Book stirs Kashmir controversy

Arguments continue over who was to blame for failures

By Vipul Mudgal in Delhi

Nearly a year after India and Pakistan fought pitched battles in the Kargil region of Indian-administered Kashmir, India's politicians and intelligence agencies continue to blame each other for the heavy cost of the fighting.

The Indian army blames the intelligence services for failing to detect the intrusion of a large number of separatist militants, while the intelligence agencies insist politicians ignored their warnings.

Now a recently published book by leading war correspondent, Harinder Baweja, details the events of last year, based on eyewitness accounts and extensive interviews with Indian soldiers.

Written as a soldier's diary, "Kargil: An Inside Story" is based on confidential defence documents gleaned from Indian and Pakistani troops in addition to extensive interviews with Indian army officers and men.

Lack of equipment

It says that the Indian infantry fought at heights approaching 20,000 feet without snow jackets, boots, binoculars, night-vision devices, laser range finders and even proper rifles.

Soldiers were not given high-altitude training

The author quotes soldiers as saying that specialised weapons either came late or did not come at all.

Troops were mostly pulled out of urban counter insurgency duties in the Kashmir Valley and were sent straight to the heights without high-altitude training or acclimatisation.

Many units were equipped with cumbersome bullet proof gear which was not designed for high-altitude fighting.

Worse still is her revelation that almost all fighting units were lacking in machine guns, bunker bursting equipment and even food and drinking water.

No logistical support

The book quotes from confidential After Action Reports (AARs) from infantry units to assert that senior officers in the Indian army compounded the problems of the soldiers by issuing weapons at the eleventh hour.

A brigadier is quoted as saying that his troops had to operate without logistical support and in an information void.

Indian forces apparently lacked basic equipment like stretchers or spare hands to evacuate casualty.

Difficult questions

Harinder Baweja raises some difficult questions for India's politicians and diplomats, pointing out that they should be concerned that a nuclear power is vulnerable to so many operational mistakes.

Intelligence agencies failed to alert soldiers

It says that India's main intelligence agencies such as the Research and Analysis Wing, the Intelligence Bureau and Military Intelligence failed to alert the country to the enemy's presence on hilltops overlooking a crucial highway.

It says that many soldiers suffered because of poor intelligence.

The author does not spare India's scientific establishment either.

She says the country could have saved up to 80% of its casualties if the Defence Research and Development Organisation had not stalled the purchase of artillery locating radar from the United States.

By the time they realised they could not develop the radar indigenously, the US had prohibited defence sales to India because of its nuclear tests.