Bio-terrorism

Anticipating the arrival of deadly diseases, either naturally-occurring or the more recent and sinister threat of bio-terrorism, is a pre-occupation of governments worldwide.

In Britain, for the first time in 60 years, the government is to re-engineer one of our most important early warning systems, with a radical shake up of the Public Health Laboratory Service.

It says the changes, due to take place on Tuesday, will strengthen our defences, but senior scientists fear the opposite will be the case.

This report is by Newsnight's science editor, Susan Watts.

SUSAN WATTS:
Last Sunday, Bank tube station was to have seen a full-scale rehearsal of a terrorist attack on the London Underground. It was called off as war began. Officials say emergency staff needed instead to be on full alert for a real terrorist attack.

The same "Be prepared" instincts drive government plans for issues nuclear, chemical and biological, merging authorities responsible for all three into a single centralised Health Protection Agency. At the very time ministers are telling us the threat of a terrorist attack is at its highest, scientists who'd be at the front line of any biological incident are telling us government plans for changes to Public Health Laboratories risk leaving the public more exposed, not better protected. The Public Health Laboratory Service was set up on the eve of World War II. In a nationwide network of nearly 50 laboratories, it has famously tracked the rise and fall of salmonella in eggs, HIV in the '80s and faces threats today such as the pneumonia- like virus spreading around the globe.

But when it becomes part of the Health Protection Agency, the system that achieved all this is to be re- organised. Critics say the effect will be a reduced response time, with tried and trusted communication networks between labs severed, and an overall decline in the quality of the scientific work.

DR MICHAEL WEINBREN:
Everybody's aware that the risk of bio-terrorism is at its greatest. You don't want to go through a process of change at present.

WATTS:
Michael Weinbren is a consultant microbiologist at the Coventry Public Health Laboratory. The government says under its changes, labs like this will be part of a new bigger network within the NHS system. He says this will be a poor substitute for the proven public health network that will be lost.

WEINBREN:
We're risking a great deal. Imagine the network is like a spider's web, if something lands up in the periphery, this information vibrates to the centre and once it gets there, the centre can start saying to the other areas, "Are you seeing the same thing? Please look for this", and immediately you start building up the picture. The management is instantaneous. It will not be the same in the future, as immediately you have to start going through layers of bureaucracy.

WATTS:
In 1978, Birmingham saw the world's last case of smallpox. The man who diagnosed it advises the government on bio-terror and trains public health staff to be prepared. Alasdair Geddes questions the need for changes and is uneasy about the timing.

Professor ALASDAIR GEDDES:
The timing is unfortunate, we are at risk of bio-terrorism and one of the best ways of detecting bio-terrorism is to have a network of laboratories working together, reporting centrally any unusual infection that might appear.

WATTS:
He says moving public health work into the NHS, where waiting lists and individual patients matter most, will mean a clash between two different sets of priorities.

GEDDES:
Presently, we have two networks, the hospital laboratory dealing with patients in hospital and the Public Health Laboratory function, dealing with infection in the community. The two have to work closely together, as infection in the community often starts in the hospital, often starts in the community or vice versa, but there is a danger of merging the two, resulting in the hospital taking pride of place and the public health aspects of infectious diseases are minimised.

WATTS:
It's not just bio-terrorism. The threat to the population from infectious disease is ever present, as the recent mystery virus from South East Asia has shown and it's that everyday threat, whether from a flu epidemic or a novel form of food poisoning, that senior figures are less confident they'll be able to combat under the new system.

In the mid 1980s, Keith Cartwright worked on one of Britain's worst meningitis outbreaks whilst at the Gloucester Public Health Lab and he went on to help develop Britain's routine childhood meningitis jabs. He's now one of only nine regional directors of the PHLS and a government advisor on vaccination. He's committed to making the changes work at this late hour, but has decided to go public on Newsnight because of his concerns.

Professor KEITH CARTWRIGHT:
For me the big issue is not so much the deliberate-release scenario or the bio-terrorism scenario, it's what's going to happen to routine day-to-day surveillance of diseases, the information that underpins vaccine policies, the work that was being carried out to try to reduce or control anti-microbial resistance and hospital acquired infection. It's disruption to those on- going processes I fear and we should try very hard to avoid.

WATTS:
So is he alone? Or do others within the service share his disquiet?

CARTWRIGHT:
Now, there isn't much buy-in by microbiologists. There's a sense of bafflement. Why was the PHLS network broken up? Will it be replaced with anything as good? How do we keep motivation going within those laboratories transferring from the PHLS network into the NHS? It really is quite an uncertain future into which we're entering.

WATTS:
That uncertainty stems as much from how the shake-up is being handled, as from the detail of the changes themselves. The transfer of the labs was first announced early last year and many feel that April 1st is an arbitrary deadline. The PHLS itself asked for more time, but the government has said no. Inside the service the view is that key players have been left out of the loop.

WEINBREN:
They have ignored what everybody has said. Not from just within this country but from every other country. When you write in to the department they either don't reply or when they do they dismiss your points. Nobody has listened.

WATTS:
Pat Troop, currently Deputy Chief Medical Officer, has masterminded the changes and will run the new agency. How does she respond to the charge that the whole process has been mishandled, and in a way that leaves us vulnerable to bio- terrorist attack

DR PAT TROOP:
I'm completely confident we won't be left more vulnerable. In fact, we will be better.

WATTS:
She says she's personally been involved in government preparations for a bio-terror attack and has convinced herself there are no weak links in the system.

TROOP:
We've built in a range of safeguards, we've created new facilities and new posts, all of which, right from the beginning, will start to bring about improvements rather than risk.

WATTS:
But there seems to be a level of dissatisfaction within the service and people are painting a picture of very demoralised staff. It's people within the service itself who are calling for more time to make these changes.

TROOP:
Those moving their managerial arrangements, are uncertain about what the future's going to hold, but I hope that as they see that as a laboratory, as a group of staff within that laboratory, they'll be working across a much bigger network of laboratories across that region, as they see the new pattern and the strengthened role of microbiologists, I hope then they'll start to feel confident and understand that the new model is going to be better, and then start to be more relaxed.

WATTS:
The new agency comes into being next Tuesday, and attempts to persuade critics inside the service will continue beyond that. But those on the outside will have to hope the government's right and that they're not sending a key part of our defences down the drain.

This transcript was produced from the teletext subtitles that are generated live for Newsnight. It has been checked against the programme as broadcast, however Newsnight can accept no responsibility for any factual inaccuracies. We will be happy to correct serious errors.