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By Andrew North
BBC News, Baghdad
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Shia militias face a crackdown under the new strategy
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The new US and Iraqi strategy has about two to three months to start showing results - in terms of real improvements in security for people in Baghdad.
That is the timeframe Western and Iraqi officials here have mentioned in discussions about the strategy.
None will make any predictions for what will happen if those improvements do not come.
One way of assessing its chances is to look backwards, to Operation Together Forward.
That was the last big push to quell the surging violence in Baghdad.
'More forces'
It was last summer and like this new plan, it was a joint Iraqi and US initiative.
But it failed. Attacks rose by 20%.
The main reason, US commanders say, is that they did not have enough troops - especially Iraqi units - to hold areas they had cleared.
The operation was also one-sided, largely focused on neighbourhoods under the sway of Sunni insurgents.
Districts controlled by Shia militias such as the Mehdi army - blamed for much of the sectarian killing - were in essence ignored.
Things will be different this time, US and Iraqi officials say, because they will have more forces.
'Last chance'
In addition to the 17,500 extra American troops earmarked for Baghdad, the Iraqi government has pledged three more army brigades, in addition to the six already here. More police units are also due.
And this time, the government says it will take on all armed groups, regardless of their sectarian persuasion.
But many Iraqis simply do not believe this.
After all, it is the same Shia-led government, made up of the same factions still linked to the same militias. Why should things be any different four months later, they ask.
Iraqi deputy prime minister Barham Saleh admits this is the government's last chance.
"If we don't demonstrate tangible progress, we will lose all credibility in the eyes of the Iraqi people," he said.
But Iraqi troop commitments are also open to serious doubt.
They could not meet their pledges for Operation Together Forward. Now they are being expected to provide far more.
The US military were to blame too, Iraqi officials say, for failing to equip army units adequately.
These concerns remain, as well as with the quality of leadership and effectiveness of many Iraqi army formations.
Longstanding - and even deeper - concerns about Iraq's multiple police forces are also unresolved.
In many cases, the first loyalty of many Baghdad police is to the Mehdi Army of Moqtada al Sadr, not the government, because of widespread militia infiltration.
"No-one trusts the Iraqi security forces now," a resident of west Baghdad told me. "If anything, we trust the Americans more."
But after past experiences, many remain deeply suspicious of US forces.
Whatever the case, even with the extra American units on their way to Baghdad, there are still doubts as to whether they will be enough to stabilise a city of more than six million people.
'More wasted blood'
If these were not concerns enough, the US and Iraqi authorities face a situation that has deteriorated even further since Operation Together Forward.
So among Baghdad residents, a common view is that the extra troops will only bring extra violence - sparking widespread street-to-street fighting.
They take the past four years since the US and British invasion as their guide - the one constant theme has been almost nothing going to plan.
"The new plan will just mean more wasted blood," said one resident. As so often these days, he did not want to be named.
Another said that with the new strategy getting so much publicity, insurgents and militia fighters "will have plenty of time to prepare".
Yet in this dark fog of gloom, there are some cautious voices of optimism among Western diplomats - particularly on the issue of tackling the Shia militias.
There is a belief that Prime Minister Nouri Maliki is now "serious" about going after Shia militia forces, particularly those linked to Moqtada al Sadr.
Because of Mr Maliki's political constraints, he has resisted putting full pressure on these groups before and even now does not want to see US forces charging all over Sadr City.
One official, who did not want to be named, argued there had been a gradual hardening in his position over the past few months.
Mr Maliki had been emboldened too, he said, by signs Moqtada al Sadr's power was weakening.
Preparing for the worst
It has been clear for some time that the cleric does not have full control over the Mehdi army.
According to US intelligence estimates, at least a third of its members may be following their own agendas, loyal to him in name only.
They are also the groups accused of running many of the death squads targeting Sunnis.
He could no longer hide his lack of control, the official said, and also pointed to signs of differences within his own Sadrist bloc.
A more fragmented Sadrist movement - including the Mehdi army - may therefore prove easier to deal with than many have feared.
The question is whether Mr Maliki and his US backers are too late.
But there are two other possibilities some believe.
First, the appearance of the Mehdi army slipping out of Moqtada al Sadr's grasp may be part of an elaborate bluff, allowing him to distance himself from some of its actions.
But if the time comes for confrontation, his followers will still rally round.
But if the splits are real, the thousands of Mehdi army gunmen may now be more dangerous and even harder to rein in.
Many Baghdad residents fear it's the latter and are preparing for the worst.