Day 20: Alastair Campbell main points

Here are the main points from the evidence of Alastair Campbell, the government's outgoing director of communications, on Day 20 of the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly.

Alastair Campbell

Jonathan Sumption QC, counsel for the government, asked Mr Campbell about the 9 September 2002 memo to John Scarlett, head of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), in which he made comments about the dossier on Iraq's weapons.

Mr Campbell was asked if it was appropriate for him or the prime minister, to be making suggestions about the dossier.

I did not brief Dr Kelly's name to any journalists, neither was I aware of any strategy to do so Geoff Hoon Geoff Hoon: Key points

Mr Campbell said he was making presentational points and had been doing a job the prime minister expected him to do - coordination of an issue which crossed departments.

He stressed that the prime minister was going to have to be answerable to Parliament "for every word in it [the dossier]".

He said he did not believe his comments would have affected the objectivity of Mr Scarlett or the JIC.

The dossier, which would be presented to Parliament and the public, was a "major communications exercise", he said.

The JIC did not have the expertise to deal with this, said Mr Campbell.

The communications chief said Mr Blair "had to be confident" the dossier "was a document worthy for him to present to Parliament".

John Scarlett was in control of the content of the dossier - he had asked me for advice on presentation Alastair Campbell

The prime minister's presentation was never seen as a case for war but merely "setting out the facts of WMD as the British Government understood them to be", said Mr Campbell. He said the source of the document was the JIC.

The inquiry was shown a note from Mr Campbell dated 17 September, last year. He was asked to explain the suggestion that the dossier "would be made stronger if we said 'despite sanctions, with the policy of containment he has made real progress"'. Mr Campbell said this referred to the development of Saddam Hussein's weapons programme.

Mr Sumption went methodically through the memo. Mr Campbell explained what he had wanted to change on each of 16 points and how Mr Scarlett checked them carefully before deciding whether a change was right or appropriate.

He was asked why he did not include all those 16 points in a list about his request for changes he gave to a committee of MPs - and especially why he missed out the point about the controversial 45 minute claim.

"It was in relation to point 10 which pointed out an inconsistency between the executive summary and the text," he said. "I was not suggesting how the inconsistency should be addressed. I was not making a request for a change. This point about 45 minutes had never been a big issue in relation to the planning of the dossier."

He added: "The final point I would make is we knew at that stage that the Intelligence and Security Committee [ISC] would be looking at all these issues anyway, so I provided what I was asked to provide, which is a list of requests for change and John Scarlett's responses."

I think it's important to understand the sense of anger and frustration is building when you have been accused of something very, very serious which you know you have not done ... Alastair Campbell

Mr Campbell agreed that without exception, the comments he made on the dossier were from a "presentational point of view".

"It is important to understand the dynamic of the professional relationship at the heart of this, the professional relationship between myself and John Scarlett," he said.

"John Scarlett was in control of the content of the dossier - he had asked me for advice on presentation. We were both conscious of the fact the expectations surrounding this publication were huge. The media and parliamentarians were [certain] to pore over every word.

"John Scarlett would freely admit it was not an area he had much expertise in and I could offer the sort of advice he wanted."

Mr Campbell said that while he stood by the substance of what he said, "I think the manner in which I said it at times left something to be desired. But I think it's important to understand the sense of anger and frustration is building when you have been accused of something very, very serious which you know you have not done, when your efforts to seek to resolve it properly are met with a mixture of disdain and indifference."

Mr Campbell claimed the BBC had tried "to wish away what they had said and tried to pretend that they had never said it" when it became a public issue.

I'm not sure the 45-minute point carried quite the weight that you think Alastair Campbell

He admitted he had not made any effort to cover up the fact he "was extremely angry". "I was very frustrated, and increasingly dispirited about the whole thing for all sorts of reasons".

These included professional reasons, because the implication was that he had not been doing his job properly, as well as political and personal considerations, he said.

Mr Campbell said his frustration was shared throughout the government, from the prime minister down, through the Cabinet, the intelligence agencies and people who worked for him. "We all knew the allegations were false," he said. "It is a very difficult thing to try and deal with."

Mr Sumption quizzed the communications chief about claims made by the BBC that the government had not complained about the 6.07am broadcast by Andrew Gilligan to the Today programme until almost a month after the story broke.

Mr Campbell replied: "It is not true ... bearing in mind the whole context, the prime minister had been denying this on a daily sometimes twice daily basis since the story was first aired, including in the House of Commons."

In his first letter to the BBC, dated 6 June, he had specifically mentioned the 6.07am broadcast and had attached a transcript of what had been said, said Mr Campbell.

What you were concerned to do was to strengthen the language in the dossier, weren't you? Andrew Caldecott QC Counsel for the BBC

He had also included the BBC producer guidelines and highlighted three areas in which the BBC had been at fault, he said.

Lord Hutton intervened to stress that the BBC claimed Mr Campbell had made reference to several reports, but did not single out any particular broadcast.

