Viewpoint: Greece's anti-terror troubles

The diplomat was killed for Britain's role in the bombing of Kosovo

By George Kassimeris Athens

Two years after the murder of British diplomat Stephen Saunders in Athens by militant group 17N, political analyst George Kassimeris says the Greece authorities have little to show for their anti-terror efforts.

It is two years since Brigadier Stephen Saunders was on his way to work at the British Embassy in his unmarked white Rover when a motorcycle drew up alongside and four bullets were fired from an automatic pistol.

17N said Saunders had an "instrumental role" in Nato's Kosovo campaign

The helmeted killers then drove off at speed into the traffic, leaving their victim to bleed to death.

He was the 23rd victim of 17 November (17N) - Europe's most wanted and most durable communist militant organisation.

As with all 17N actions, this attack was meant to be a political statement.

In a ferociously worded communique, the group claimed that the brigadier had been punished for his "instrumental role" in Nato's 78-day aerial bombardment of Yugoslavia during the Kosovo conflict.

In 27 years not one 17N terrorist has either been killed or injured in an operation, or captured as a result of actions of the Greek security forces

Two years down the track, Greece does not have much to show for on the anti-terrorism front.

While it is true that the Greek Government has undertaken some meaningful, albeit long overdue, steps to combat 17N terrorism, there is no end in sight to what seems to have become a permanent fixture of Greek national life.

Despite the close co-operation between Greek, UK and US officials in the pursuit of the assassins, the astronomical financial rewards offered for information, and a new anti-terrorist law which makes it easier to bring suspected terrorists to trial, 17N always remains one step ahead.

Money matters

The history of 17N terrorism began 27 years ago, on 23 December 1975, when three gunmen stalked Richard Welch, officially First Secretary at the American Embassy, but in fact the CIA's station chief in Athens, shooting him down at point-blank range in front of his wife and driver.

It was the first serious setback to the country's efforts to wipe away the legacy of its seven-year dictatorship and establish the foundations for an effectively functioning democracy.

Combining ideological rigidity, fanatical nationalism, contempt for the existing order and a cult of violence for its own sake, 17N has refused to accept that its beliefs are incompatible with democratic principles

For the best part of the past 27 years, 17N terrorists have been assassinating US officials, Greek parliamentarians, magistrates, newspaper publishers, leading industrialists and ship-owners, planting bombs underneath the cars of Turkish diplomats and firing rockets against foreign embassies and firms.

Yet, astonishingly, in all this time not one 17N terrorist has either been killed or injured in an operation, or captured as a result of actions of the Greek security forces.

Nor has any undercover agent ever succeeded in penetrating the group, and the high rewards - $11m is the most recent estimate - offered by the Greek and the US authorities for information that would lead to an arrest have come to nothing.

The capacity to protect its citizens against terrorism and subversion is a necessary attribute of any modern state.

Whenever faced with a severe test of that capacity, the Greek state has failed to pass it.

The histories of the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Germany and Action Directe in France suggest that while other liberal democracies are initially uncertain in their handling of violent domestic organisations, they overcome them in time.

Over the past two-and-a-half decades, successive Greek governments have deployed a variety of measures to meet the violence of 17N, but so far have failed to demonstrate a firm grasp of the essentials, a clear sense of strategic priorities and a coherent approach to achieving them.

Out of touch

Dealing with experienced and heavily armed terrorists like the members of 17N, requires a combination of discipline, alertness and operational proficiency on the part of the security forces.

Despite claims to the contrary, government security forces were - and continue to be - structurally weak.

The financial offers have produced no significant leads

Anti-terrorist strategy, for most of the past 27 years, has been carried out by an under-resourced, under-trained and ill-equipped police force which lacks the motivation, discipline, dedication and expertise to wage an effective war against the professionalism and sophistication of 17N.

But what does the tiny fringe movement - which has no community support to draw on for strength and recruits - hope to accomplish?

Combining ideological rigidity, fanatical nationalism, contempt for the existing order and a cult of violence for its own sake, 17N has refused to accept that its beliefs are incompatible with democratic principles.

Since its emergence in 1975, 17N has tried purposely to cultivate an image of itself as a revolutionary group engaged in a protracted struggle against domestic and foreign enemies of the Greek people.

The group saw the transition from military junta to democracy as nothing more than a democratic facade, a confidence trick played on the nation by a political class that sought to legitimise its authority through the deliberate cultivation of fantasies of stability, transparency and pluralism.

The group failed to attract public support, however, because its political-military rationale had little connection with political and social realities.

17N is more of a clandestine band of armed radicals with a flair for revolutionary rhetoric and symbolism rather than an effective political movement

In the late 1970s, revolution was the last thing in the minds of ordinary Greek people.

All society wanted was political calm and long-term institutional stability.

It is unlikely that the group will voluntarily abandon its terror campaign.

Although there have been no further incidents since the assassination of Brigadier Saunders, the movement has hinted at further "just, armed, popular resistance", suggesting that the terrorists will continue to attack people and institutions they despise for years to come.

Or at least until the country's established political class decides to do more to combat terrorism and eradicate it permanently.

George Kassimeris is a Greek political commentator and the author of Europe's Last Red Terrorists, a study of 17N