Report conclusions on train crash

Train design added to seriousness of derailment

A report into a train crash in County Londonderry in which six people were injured has been published.

Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate has been investigating the accident which happened at Downhill near Castlerock on 4 June 2002.

In his report published on Wednesday, Principal Inspector Gerald Kerr found that there were a number of management deficiencies in Northern Ireland Railways which were contributory factors in the accident.

His report made the following conclusions:

The radio equipment on the train was in working order and capable of sending and receiving messages.

VHF radio reception along parts of this coastline is poor. However, tests carried out on radio reception indicate that, under normal circumstances, the driver should have been able to receive at least the first (of the three) radio broadcasts.

During the time the Northern Ireland Railways (NIR) control room were attempting to contact the driver, the train radio is likely to have been switched off or at a volume which did not allow the driver to hear the broadcasts.

The police and NIR did not come to a clear understanding as to the seriousness or the exact location of the incident.

Due to an unexplained technical fault, PSNI (police) systems failed to record the details and timings of the two emergency calls made by the eye witness. Consequently, I am unable to confirm that the information was transmitted to NIR from PSNI in a prompt fashion.

NIR Control Room Operator acted promptly on the information given by PSNI.

The design of the rolling stock was a contributory factor in the seriousness of the derailment and to the injury to the driver.

Some of the relevant evidence of a perishable nature was not collected.

The train did not have an emergency cut-off switch for the engine which caused concern for the members of the public attempted to rescue the injured driver.

Although there were outstanding maintenance defects on the train these did not contribute to the seriousness of the incident.

NIR had allowed the effectiveness of the radio system to fall below achievable standards in that they did not ensure procedures for operation were followed; have adequate maintenance arrangements for the systems as a whole.

Rock falls from all the cliffs in the Downhill area are foreseeable and some prediction of their outcome can be made.

The risk of a rock falling from the Downhill slope and resulting in a derailment (either directly or indirectly) had not been properly evaluated by NIR prior to the derailment.

Further incidents of rock fall will occur in the Downhill area and present a risk of injury, particularly to residents, and to a lesser extent, road and rail users.

Had NIR received the information in the order of one minute earlier, it is likely the accident could have been prevented.

Although Roads Service did not apply a sufficiently proactive approach to the management of slopes this was not a contributory factor in the accident.