This prompted Mr Campbell to repeat that he had included the 6.07am transcript in his letter, adding that there were a number of reports which he had difficulty with.

"The point was this was the report that did the damage, the report that went round the world. This was the report that the rest of the media picked up on. This story was the biggest story, not just in Britain but other parts of the world."

Mr Campbell said he could not imagine that Richard Sambrook, the BBC's head of news, and Greg Dyke, the corporation's director general, had been unaware of the nature of the allegations being made.

Mr Campbell said he did not accept a suggestion by some BBC witnesses that the dispute had gone quiet until Mr Campbell re-ignited it with his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC).

I was keen ... to make sure that the dossier as presented to Parliament was a strong consistent document that would allow him effectively to explain to the British public the reality of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's WMD Alastair Campbell

He said he had not suggested to Godric Smith, the prime minister's official spokesman, or to Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon who had come forward as Mr Gilligan's source. He said he had suggested revealing the fact that someone had come forward.

"I hesitate even to call it a proposal. It was a thought which was very quickly rejected by the defence secretary, and Godric and Tom Kelly [other official spokesman for the prime minister] both thought it was a bad idea. More importantly, I raised it with the prime minister. He thought it was a bad idea and nothing came of it."

The communications director said he had believed it important to get the information into the public domain before the prime minister's appearance before the Parliamentary Liaison Committee.

Under cross-examination by Andrew Caldecott QC, counsel for the BBC, Mr Campbell agreed that the dossier was a "distillation of JIC assessments presented to the prime minister", but added that it also included historical background information.

Mr Campbell said the prime minister "wanted to share" with the public some of the reports he was seeing and was concerned about.

In relation to the dossier, he said it had been up to Mr Scarlett "to rewrite what he saw fit".

GH and I both wanted to get the source up but TB was anxious about it Extract from Alastair Campbell's diaries

Intelligence service officers were unhappy with press reports about intelligence related to Iraq, said Mr Campbell, who added that he met three of them on 9 September to discuss their concerns. He said he did not discuss the JIC assessments which were finalised that day.

Mr Campbell said he first noticed the 45-minute claim when he read the 10 September draft of the dossier.

Mr Campbell said he had chaired a meeting on 9 September, in the run up to publication of the dossier, because the prime minister had asked him to look at the presentational aspects of it. But he said Mr Scarlett was "superior" to him with regard to the dossier's contents.

Mr Caldecott asked why no live minutes were taken during the meeting, to which Mr Campbell replied: "There are no routine notes, I am not a minister... If (I) had to take notes of every single meeting I have, then that would be of considerable cost to the Exchequer."

Mr Caldecott asked why Mr Campbell had written the final version of the dossier when Mr Scarlett had already volunteered for the task. He replied: " ... By this point Mr Scarlett and I were very, very clear about the process that would follow."

Mr Caldecott asked Mr Campbell about one version of the dossier which said intelligence suggested the Iraqis could use the weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so while the other version said intelligence indicated it. Mr Campbell replied: "That wasn't something that struck me at the time. What struck me at the time was the inconsistency I pointed out."

In government circles it was recognised that it would assist them to have Dr Kelly's name out. Is that fair? James Dingemans QC Counsel to the inquiry

Mr Caldecott said this was in a latter version, but Mr Campbell said: "I'm not sure the 45-minute point carried quite the weight that you think."

The hearing was shown an email which said the dossier had "a long way to go" and describing how "we're in a lot of trouble with this". Mr Campbell said the sender was "saying he wasn't terribly impressed with the draft". He said he "was impressed with the draft, adding that he believed it was a "very strong document".

An email from Phil Bassett, a former Downing Street aide, was shown which referred to intelligence being light and called for more convincing intelligence, to which Mr Campbell said: "Within the office people were making comments, trying to be helpful ... it was clear who was in charge - John Scarlett."

Mr Campbell said Mr Scarlett had the idea of writing a conclusion to the dossier, drafted one up and said he had doubts about it. Mr Campbell said he agreed with those doubts "and ultimately there was no conclusion".

Mr Caldecott showed Mr Campbell a series of memos he had written suggesting alternative phrasing for the dossier, including his use of words such as "it would be stronger if..." and "may" is weaker.

Mr Caldecott suggested: "What you were concerned to do was to strengthen the language in the dossier, weren't you?"

Mr Campbell replied: "I was keen, and this is the job the prime minister asked me to do, to make sure that the dossier as presented to Parliament was a strong consistent document that would allow him effectively to explain to the British public the reality of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction ... I think if you're saying strong equals "sexed up", I don't accept that at all.

That's correct. It was my view ... This has become the nub of the issue. It wasn't Dr Kelly's fault. He didn't know that when he met Mr Gilligan. It was just reality Alastair Campbell

"If you are saying strong equals a good, solid piece of work, does the job the prime minister wants it to do, I agree with that."

