A regime that has something to hide

George Bush

With American resolve hardening and European opposition growing, the British prime minister finds himself in the middle of the debate about whether to take the war on terrorism to Iraq.

The Bush administration has done little to disguise its determination to see a regime change in Baghdad. In his State of the Union address, President Bush described Iraq as "a regime that has something to hide from the civilised world".

However, the transition from a war of words to possible military conflict against Iraq is likely to be a long, complex and controversial process.

Support

Diplomatically, the United States runs the risk of stark isolation. With an absence of evidence linking Iraq with al-Qaeda, it will be difficult for the US to rally support in Europe and among Gulf states.

Washington is very short on allies in the region and even Kuwait (a vital strategic ally for the Americans) is cautioning against military action.

The fragile international coalition that the US rallied in the weeks after September 11 is unlikely to survive a unilateral American offensive against Iraq.

However, a renewed attempt by the United Nations to get weapons inspectors back into Iraq could do much to garner international support.

If, as has happened before, UN weapons inspectors are met with Iraqi obfuscation, the US may find it easier to convince its allies of the need for military action.

The stance taken by Russia and France may prove decisive.

Sanctions

The US judges the ten-year old policy of containing Iraq redundant. Unpopular and ineffective sanctions have failed to dislodge Saddam Hussein while causing suffering for ordinary Iraqis.

Saddam Hussein has governed Iraq since 1979

Buoyed by its military operation in Afghanistan, the US may feel that only an overwhelming military campaign to destroy Saddam Hussein's rule can safeguard peace in the region.

A new (US-friendly) government in Baghdad could also have the advantage of allowing the United States to remove its troops from Saudi Arabia, defusing a significant cause of anti-Americanism in the region.

Yet many argue that a US-led military campaign against Iraq could turn into a desert-replay of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Firstly, it would be naïve to use the military strategy in Afghanistan as a template for success in Iraq. Even if the divided opposition groups could be combined, they would have about one-tenth the strength of the Iraqi armed forces.

The US would need to be prepared for a massive military undertaking. It has been widely estimated that the US force would need to total around 500,000 personnel.

Retaliation

Secondly, the campaign itself could open a Pandora's box of problems. For instance, a military campaign that cornered Saddam Hussein could greatly increase the risk of him using weapons of mass destruction.

If the aim of the mission was to remove him from power and install a new regime the Iraqi ruler may reason that he has nothing to lose. If he decided to use them against his neighbours then Israel would be particularly vulnerable.

There is also a big question mark over what would replace a post-Saddam Iraq. If the regime is changed, there is a high possibility that Iraq would dissolve into feuding ethnic territories.

This could de-stabilise neighbouring countries such as Turkey whose unity could be threatened by Kurdish independence. The US would also need to be prepared for a long-term military and financial commitment to a post-Saddam Iraq.

According to the Brookings Institute in Washington, it would require a multi-year military presence by tens of thousands of U.S. military forces.

This implies annual military costs of at least $10 billion. Neither the American public nor the Arab street would be happy with that scenario.

Mark Urban's report was shown on Thursday 4 April.