Analysis: UK forces apply peacekeeping lessons

Analysis: UK forces apply peacekeeping lessons

Michael Codner
Military analyst, Royal United Services Institute

Trying to win the hearts of Iraqi children

In their press statements during the course of the War in Iraq British military commanders have used the word "effect" a great deal.

There has been talk of "effects based targeting", a concept at the forefront of British military doctrine since Kosovo.

In a nutshell, when military force is used, success is measured not by how accurate or destructive the attack might be, but whether it achieves the objective.

There's a particular focus on the coercive effect of an attack. Has it destroyed the will of the enemy or bent it to the wishes of the attacker? The American "shock and awe" strategy contains similar themes.

British soldiers and marines seem to be prepared to mingle with the crowd and to talk affably

But there's another important psychological effect of military force - reassurance leading to consent, assent, compliance or acquiescence.

During peace-keeping operations, reassuring the local population is of the essence. Again and again the coalition have referred to winning the heart and minds of the Iraqi people.

Clearly coercion and reassurance are opposite sides of the same coin.

Commentators have noticed differences in behaviour between British and American troops in their contact with Iraqi people.

British soldiers mingle with the crowd and talk affably. American troops rarely seem to behave in this way.

Providing water and food is a key objective

They're more likely to remain within their armoured vehicles. When they're on foot in civilian areas, their posture is more confrontational.

Perhaps this difference is one of situation. British marines in Umm Qasr may not be in combat mode, as the decisive battle for the town is over.

Reassurance and coercion

But there's also an important doctrinal difference that was apparent in operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The operational style in American zones of responsibility was very different from that in British and French zones.

For American commanders force protection is an overriding political consideration. They're not at liberty to put their troops at risk even if the pay-off in winning hearts and minds would be big.

After many years on the streets in Northern Ireland the British Army have a lot of experience of what is called, somewhat euphemistically, "aid to the civil power".

Liberator or conqueror?

They've learned that there's a fine balance between reassurance and coercion, and between force protection on the one hand and positive communication through human behaviour on the other.

Imperial powers

French doctrine for peace support operations, entitled maîtriser la violence or "mastery of violence", commends the subtle use of armed forces in striking this balance between reassurance and coercion.

It's probably relevant that both Britain and France are former imperial powers with long histories of policing their empires.

In Britain's case there may also be self-confidence born of a history of successful military operations since Suez.

There are differences in doctrine between the US services. The Marine Corps has made "small wars" one of its specialities claiming that it is the Nation's 911 (or emergency) Force.

It's been traditionally closer in doctrine to the British Army than the US Army, which prefers to use overwhelming force in a decisive way.

American tactical commanders have said on several occasions that they would operate more along British lines when working close to civilians if their political masters would allow them to be less risk averse.