Future tense as nuclear treaty stalls

By Paul Reynolds
World Affairs correspondent, BBC News website

The conference failed to solve some key issues of public concern

The failure by a review conference to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is no surprise given the competing interests and arguments.

But it leaves the world even more uncertain as to how to stop the spread of nuclear weapons on the one hand and to reduce their numbers on the other.

Two loopholes have not been closed. The first is that a member state can, under inspection, legally develop fuel enrichment technology to produce nuclear power.

But that know-how can then be used to make a nuclear bomb and all the country concerned then has to do is to leave the treaty.

The second loophole is that leaving the treaty is virtually cost-free.

Two countries demonstrate what can happen.

Iran wants to develop the fuel cycle technology and efforts are being made to stop it, given the mistrust that developed after it hid its programme for nearly 20 years. It insists despite this that its intentions are peaceful.

North Korea has not only developed the expertise, it has left the treaty and has announced that it has built a bomb. Several in fact.

US strategy

The deadlock means that the US will concentrate even more on unilateral and multilateral measures outside the treaty to counter future threats.

It was significant that the opening statement from the US delegate, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker, laid heavy emphasis on such measures.

We have also had success in designing new tools outside of the NPT that complement the treaty Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker

"We have also had success in designing new tools outside of the NPT that complement the treaty," he said.

Not long ago, the US put together the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in which more than 60 countries agreed to monitor and if necessary to intervene against the illegal trade in nuclear materials.

The threat is seen to come not only from North Korea and possibly Iran but also from clandestine groups like the AQ Khan network, named after the Pakistani nuclear scientist who sold his secrets around the world.

Accusations are already flying as to who is most to blame for the conference's failure.

The US is in the frame for some critics, who say it has turned its back on a commitment at the last review meeting to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons, has refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and is planning to develop so-called "mini-nukes" as bunker-busting bombs.

The US and Russia are also accused of not reducing their strategic arsenals enough.

Complacency

The Americans blame others for complacency in the face of North Korea, which has openly proclaimed its development of nuclear weapons, and Iran, which hid its enrichment programme for nearly 20 years.

They argue that some of the most significant successes have come independently of the treaty, notably when Libya gave up its nuclear programme under pressure and the Khan network was rolled up.

As for working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, the US says that thousands of warheads have gone since the Cold War and under its agreement with Russia, thousands more will soon be gone, leaving around 2,000 active warheads on each side.

The conference pitted nuclear haves against the have-nots

The conference got bogged down on the usual issue that bedevils any attempt to strengthen or reform the treaty - the tension between those who have nuclear weapons and those who do not.

The basic deal in the treaty was that the haves would negotiate towards eliminating their weapons and the have-nots would not seek to acquire them, while being free to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes.

The have-nots have always argued that until the haves are serious about negotiating, then they should not be expected to agree on tightening up methods of control.

Thus, Egypt complained about the "laxity" of the nuclear powers in negotiating reductions in arsenals and asked whether it would therefore be "logical or even feasible" to expect the others to negotiate additional controls.

The NPT has been successful in stopping a flood of countries from becoming nuclear powers.

The two loopholes will be the subjects of further discussion but given the failure at this conference, the hopes of a successful outcome cannot be very high. And the next review conference is not for another five years.