MoD's sigh of relief over Hutton

By Paul Adams BBC Defence Correspondent

A collective sigh of relief was felt at the Ministry of Defence as it emerged that Lord Hutton was not, as many had predicted, going to reserve some of his harshest criticism for the department with immediate responsibility for David Kelly.

Similar expressions of relief must have been felt by officials involved in drawing up the September 2002 dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, but questions linger about the government's decision to serve up intelligence for public consumption.

Officials at the MoD have always believed that their position was strong, and poorly represented in the media. Lord Hutton, with some reservations, appears to agree.

The famous "Q & A material", prepared for MoD press officers fielding questions for journalists, were not part of a grand conspiracy to reveal Dr Kelly's name.

The fact that it, like so many crucial documents involved in the Kelly affair, went through various drafts is seen by Lord Hutton as entirely understandable.

'Abrupt' identification

The MoD does not get off scot free, though.

The abrupt way in which officials broke the news to Dr Kelly that his name had been confirmed, "without any explanation as to why this had been done," is criticised by Lord Hutton.

Geoff Hoon, widely portrayed as an inevitable fall guy while the enquiry was in session, emerges unscathed from the report Paul Adams Defence Correspondent

It "must have been very upsetting for him," the report says, "and must have given rise to a feeling that he had been badly let down."

But even here, the criticism is tempered by what Lord Hutton calls "mitigating circumstances".

It was "only one of the factors" causing stress for David Kelly; officials did try to help him at this crucial phase and "Dr Kelly was not an easy man to help or to whom to give advice."

Geoff Hoon, widely portrayed as an inevitable fall guy while the inquiry was in session, emerges unscathed from the report.

Officials close to him said on Wednesday that he was glad that no-one within the MoD was singled out for strong criticism.

Officials offered little on-the-record comment, except the vague assurance that the department's "procedures" would be looked out.

Privately, sources acknowledged that the unprecedented nature of the Kelly affair (something pointed out by Lord Hutton) meant that there simply were no procedures for dealing with a case like this.

'Subconsciously influenced'

Another area where procedures will almost certainly have to be scrutinised before another episode explodes in the face of government, is where intelligence material is marshalled to influence public opinion.

John Scarlett had overall responsibility for the dossier

In one of the report's most enigmatic passages, Lord Hutton raises the possibility that Tony Blair's desire to see a strong dossier "may have subconsciously influenced Mr Scarlett to make the wording of the dossier somewhat stronger than it would have been if it had been contained in a normal JIC assessment."

Lord Hutton clearly believes that the dossier was properly assembled, but this gentle suggestion goes to the heart of what many - including some intelligence officials - see as a fundamental issue.

They are not used to serving up their usually dry intelligence assessments for public consumption.

It was this, more than any single element of the September dossier, that caused unease in the intelligence community.

The dossier's 45-minute claim was a good example of the sort of confusion and controversy that results when genuine intelligence is shorn of all context.

Publishing of intelligence

It was only during the Hutton Inquiry that we finally learned that 45 minutes referred to battlefield munitions and not, as the dossier had sloppily implied, more threatening weapons.

In their own report into intelligence assessments of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the Intelligence and Security Committee last September highlighted this same concern.

It was highly likely, they reported, that governments would in future "feel that they have to brief the public using intelligence-derived material."

"It is vital," they went on, "that the JIC's and the agencies' credibility and effectiveness are not degraded or diminished by the publication of their product in an inappropriate manner."

The ISC said they intended to examine the relationship between the intelligence agencies and the media.