Day 21: Key points

Here are the main points from the evidence on Day 21 of the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly. The most recent witness is first.

Assistant Chief Constable Michael Page

Murder and criminal activity had been ruled out as possible causes of Dr Kelly's death, said ACC Page.

Police had interviewed the scientist's last known contacts, including weapons inspector Olivia Bosch and Mai Pederson, the woman said to have converted him to the Baha'i faith and German army officer Gabrielle Kraatz-Wadsack.

I do not believe that there was any third party involvement at the scene of Dr Kelly's death ACC Michael Page

The interviews had not furthered inquiries at all.

Three mysterious men dressed in black spotted at the time Dr Kelly's body had been found had been police officers, said ACC Page.

Dr Kelly's dental records had been reported missing, he said. But an examination of the surgery found nothing untoward and they had later turned up without any out-of-place fingerprints on them.

ACC Page said that as a police officer he was inherently suspicious and as dental records were a means of identification, had DNA checks done to confirm Dr Kelly's identity.

John Scarlett

The chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) took to the stand at the Hutton inquiry 1215 BST.

Mr Scarlett said drafts of the Iraq dossier text were sent to JIC members on 11, 16 and 19 September 2002. He said this was three times more than normal to ensure full visibility throughout the process.

He said the most important meeting to consider the draft dossier was on 11 September.

The JIC wanted him to reflect the rising level of concern about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes. The JIC wanted the drafters to make it clear the assessment that Iraq was ready to use these weapons and to take full account of the recent intelligence which had been coming in.

Mr Scarlett said there was a regular weekly meeting of the JIC on 18 September 2002, in which the draft was discussed. The committee noted new intelligence had come in on nuclear matters which would need to be included in the draft.

The new draft was circulated on 19 September and comments received with the final draft put out on the 20th. There was no further input by members of the JIC. The procedure which had been followed was the "silent procedure" and JIC members understood this was their chance to comment "if they did not take it, then no comment meant assent".

Jonathan Sumption QC, counsel for the government, asked about input of non-JIC people into the drafting of the dossier - what input did he expect the prime minister and his staff to have?

Mr Scarlett said he expected the prime minister to be interested in the way the assessment was presented and explained. He expected the PM's senior staff to be ready to offer "advice on a range of presentationally linked points regarding the dossier, because this was an unusual project".

By senior staff he meant Alastair Campbell, David Manning and Jonathan Powell. He said he was open to such advice, and was likely to find it useful because the JIC itself did not have expertise.

Mr Scarlett said he received a "small number of comments" from the PM via Mr Campbell on 17 September, and the 18th and 19th, and two e-mails from Jonathan Powell.

Mr Scarlett said comments were received from Defence Intelligence Staff after the 19 September draft was circulated. He had 3 pages of "largely non essential comments" from DIS, in addition to some comments from GCHQ and SIS.

He said "the majority of the detailed comments from DIS were incorporated. It is an efficient system. It is used to working like that".

Mr Scarlett said he had made himself responsible for all proof-reading of the dossier.

We were at pains to resolve... a very difficult issue for the government Tom Kelly

He said he knew of Defence Intelligence Staff concerns about the language about claims about Iraq's chemical weapons production.

The standard definition of weapons of mass destruction did include battlefield munitions

BBC barrister Andrew Caldecott QC, talking about the claim that Iraq would deploy weapons of mass destruction within 45 minutes, said he could not understand how the dossier could add a judgment which not appeared in the JIC assessment before.

Mr Scarlett denied the claim in the dossier had been inconsistent with the only previous intelligence judgement on the issue.

He said the 45-minute claim had been based on more than one specific intelligence report - it had also drawn on previous intelligence about Iraq's command and control structures.

Mr Scarlett rejected suggestions that changing the wording about the 45-minute claim from "indicates" to "are able" had altered the meaning of the intelligence.

When it was suggested to him that he did not know what munitions the claim referred to, Mr Scarlett said it was it was taken that "these were munitions in forward deployment positions".

Mr Scarlett said it was natural for Downing Street media chief Alastair Campbell to chair a meeting about how the dossier was presented.

He told the BBC barrister "sorry to disappoint you" but Mr Campbell had not asked what the latest up-to-date assessments.

The intelligence chief could not remember discussing the 45-minute claim at all with Tony Blair.

Asked about newspaper reports that the 45-minute claim was about missiles which could reach British bases in Cyprus, Mr Scarlett said most of the coverage was "very sober and sensible".

Mr Scarlett remembered Mr Campbell saying the 11 September draft of the dossier be "less assertive, less rhetorical" - he agreed and the next version was clearly better.

Mr Caldecott suggested one e-mail from Number 10 chief of staff Jonathan Powell had suggested the dossier be redrafted to leave the impression that Saddam Hussein was an offensive, and not just defensive, threat.

Mr Scarlett did not accept that was the implication of Mr Powell's e-mail. But he had looked again at the passage and changed the text because recent intelligence reports suggested Saddam Hussein wanted chemical and biological weapons to boost his regional influence.