Mr Campbell denied the document had been "sexed up", adding: "None of it would be 'sexing up' unless you were doing something improper in relation to the intelligence judgments."

He said he had not been "tightening up" the dossier in relation to the 45-minute claim and that Mr Scarlett had adopted a change which he had initiated. Mr Campbell denied that he had done anything improper.

Mr Campbell said the reference to the 45-minute claim was included at the request of the prime minister. "The thrust of that point stayed the same throughout. I certainly had no influence on it whatever."

Mr Campbell was then cross-examination by James Dingemans QC, counsel to the inquiry. Referring to the 16 recommendations he had made to the dossier, he said: "They certainly did not amount to a transformation of the dossier."

The hearing was shown diary entries written by Mr Campbell which referred to someone coming forward stating that the "intel went in late". Mr Dingemans said Dr Kelly denied saying this about the 45-minute point, to which Mr Campbell said: "This is my recollection of my conversation with Geoff Hoon on that day."

The diaries also showed that Mr Campbell had said it would be pretty "bad" for Mr Gilligan if the individual who had come forward was confirmed to be the source for his report.

Mr Campbell agreed that he was "very, very angry and frustrated about this whole situation".

"The BBC was saying that the source for the story was a senior intelligence official, somebody centrally involved in drawing up the dossier," he said. "I was certain as far as it is possible to be in myself, and I think so was John Scarlett and so was [MI6 chief] Sir Richard Dearlove and so was the prime minister, that this was not the case."

Mr Campbell said he felt it was important from 29 May that the allegation was withdrawn and retracted. "I explained when I gave evidence I felt this development was important to that."

Mr Campbell was taken through various extracts of his diary, which included an entry on 6 July: "GH, like me, wanted to get it out but the source had broken cover to say that Andrew Gilligan misrepresented him."

Mr Campbell told the inquiry: "I think both of us felt that this was a development that was relevant both to the FAC report that was being published on Monday and to the [BBC] governors' meeting on Sunday evening."

Mr Campbell said he was not aware that the source was Dr Kelly, but was someone who was not centrally involved in the dossier.

Mr Dingemans read from the diary: "GH said he was almost as steamed up as I was. TB said he did not want to push the system too far."

Mr Campbell said: "I felt in relation to these allegations that they were so damaging, both to the prime minister and the government, we had to get to a position where the BBC withdrew them."

Mr Dingemans asked him about an entry where he said he was determined to win and not just get "a messy draw", to which Mr Campbell said this referred to the BBC saying it would offer a retraction if the FAC was unanimous in finding there was no evidence for its claims.

Another diary entry said: "GH and I both wanted to get the source up but TB was anxious about it." Mr Campbell said: "That is, I'm afraid, the journalist in me coming out. That is the issue, get that issue to those two bodies that were relevant to the situation at the time. The BBC governors and the FAC. I am not talking about getting anything, as it were, public."

Mr Campbell added: "This was a development potentially absolutely central to the discussion the governors were having on the Sunday and to the report being published on the Monday."

Mr Campbell said he believed a decision was taken within the BBC that they were not going to cover the story "and that's when I say big conspiracy - that's not me getting paranoid, that [reflects] that they had basically taken the decision that they were not going to cover this".

Mr Dingemans asked Mr Campbell if in "government circles" it was recognised that it would assist them to have Dr Kelly's name out. "Is that fair?"

Mr Campbell replied: "That's correct. It was my view ... This has become the nub of the issue. It wasn't Dr Kelly's fault. He didn't know that when he met Mr Gilligan. It was just reality."

"The mood around Number 10 and in much of the rest of the government is that this issue was taking up a lot of energy. The BBC were not going to accept they were wrong. It was, frankly, just going nowhere," said Mr Campbell.

He said he was "aware" that Pam Teare, the MoD press chief, and the department had agreed the policy of confirming Dr Kelly's name to any journalist who put it to them. "I was aware that that was the policy they had agreed."

Mr Dingemans referred to another diary entry which said: " ...looking forward to Kelly giving evidence but GS, CR and I all predicted it would be a disaster and so it proved". Explaining what this meant, Mr Campbell said: "What has been terrible, and terrible and far worse for Dr Kelly and his family, was ... nothing really had ever gone according to the outcome that we might have wished ... this was something which we were just going to have to sort of put behind us and forget."

Asked what he meant when he wrote that Dr Kelly's evidence was a disaster, "despite MoD assurances he was well-schooled", Mr Campbell said: "Again I think that was myself and Jonathan Powell [who] had just wanted to be assured by the MoD that Dr Kelly was being prepared. An FAC appearance does require a lot of preparation."

Mr Campbell said he and his Downing Street colleagues had agreed they should not try to do the preparation themselves. "I'm not suggesting there that anyone is saying we should be doing it ourselves," he added. "The prime minister is clear that we should be doing nothing about this at all beyond the strategic points that I had been making earlier, namely if this is the person then the BBC story is wrong and the BBC should be big enough to accept that."