible for the approaches to the city and to bolster the regular army. They are also a threat to the regular army and can maintain loyalty by force; the Guards despise the regular army and we found during the '91 conflict that the army soldiers fear and hate the Guards.

The equipment these soldiers have include T-72 tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. The serviceability of these vehicles is reasonable but there is by no means 100% availability after years of sanctions.

The officers in the Guards are predominantly Sunni and the higher echelons are manned by officers chosen for their loyalty, although this does not necessarily mean that they are all from Tikrit, Saddam's home city.

I doubt that these troops will be prepared to meet allied armoured forces in open battle; they may retreat to cities like Al-Khut or Tikrit and hope to be able to fight there. Getting involved in OBUA (Operations in built up areas) is not something the allies will want to do and indeed it may not be necessary. If your enemy is stuck in a city in Iraq, the only thing they can do is starve or die of thirst; it may therefore possible to negotiate surrender.

Staunch loyalty

The Special Republican Guard is most likely to remain loyal to Saddam and fight hard. This is because they are most closely linked to the leader and are unpopular due to the privileges they enjoy and the excesses they have committed against the people.

They are drawn from the ranks of Saddam's most loyal tribal associates and have the most serviceable equipment (T-72 and BMP-2 Infantry fighting vehicles). There are not many of them though; apart from one strong and well-equipped brigade, the majority are security details for regime buildings.

If the allies really want to go into Baghdad, they may well have to winkle these people out of buildings, a difficult and dangerous task. Again I would argue: "Why bother?" - without the oilfields and access to the agriculture of the Euphrates and Tigris, Saddam has nothing.

Settle scores

This brings in the second part of this question. The people in Baghdad are likely to see the writing on the wall and may very well start to settle scores. This will do the allies' job for them and the biggest risk of casualties will be in this internecine strife. It might even be possible for the allies to sit around Baghdad and other large central cities and wait for the dust to settle; the morality of this action is of course debateable.

This is very speculative but the middle classes in Iraq who have been most badly hurt by the sanctions will want the opportunity to improve their lives. A well-executed campaign that avoids collateral damage, mounts a good information operation and quickly aids in reconstruction could blunt all but the most fanatical of Saddam's security forces.

A post-conflict Baghdad may not be completely safe but I doubt there will be a sniper around every corner. You might like to note that after the Islamic state came to power in Iraq's old enemy Iran, the Shah's security apparatus, the Savak, was purged and then changed its name before carrying on as normal under the new masters. In the world of Realpolitik we might see something of this nature in Iraq.

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