He said he had decided to change the title of the draft dossier from "Iraq's programme for weapons of mass destruction" to "Iraq's weapons of mass destruction" because that accurately reflected its contents.

Mr Scarlett said he viewed the allegations in BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan's report as "completely wrong".

He insisted a point made by Mr Campbell about the 45-minute claim was a comment on an inconsistency rather than a request for a change.

He had checked with the head of the MI6 and all the JIC members that there was no intelligence disquiet about the 45-minute claim.

Mr Caldecott said Mr Campbell's account to MPs about his discussions to Mr Scarlett had lacked candour - but the spy chief disagreed.

Godric Smith

Godric Smith, one of Tony Blair's two official spokesmen, took to the stand shortly after 1130 BST.

Peter Knox, counsel for the inquiry, asked about Alastair Campbell's diary entry on 9 July about getting the source "out". Mr Smith said he agreed it reflected Mr Campbell's view at that time.

Mr Smith said the point about the letter from Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon to the BBC was "we were at pains to resolve... a very difficult issue for the government" there was "a stain against the government's integrity" and this was "an opportunity to try and correct the public record".

Mr Knox asked about Mr Campbell's diary entry of 15 July which says "looking forward to Kelly giving evidence, but GS (Godric Smith) CR and I all predicted it would be a disaster and so it proved".

Mr Smith said he had come to the view that Dr Kelly's appearance before the committees "would generate more heat than light". He thought nothing would come out of it to help correct the public record unless the BBC were prepared to say something different.

Asked why he had feared it would be a disaster Mr Smith said his prediction "was more one of weary resignation" and not because it was feared that Dr Kelly had not been candid with the MoD.

Tom Kelly

Tom Kelly, one of Tony Blair's two official spokesmen, took the stand at 1015.

Under questioning from Jonathan Sumption QC, government barrister, he told how he and fellow spokesman Mr Smith had dissuaded Mr Campbell from leaking to a newspaper the fact that an official had come forward to say they might be the BBC's dossier row source.

Mr Kelly denied that information he gave at a lobby briefing on 9 July had helped newspapers work out who was the unidentified official mentioned in a MoD press release on 8 July.

The MoD statement had said the official worked for the MoD - the BBC responded shortly afterwards by saying their source was not employed by the MoD.

I have to stress that at no point did I try to give information or drop clues which I thought would lead to Dr Kelly's identification.... the BBC statements had created considerable difficulties for me and I was under no illusion about the difficulties I faced. I had to balance what I thought were a number of competing pressures I genuinely wanted to protect Dr Kelly's identity as much as possible Tom Kelly No 10 spokesman

Mr Kelly said he had specified that the source was paid for by another department but worked for the MoD, because he wanted to show that their unnamed official might still be the BBC's source.

Because the Foreign Office did not want people to assume the unnamed official was a diplomat he described the individual as a consultant "as it was a vague term".

Asked if Dr Kelly "was some kind of pawn in a game that you were playing with the press" Tom Kelly said "absolutely not".

Despite lots of pressure, he said, he did not believe they lost sight that there was an individual caught up in this controversy, and they had to respect that individual.

Tom Kelly said it had been wrong for him to have suggested Dr Kelly had been a "Walter Mitty" type character.

He said it was not part of any strategy "to demean or belittle Dr Kelly. I have accepted that my remark was wrong, it was a mistake... but it was a mistake in what I thought was a private conversation. It was not part of any broad strategy".

Jeremy Gompertz QC, counsel for the Kelly family, suggested that if somebody combined what was said in the lobby briefing with the MoD statement, there was a lot of information which would let a journalist identify the person very quickly. Tom Kelly said they were talking about two "separate events".

Mr Gompertz, asked about Mr Campbell's diary entry of 9 July "that the biggest thing that was needed was the source out" - the same day that the lobby briefings gave the clues which led to Dr Kelly being identified.

Mr Kelly, who said his lobby comments had been left up to his own judgement, said he did not want to second guess what Mr Campbell's diary entry meant.

Asked about his Walter Mitty remark to a journalist, Mr Kelly said: "I did think it was part of my role to underline the issues which I thought the inquiry would have to address, and central among those issues, was the question of the position of the alleged source".

Mr Kelly said other reporters made it clear to him he had been speaking in the "very narrow focus of the issue being who exaggerated what they knew... was it the reporter or was it Dr Kelly".

"I fully accept that I should not have used what was a too colourful phrase. I fully accept that in doing so I ran the risk of misunderstanding and I fully accept that that must have caused the family much distress. It was not what I intended and that is why I gave my unreserved apology at the time... and why I repeat it again today"

Mr Gompertz suggested it was not a single off the cuff remark "it was a scene setting remark.. .made to several journalists" - Mr Kelly said it was not intended as that.

Mr Gompertz asked if when he made the remark it was in his capacity as the prime minister's official spokesman. Mr Kelly said: "I was speaking in what I thought was a background conversation in which both sides were trying to understand the issues at the heart of this tragedy".

James Dingemans QC, senior counsel to the inquiry, asked about Campbell's diary entry saying they needed to get the source out: Mr Kelly said his objective was not to get Dr Kelly's name out, but to answer journalists questions.