Analysis: Message control in Afghanistan war

A media campaign is under way to win hearts and minds

By Jake Lynch

"Everything is going according to plan". It's become the familiar Pentagon mantra since the bombing of Afghanistan began on 7 October.

But what is the plan, and how is it supposed to deliver the stated objectives - to eliminate al-Qaeda and overthrow its Taleban hosts?

Information on this point has been scarce.

On his recent visit to London, Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, appeared to be in the dark.

Accepting the raids would continue until the "strategic objectives" were met, he could "only hope" those objectives were clear, and that they would be met before long.

Pentagon spokespersons have spent the last few weeks issuing apparently contradictory statements.

General Franks has given conflicting reports of US aims

US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld told USA Today that Osama Bin Laden, chief suspect for the 11 September attack on America, might never be caught or killed - only to follow up with a "clarification" that he still expected to track him down.

Two weeks into the operation, General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Taleban defences had been "eviscerated". The following week Pentagon spokesman Admiral John Stufflebeem professed himself "surprised" at the doggedness with which the Taleban regime was withstanding the onslaught.

Winning territory

How vital is it to the plan for Taleban-held territory to be taken from them?

What about the northern town of Mazar-e-Sharif, focus of claim and counter-claim that it will soon change hands?

On 5 November, operational commander General Tommy Franks said the US was not awaiting an offensive against the city by Northern Alliance forces, nor was it part of the plan to occupy land.

"We're not occupying major strategic terrain like Mazar-e-Sharif - that's not our approach," General Franks declared.

Then, three days later, General Franks said: "Yes, we are interested in Mazar, it would provide a land bridge up to Uzbekistan which could provide a humanitarian pathway into Afghanistan."

Hard on the heels of these pronouncements came the appointment of a senior advertising executive, Charlotte Beers, as Under-Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, to co-ordinate contacts between government and media.

It remains to be seen whether Ms Beers will be any keener than US Department of Defense officials to clarify whether there has been a recent expansion in the scope of bombing to include economic targets.

New targets

The UN has given a warning of possible disaster after an attack on the Kajaki hydro-electric power station and dam, which has cut electricity to the cities of Kandahar and Lashkarga and threatened important grazing land with flooding.

So perhaps the plan now includes some expectation that bringing hardship to the remaining civilians in the area - over half of Kandahar's population of 200,000 have reportedly fled - will cause them to overthrow, or at least seriously weaken, their Taleban rulers.

Another historic function of bombing has been to pin down an army on the ground, giving its enemies scope to manoeuvre around it and eventually force it out.

This seems to be the aim around Mazar-e-Sharif, where Northern Alliance forces have reportedly attacked the Taleban stronghold on horseback.

Pakistan's unease at the prospect of Northern Alliance advances is well canvassed. How cohesive would such an alliance prove?

Leading the attempt to take Mazar is the local Uzbek warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum.

The Northern Alliance attack on horseback

Before the Taleban overran the city in 1997, he spent most of his time either plotting or launching attacks against those who are now his allies in the self-styled United Front.

The political plan calls for him to be part of a government - the hope that he proves a more reliable component of such an administration than he was in the last, chaotic period of Northern Alliance rule from 1992-96.

Far above these intrigues, in Afghanistan's uncontested skies, Operation Enduring Freedom appears to be settling into a long, attritional campaign.

Across the 90% of the country they still control, Taleban forces have reportedly taken the obvious precaution of stationing themselves in houses, schools and mosques for protection.

Their 'frontlines' tend to be mingled with small farms and villages, so any systematic attacks on them may well bring higher numbers of civilian casualties.

Controlling the message

The Taleban's ambassador in Islamabad has been a significant source for many stories about civilian deaths - stories journalists have found it difficult to verify since they cannot obtain visas to enter the country.

Now Pakistan has told the envoy to pipe down, citing diplomatic rules, which effectively removes him from the information war.

How significant might this be? After the Kosovo campaign, then Downing Street Press Secretary Alastair Campbell recalled that "the only battle we might lose was the battle for hearts and minds," with polls suggesting declining support for the operation in Nato countries amid reports of mounting civilian casualties.

If a similar assessment is being made by the architects of this campaign, then message control may be more central to the plan than many have realised.