Here are some key excerpts from the report into Iraq's weapons capability by CIA official David Kay.
"The report does not represent a final reckoning of Iraq's WMD programs, nor are we at the point where we are prepared to close the file on any of these programs.
"While solid progress - I would say even remarkable progress considering the conditions that the ISG has had to work under - has been made in this initial period of operations much remains to be done.
We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapons stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war
"We are still very much in the collecting and analysing mode, still seeking the information and evidence that will allow us to confidently draw comprehensive conclusions to the actual objectives, scope and dimensions of Iraq's WMD activities at the time of Operation Iraqi Freedom."
"We have not yet found stocks of weapons, but we are not yet at the point where we can say definitively either that such weapons stocks do not exist or that they existed before the war and our only task is to find where they have gone.
"We are actively engaged in searching for such weapons based on information being supplied to us by Iraqis."
"We have discovered dozens of WMD-related program activities and significant amounts of equipment that Iraq concealed from the United Nations during the inspection that began in late 2002.
"The discovery of these deliberate concealments have come about both through the admissions of Iraqi scientists and officials concerning information they deliberately withheld and through physical evidence of equipment and activities that ISG has discovered that should have been declared to the UN."
- "A clandestine network of laboratories and safe houses within the Iraqi intelligence service that contained equipment subject to UN monitoring and suitable for continuing CBW research."
- "A prison laboratory complex, possibly used in human testing of BW agents that Iraqi officials working to prepare for UN inspections were explicitly ordered not to declare to the UN."
- "Clandestine attempts between late 1999 and 2002 to obtain from North Korea technology related to 1,300km range ballistic missiles, probably the No Dong 300km range anti-ship cruise missiles and other prohibited military equipment."
"While searching for retained weapons, ISG teams have developed multiple sources that indicate that Iraq explored the possibility of Chemical Warfare production in recent years, possibly as late as 2003.
"When Saddam had asked a senior military official in either 2001 or 2002 how long it would take to produce new chemical agent and weapons, he told ISG that after he consulted with CW experts in OMI he responded it would take six months for mustard.
"Another senior Iraqi chemical weapons expert in responding to a request in mid-2002 from Uday Hussein for CW for the Fedayeen Saddam estimated that it would take two months to produce mustard and two years for Sarin."
"Multiple sources with varied access and reliability have told ISG that Iraq did not have a large ongoing centrally controlled CW program after 1991.
"Information found to date suggests that Iraq's large-scale capability to develop, produce and fill new CW munitions was reduced - if not entirely destroyed - during Operation Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN inspections."
"With regard to biological warfare activities, which has been one of our two initial areas of focus, ISG teams are uncovering significant information - including research and development of BW-applicable organism, the involvement of Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) in possible BW activities and deliberate concealment activities.
"All of this suggests Iraq after 1996 further compartmentalised its program and focused on maintaining smaller covert capabilities that could be activated quickly to surge the production of BW agents.
Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus
"Debriefings of IIS officials and site visits have begun to unravel a clandestine network of laboratories and facilities within the security service apparatus. This network was never declared to the UN and was previously unknown.
"We are still working on determining the extent to which this network was tied to large-scale military efforts or BW terror weapons, but this clandestine capability was suitable for preserving BW expertise, BW capable facilities and continuing R&D - all key elements for maintaining a capability for resuming BW production.
"The IIS also played a prominent role in sponsoring students for overseas graduate studies in the biological sciences, according to Iraqi scientists and IIS sources, providing an important avenue for further BW-applicable research."