Excerpts from the International Atomic Energy Agency's
report on Iran's nuclear enrichment programme,
dated 18 February 2010:
The information available to the agency is extensive and has been collected from a variety of sources over time. This raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.
These alleged activities consist of a number of projects and sub-projects, covering nuclear and missile-related aspects, run by military related organisations.
Among the activities which the agency has attempted to discuss with Iran are: activities involving high-precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile re-entry body engineering... and various procurement-related activities.
Specifically, the agency has... sought clarification of the following: whether Iran's exploding bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes; whether Iran developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert knowledgeable in explosives technology; whether the engineering design and computer modelling studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military organisations in Iran to obtain nuclear-related technology and equipment.
The agency would also like to discuss with Iran: the project and management structure of alleged activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear-related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons.
Since August 2008, Iran has declined to discuss the above issues with the agency or to provide any further information and access (to locations and/or people) to address these concerns, asserting that the allegations relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme are baseless and that the information to which the agency is referring is based on forgeries.
Iran has not provided the necessary co-operation to permit the agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.
Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolutions of the board of governors and the security council... which are essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions.
In particular, Iran needs to co-operate in clarifying outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme.
Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the board of governors and the security council, Iran has continued with the operation of PFEP and FEP at Natanz, and the construction of a new enrichment plant at Fordow. Iran has also announced the intention to build 10 new enrichment plants.
Contrary to the relevant resolutions of the board of governors and the security council, Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR-40 reactor and related heavy water activities. The agency has not been permitted to take samples of the heavy water which is stored at UCF, and has not been provided with access to the heavy water production plant.
The director general requests Iran to take steps towards the full implementation of its safeguards agreement and its other obligations.