Analysis: Sharon's tight spot

By Martin Asser
BBC News Online

Defeat by Likud leaves Sharon searching for new plan

Ariel Sharon has been left groping for a new solution to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, after his Likud party comrades roundly rejected his plan to withdraw troops and settlers from Gaza and parts of the West Bank.

The unilateral withdrawal plan was already Plan B - his response to an absence of negotiations to secure a proper deal between Israel and the Palestinians - now he needs a Plan C.

But what will Plan C look like, and will it enjoy any more success than its predecessors?

The most likely next step for Mr Sharon appears to be a diluted version of the same idea, in the hope he will gain more support this time.

Israel may remove the isolated Jewish enclaves in Gaza that aren't connected to the big settlement blocs, and get rid of a few others in the West Bank - perhaps as few as five dismantled settlements in all.

'Diet disengagement'

Israeli reports say Mr Sharon has already presented this amended plan to the cabinet, and it will be discussed fully next Sunday.

But it's easy to see where a "disengagement lite" plan, as it's being called, might come unstuck.

For a start, it seems to lack any of the advantages that the full-scale Gaza pullout hoped to offer - to both Israelis and Palestinians.

The argument has split Likud ranks

Large numbers of Israeli soldiers would have to continue the job of occupation, while only a few of the flashpoints would disappear.

The expense and attritional effect of that occupation would scarcely be reduced.

And the shortcomings of disengagement remain - the unilateralism, the avoidance of long-term solutions, the vulnerability to attack.

Indeed, it may even be less likely to create a better climate for peacemaking than the pullout plan that has been rejected by Likud.

And having won the first round, the highly-organised grassroots supporters of settlements - who hold that the land was promised to them and their ancestors by God - are unlikely to soften their opposition to withdrawal.

The margin of victory on Sunday was 20 percentage points. Another unilateral plan that offers even less chance of opening the doors to peace probably faces a similar fate.

Party rifts

Mr Sharon has also hinted that he may press ahead with his original plan, disregarding the objections of Likud and putting the same ideas directly to the Israeli people, in elections or in a national referendum.

The general public - unlike the roughly half of Likud members who turned out to vote on Sunday - are thought to broadly favour the disengagement plan as the way forward.

Sharon's rivals are waiting in the wings if he fails

In the 2003 elections when Mr Sharon thrashed his Labour rival, Amram Mitzna, who was advocating withdrawal from all the settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. It would be ironic if he now went to the electorate with a not too dissimilar plan.

But he would have to act against stiff opposition from within Likud, threatening even to split the party.

Binyamin Netanyahu, for example, may well be waiting for the first opportunity to challenge for the leadership over the issue of keeping or dismantling settlements.

Mr Sharon's third option (and this may be the least likely outcome of Sunday's defeat) could be to turn to the Palestinian Authority - in effect to Yasser Arafat.

Reaching out for a political lifeline from the man he has reviled so much during his three years in office seems unlikely for someone like Mr Sharon, although that is what the overwhelming weight of international opinion would have him do.

In fact, some analysts are expecting Israel to step up its military action in the occupied territories, to foster an impression of strength and resolution after the setback at the ballot box.

Unconditional reward

So what was it that brought a wily political operator like Ariel Sharon to this pretty pass - "a political U-turn straight into a cul-de-sac" as one Israeli commentator put it?

Cynics say that he put his plan to Likud and not the entire populace because he knew that it would fail and he would not have to make the "painful concessions" that he has spoken about in the past.

He conducted a lacklustre campaign against opponents he knew would fight tooth-and-nail to save the settlements.

He also received his reward for the plan up front from Washington.

The Bush administration overtly amended US policy in Israel's favour by endorsing the continued existence of many of its settlements on occupied land and rejecting Palestinian refugees' right of return to what is now Israel.

The political risks probably outweighed the benefits in this calculation: the tight spot the prime minister finds himself today; the appearance of losing grip; the potential damage to his coalition; the embarrassment caused to Israel's biggest benefactor.

But what this exercise has proved is that the path to peace, and the future well-being of tens of millions of people throughout the Middle East, are best not left to the hardline wing of the Likud party, 53,000 members of which voted "no" on Sunday.

That said, Mr Sharon's own fate may yet be decided by just one man, the attorney general, who is due to rule within weeks as to whether or not the Likud leader will face criminal charges in a corruption scandal.