Here are key points from the 900-page congressional report on intelligence failings in the run up to the 11 September attacks. Parts of the report, however, have not been made public.
Some of the report has been blanked out
No specific information pointed to the 11 September plot, although intelligence agencies had a great deal of information about Osama Bin Laden and his activities.
The agencies missed opportunities to disrupt the plot by denying entry or detaining would-be hijackers.
An FBI informant knew two of the hijackers but the FBI agent who handled the informant had not been told they were suspected terrorists, even though intelligence officials had linked them to al-Qaeda.
Inadequate attention was given to the threat of a terrorist attack against the US.
The military was reluctant to launch attacks on Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan, partly because intelligence on his whereabouts was unreliable.
Reports warned of an attack against aviation in the US. One in December 1998 said: "...plans to hijack US aircraft proceeding well. Two individuals... had successfully evaded checkpoints in a dry run at a NY airport".
Omar al-Bayoumi - who paid expenses of two of the hijackers - "had access to seemingly unlimited funding from Saudi Arabia" and was suspected of being an agent for Saudi Arabia "or another power".
Prior to 11 September, there was no co-ordinated strategy to track terrorist funding and
close down their financial support networks.
Cost to mount the attacks: $175,000-$250,000
No link has been found yet between the 11 September attacks and the anthrax mailings.
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