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By Irene Mona Klotz
at the Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas
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We're committed to opening lines of communication and making sure people get their dissenting opinions and minority opinions on the table
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By the time Nasa managers meet again to oversee a shuttle mission,
they may find their old rectangular table replaced by a nice big round one.
Or perhaps the team will
gather around a triangular table, like the US Navy uses.
"Now you laugh," chides deputy shuttle manager Wayne Hale, addressing
a group of grinning reporters.
"But when you talk about culture and
how people subconsciously deal with hierarchy, and where they fit
within an organisation, and whether they feel comfortable in bringing
things up, things like the shape of the table matter."
Hale, a former flight director recently picked to serve as the
shuttle programme's deputy manager, is taking a stab at explaining how
Nasa will tackle the most challenging recommendations offered by the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board: changing the agency's mindset.
"I'm wishing I'd taken more sociology classes in college," confesses
Hale.
"I'm learning a lot - I think we're all learning a lot in this
arena - and we're committed to opening lines of communication and
making sure people get their dissenting opinions and minority
opinions on the table so we can consider them."
Nasa is not quite ready for yoga and aromatherapy, but Hale says
outside experts will be sitting in on training simulations and
gauging communication and management skills as carefully as technical
experts crunch data about solid rocket booster performance.
"I've added a number of books to my bookshelf that are
decision-making related," says Hale.
"And we're going to have a
number of these folks come and talk to us."
Flawed decision-making
Investigators probing the fatal 1 February shuttle accident faulted Nasa
management and flawed decision-making processes as much as hardware
breakdowns for loss of Columbia and its seven astronauts.
Mission managers, for example, squashed attempts by engineers to
obtain high-resolution photographs of the shuttle in orbit to assess
possible damage from a debris impact at liftoff.
Accident
investigators determined the shuttle was destroyed because of wing
damage from falling foam insulation.
Managers also failed to meet
daily, as rules required, and failed to realise that data being used
to rationalise the foam strike as a non-issue was being erroneously
applied.
"We've got to put into place a structure that prevents the next
accident," says Hale.
"We were not good enough," he added. "We did not do what is necessary
to keep the Columbia crew safe. That is something we have to live
with as a legacy that will compel us to do the right thing for future
shuttle flights and for future human exploration of space."
More headaches
Hale's comments came at the midpoint of a three-day workshop to
explain Nasa's plans for returning its remaining three space shuttles
to flight.
With all the new requirements for launching, just getting
a shuttle off the ground will be an accomplishment.
The new constraints include
- daylight liftoff for better photographs and video of possible debris strikes
-
sunlit angles on the fuel tank as it is being jettisoned - and
photographed - eight and a half minutes after liftoff
These rules are in addition to the technical requirements to launch
when the station's orbit is properly aligned with the launch site and
to schedule the mission when the sun angle will not fry or freeze a
shuttle docked at the station.
Add to the mix
- the launch schedules of commercial and government payloads from Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station, which supplies range safety and tracking
services for shuttle flights as well
-
Soyuz and Progress launches and operations at the space station
-
the occasional meteor shower
and, of course, Florida's famous fickle weather, and you have "a
great challenge," says flight director John Shannon.
During the autumn and winter, the launch opportunities shrink to just a
few days a month.
Mr Shannon says: "We're just beginning to grapple with
what that means for the space station."