Idea of one Iraq 'has been lost'

By Roger Hardy
BBC Middle East analyst

The study group tried to point a way forward for US Iraq policy

A high-level, bipartisan group in Washington has called for a significant change of policy towards Iraq.

The Iraq Study Group (ISG) report says US troops should shift from a combat to a support role, and calls for a new regional diplomatic initiative to help Iraq and revive the Middle East peace process.

And the Iraqi government should take more responsibility for determining the country's future, the report says.

The ISG report is based on the politics of carrots and sticks.

At its heart is the conviction that Iraq's severe problems need a political, rather than a military solution.

But in the end it must be Iraqis, not Americans, who come up with a political solution.

Unsparing indictment

So how to persuade and cajole a weak Baghdad government to do what is necessary?

The report is an unsparing indictment of Iraqi, as well as American failings.

The report sets targets or milestones for the policy-makers

The current self-styled "national-unity government" has talked of national reconciliation, but done little to promote it.

The Shia leaders who dominate it pursue openly Shia agendas. They are unwilling to disarm their own militias, which stand accused of being infiltrated by death squads responsible for sectarian killings.

The Shia are obsessed with the violence of the Sunni-led insurgency - the Sunni Arabs are obsessed with the violence of Shia gunmen.

The Kurds of the north are quietly building up their own largely autonomous region, and want to extend it to include the oil-rich area around Kirkuk.

The idea of one Iraq has got lost amid the naked pursuit of individual and communal self-interest.

The report describes corruption as "rampant" and depicts government ministries as centres of cronyism.

Barely-veiled threat

It is hard to quarrel with the analysis. But what is the ISG's solution?

A mix of carrots and sticks - or, as the report calls them, incentives and disincentives.

The US must continue to help the Iraqis to help themselves.

It must set targets, or "milestones", for progress in the key areas of security, governance and, above all, national reconciliation.

The consequences of failure in Iraq will be high

If the government meets the targets, it can expect continuing US military, diplomatic and economic support. That includes dollars for reconstruction.

But there is also a barely-veiled threat. If the government fails, it will lose that support.

The hope, clearly, is that this threat will concentrate Iraqi minds. But what if it doesn't?

The clear implication is that US combat troops would leave anyway, by the hoped-for date of the first quarter of 2008.

Because this carrot-and-stick approach is at the heart of the report, experts and policy-makers are likely to scrutinise it carefully.

Is it likely Iraqi politicians will suddenly abandon their narrow self-interest and rediscover the virtues of the common good?

It is hard to be optimistic. And the report itself warns, in apocalyptic tones, of the consequences of failure.